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Abstract 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyze the economic consequences of ethnic cleansing in 
the countries affected, with particular focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. As one of the key 
distinguishing characteristics of ethnic cleansing is mass displacement of people, it focuses its 
investigation on the impact of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital in the country 
affected. Using the framework of the analysis of brain drain developed for voluntary migration, the 
further analysis is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the negative consequences of 
ethnic cleansing for human capital through emigration of highly educated (brain drain), while the 
second part deals with positive reverse effects of such emigration (brain gain). This should 
eventually allow us to estimate the net effect of migration on the stock of human capital in the 
country affected by ethnic cleansing. 
The analysis of the brain drain caused by ethnic cleansing starts with the development of a 
theoretical model that explains the impact of ethnic cleansing on emigration of highly educated 
individuals. The model is based on the models of self-selection and amended by incorporating a 
―restoration‖ hypothesis, originally developed in this thesis. This model is then tested by two 
different empirical studies. In the first study, a household level data from Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
used in order to measure the impact of different factors affecting the household‘s decision to 
migrate. In the second empirical study, country level data were used to measure the difference in the 
magnitude of brain drain between countries with different histories of conflict.  
The second part of the thesis provides the empirical evidence on brain gain by using two 
different studies. In the first study, country level data were used to analyze the possibility of the 
―incentive effect‖ that increases the stock of human capital in the country as a result of migration. In 
the second study, household level data were used to analyze the effect of remittances inflows on the 
xi 
 
increase of human capital through increased educational investments by households receiving 
remittances. 
By providing evidence on both brain drain and brain gain effects, this thesis gives 
comprehensive insight into the impact of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital in a 
country. The main findings of these studies are that the negative effects are stronger, while positive 
effects are weaker compared to the voluntary migration. This suggests that the net effect of ethnic 
cleansing on human capital stock in a country is likely to be negative. In addition, the thesis offers a 
new theoretical model of ethnic cleansing which can also, with minor amendments, be used in the 
context of natural disasters induced and development induced displacement. 
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Preface 
 
Many conflicts in recent history, from Palestine to the Balkans, were characterized by mass 
forced displacement of people. Yet, there has not been any comprehensive analysis of the economic 
impact of such displacement on the countries affected. Also, the estimates of the overall costs of a 
particular conflict usually neglect the costs of emigration of people, despite the fact that human 
capital is considered as a key factor of economic growth by economists. In the analysis of the brain 
drain, migration theory to date has not distinguished between different types of migration based on 
the predominant motives for migration. However, the major migratory movements in history have 
been the result of forced displacement of people, based on race, religion or ethnicity. Once forced to 
move from their homes, these people have a particular incentive to migrate abroad. The events that 
cause the largest forced evictions of people from their homes are ethnic cleansing, natural disasters 
and some development projects. Expected climate change, as a consequence of global warming, 
will even increase the frequency of such events in the future. Consequently, this thesis analyzes the 
impact of ethnic cleansing, as a type of conflict that is characterized by mass displacement of 
people, in the framework of migration theory, by analyzing the impact of such displacement on the 
magnitude of emigration of highly educated people and the impact of such emigration on the stock 
of human capital in a country. This way the thesis contributes to both the theory of the cost of wars 
and the migration theory. It does so by emphasizing additional negative impact of conflicts through 
the emigration of highly educated people and analyzing migration theories of the brain drain in the 
specific context of forced migration. 
The work on the thesis begins with identifying the distinguishing features of conflicts 
characterized by ethnic cleansing. All conflicts generally share the same features in terms of their 
economic consequences such as destruction of physical capital, decrease in economic activity, loss 
of direct investments, loss of income from tourism and many other identified in the costs of war 
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literature. Yet, the key distinguishing feature of conflicts characterized by ethnic cleansing is large 
displacement of people that causes depletion of human capital through emigration of highly 
educated people. Consequently, further work was focused on the analysis of the magnitude of 
depletion of human capital as a result of displacement of population. 
In order to better understand the process of ethnic cleansing and its impact on the emigration 
of highly educated people, a number of interviews with people who experienced forced 
displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina were conducted. Bosnia-Herzegovina was chosen for research 
as one of the most severe examples of ethnic cleansing in recent history. The interviews provided 
additional insight, besides my personal experience, into the process of ethnic cleansing. This was 
used for the development of the theoretical model of forced displacement. Based on the findings 
from the interviews, the model of forced migration was developed where emigration is seen as a 
second step, or consequence, of ethnic cleansing, whereas the first step is forced eviction. This 
allows us to analyze the impact of forced displacement on the depletion of human capital through 
emigration of the highly educated, by incorporating specific features of the ethnic cleansing into the 
model. The model was empirically tested by using household level data from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The results of the model have measured the extent to which different factors influence an 
individual‘s decision to migrate, once they were forcibly evicted from their homes. 
The empirical study used both the data from the World Bank‘s Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS), as well as a small scale survey conducted by the author of the thesis. 
As the LSMS survey was conducted among people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the 
survey, thus covering only non-displaced and internally displaced people, an additional survey was 
necessary in order to collect data about refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in other countries. The 
completion of that survey was financially supported by the WIIW, through their GDN grant. 
Moreover, they organized two workshops and financially supported the author‘s participation at the 
GDN 2009 conference, which gave him the opportunity to discuss preliminary results and receive 
xiv 
 
invaluable comments and suggestions that greatly contributed to further improvements of this work. 
Additionally, the theoretical model was presented at the GDN conference in Kuwait in 2009 and the 
empirical results were presented at the conference organized by the University of Leeds in 2010.  
As the literature review shows, besides measuring negative consequences of brain drain, the 
possible positive feedback effects of such migration should not be disregarded. In order to get a 
comprehensive and unbiased analysis of the economic consequences of ethnic cleansing, the second 
stage of the thesis was devoted to the measurement of possible positive effects of emigration of 
highly educated people on human capital accumulation in the home country of migrants. This 
analysis was completed by two different empirical studies. In the first study, country level data were 
analyzed in order to reveal the impact of emigration on human capital accumulation in the country.  
In the second study, two different household level datasets were used to analyze the impact 
of remittance receipt by households on their education investment decisions. The first dataset used 
was again the LSMS dataset, which was also used in the micro level study of the determinants of 
brain drain. The second dataset used here was the dataset collected by the survey organized by the 
author and financially supported by an Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office (ASO) grant.
1
 
Besides work on the four different studies completed as part of this thesis, several other 
research projects were completed, increasing the author‘s knowledge of the topic, improving his 
research skills and experience and giving him the opportunity to discuss various issues related to the 
topic of the thesis with a large number of researchers and practitioners. All these were extremely 
helpful in the work on the thesis. First, the study on the relationship between remittances and social 
transfers and the possibility of the ―crowding-out‖ effect was completed, which revealed that the 
predominant motive for remittances to Bosnia-Herzegovina is altruism. Also, the study on the 
impact of migration and remittances on poverty and inequality in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
completed. The experience of this study was applied in the case of the study on the impact of 
                                                 
1
 ASO also financially supported the organization of a dissemination workshop, where the author received comments on 
the first results that contributed to further improvement of this study 
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remittances on education completed in this thesis, by creating an individual level variable for 
households‘ expenditures on education, by decomposing total household‘s expenditures on all 
children into expenditures per each child. The variable was created in a similar manner as a variable 
for individual expenditures is usually created in poverty studies, by using equivalence scales. Also, 
this provided a solution for the appropriate specification of the model in order to capture the impact 
of remittances, by dividing the effect between different consumption quintiles. Additionally, the 
study on the impact of forced displacement on the development of urban poverty was completed.  
After detailed discussion of each section of the thesis separately and deep critical 
investigation of the empirical results from four different studies comprised in the thesis with the 
thesis supervisors, as well as collection of feedbacks from a wide audience of theorists and 
practitioners in this field through a series of workshops and conferences, there is a sufficient level 
of confidence at the moment that the thesis can finally be offered for the most important review, the 
one by the internal and external examiners. Acknowledging that there are many opportunities for 
improvement that will hopefully be used in the author‘s future career, we can only wish this thesis 
to be used by policy decisions makers and by other researcher in this field with the intention of 
improving our understanding of ethnic cleansing, their consequences and possible solutions for 
preventing and minimizing the negative impact of these events in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
Many conflicts in history, from ancient times to Palestine and recent wars in the Balkans, were 
characterized by mass forced displacement of people. ―Population removal and transfer have 
occurred in history more often than is generally acknowledged … Moreover, despite greater 
international attention and condemnation, such campaigns have only intensified in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries‖ (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110). Notwithstanding, there has not been 
any comprehensive analysis of economic impact of such displacement on countries affected. 
Economic analysis of the costs of conflicts, as described in a review of these studies by Lindgren 
(2005), have mainly focused on the direct costs of conflicts, such as reduction of production 
capacities and infrastructure, deaths and injuries of the workforce, as well as some indirect costs 
such as reduction in production, decrease in investments, capital flight, decrease in exports and 
imports and reduced income from tourism (Lindgren, 2005: 5). Other indirect costs, such as 
depletion of human capital as a result of emigration of the highly educated are usually neglected in 
the estimates of the overall costs of a particular conflict, despite the fact that the human capital is 
considered as a key factor of economic growth. 
Alternatively, in the analysis of the brain drain, migration theory so far does not distinguish 
between different types of migration based on the predominant motives for migration. Yet, major 
migratory movements in history were a result of forced displacement of people, based on race, 
religion or ethnicity. Once forced to leave homes, these people are in a position to have particular 
incentive to migrate abroad. The events that cause the largest forced evictions of people from their 
properties are ethnic cleansing, natural disasters and some development projects. Expected climate 
change will even increase the frequency of such events in the future. Consequently, this thesis 
analyzes the impact of ethnic cleansing, as a type of conflict that is characterized by mass 
displacement of people, in the framework of migration theory, by assessing the impact of such 
3 
 
displacement on the magnitude of emigration of highly educated people and the impact of such 
emigration on the stock of human capital in a country. This way the thesis gives its contribution to 
both the theory of costs of wars and migration theory. It does so by emphasizing additional negative 
impact of conflicts through the emigration of highly educated people and analyzing migration 
theories of the brain drain in the specific context of forced migration. 
There is no an agreed definition in the literature for the migration from countries affected by 
events such as ethnic conflict or natural disaster, which produce mass displacement of people. This 
chapter will initially set the stage for the analysis of the impact of these events on the formation of 
human capital by defining this type of migration and explaining its distinguishing features. This 
clarification of terms and definitions can be considered as a first original contribution of this thesis. 
The second part of the chapter presents the possible negative effects and positive feedback effects, 
on human capital of such events. This approach is used as an introduction to and the justification for 
the structure of the thesis, described in the final part of this chapter and all the empirical work to be 
undertaken. The original contribution of the theoretical model developed as well as of the empirical 
work undertaken in this thesis is explained in each section and emphasized in a separate section of 
Chapter 6. 
 
1.1. Forced migration and population transfer 
 
 Events that cause mass displacement of people, such as conflicts or natural disasters, are not 
new (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 111), but are gaining on importance due to the increased frequency of 
occurrence of migrant inflows resulting from such events around the globe.
2
 Consequently, the 
                                                 
2
 UNHCR reports around 19.2 million people of concern to the UNHCR in 2005 (UNHCR, 2006). These people are 
mainly displaced due to the conflicts or natural disasters. Natural disasters in particular are requiring attention as it is 
expected that the climate change will be the leading factor influencing migration in the near future. For example, Myers 
(2005) estimated that about 200 million people will have to be displaced from their current places of living by 2050. 
(This is most widely cited estimate. But other authors go even to up to 1 billion in their estimates of the number of 
displaced people as a consequence of climate change by 2050.) 
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migration literature starts devoting attention to this type of migration. However, so far the migration 
as a result of large scale displacement of people has not been properly defined in the migration 
literature. The term ―forced migration‖ is quite loosely used by migration literature, media, 
politicians and other sources and it is used to describe any migration that is not completely 
voluntary and that involves factors other than economic in the migration decision. Different terms 
are used to distinguish between different types of forced migration based on the factors influencing 
forced migration. Moreover, the terms such as conflict-induced, natural disasters-induced and 
development-induced migration have been used. However, none of these terms is entirely 
appropriate when describing forced mass displacement of people as a result of events such as ethnic 
cleansing or natural disasters. Different authors (for example, van Hear, 1998; Turton, 2003), when 
discussing different definitions of types of forced migration, have not taken into account two other 
important distinguishing features of forced migration, namely the magnitude of migration
3
 and the 
influence of ―no choice‖ displacement4 on subsequent migration. According to Stark (2004a: 325): 
 
―Refugee flows differ from standard migration (henceforth migration) in two important 
respects: the flow of refugees is typically a group movement – a large number of people move 
simultaneously – as opposed to a sequenced movement of individuals; and refugee flows are 
overwhelmingly from distinctly poor economies‖.  
 
Continuous migration flows (either voluntary or forced) are primarily a result of factors 
influencing an individual‘s (or a household‘s) decision to change their place of living. So, if the 
term ―conflict-induced migration‖ for ethnic conflicts is used, it would not completely represent this 
                                                 
3
 ―It is clear that refugee flows can deprive countries of a significant proportion of their population. Thus an estimated 
one in seven Afghans, one in ten Bosnians, one in eleven Eritreans and one in thirteen Burundians currently lived 
outside their country as refugees in 2001-2002.‖ (Koser and Van Hear, 2002, p.2) 
4
 Leckie (1994) used the term ―forced evictions‖ to describe displacement of people where they were not given any 
options to stay,  thus their displacement was not results of decision making process based on the evaluation of push and 
pull factors. This term will be applied in this thesis as well. 
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type of migration, as it encompasses not only ethnic cleansing, but also other types of conflict-
induced migration which is not necessarily large in magnitude and characterized by forced 
evictions.  
Accordingly, as the two key features of displacement are the focus of this thesis, the most 
appropriate term that will be used to describe this type of displacement is ―population transfer‖.5  
Population transfer can be defined as a forced mass displacement of individuals based on their 
ethnic origin or place of living, which includes ethnic cleansing, forcible removal of indigenous 
tribes, man-made disasters and natural disasters induced migration. However, mass migration can 
be voluntary as well, so this definition of population transfer is applied in this thesis when it refers 
specifically to the forced mass displacement of people. Within this broader type of mass forced 
migration, several sub-types of migration are distinguishable, such as ethnic cleansing, natural 
disasters-induced displacement and development-induced displacement. As this thesis aims to 
provide a contribution to both the theory of economic costs of conflict and the theory of forced 
migration, its focus is on the ethnic cleansing. However, as all the above mentioned types of forced 
migration (ethnic cleansing, natural disasters-induced displacement and development-induced 
displacement) share certain common characteristics, such as mass displacement, forced evictions 
and non-random targeting of migrants, the findings from this thesis may be also used for further 
analysis of other types of forced migration. 
 
1.2. Ethnic cleansing 
 
The origin and the exact meaning of the term ―ethnic cleansing‖ are not completely clear. Yet, 
they are strongly associated with the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, particularly with Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Although the term ―ethnic cleansing‖ was used by mass media in Serbia during 1980s 
                                                 
5
 Still, some authors use this term as a synonym for forced migration. 
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to describe activities, mainly non-violent, pursued by Kosovo Albanian towards Serb minority in 
Kosovo, its wide use and the current meaning was developed during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Petrovic, 1994: 343), in order to describe violent mass removal of population and other activities 
pursued by Serbforces (from Serbia and Serb minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina) against Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Croats. Later, the term was also used to describe violent activities by Serb forces in 
Croatia and Kosovo.  
As described in the report by the UN Commission of Experts (1994: 33) ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been carried out by means of activities such as mass murders, torture, rape, 
forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks on 
civilians, and destruction of property.  The report also emphasized that ―… the manner in which 
these acts were carried out, the length of time over which they took place and the areas in which 
they occurred combine to reveal a purpose, systematicity and some planning and coordination from 
higher authorities‖ (UN Commission of Experts, 1994: 35). This led the Commission to conclude 
that ethnic cleansing is ―a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by 
violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from 
certain geographic areas‖ (UN Commission of Experts, 1994: 33).   
In the same report, the Commission provided their definition of the ethnic cleansing. 
According to their view, ethnic cleansing ―means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using 
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area‖ (Commission of Experts, 
1993: 33).  Later, other authors provided their definitions of ethnic cleansing. Today, the term is 
usually described as ―the expulsion of an ‗undesirable‘ population from a given territory due to 
religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination 
of these‖ (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110).  
Many authors (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Blum et al. 2007) highlight that the characteristics of the 
ethnic cleansing are actually such that it is closer to genocide. ―At one end it is virtually 
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indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange while at the other it merges with 
deportation and genocide‖ (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110). Indeed, the term was promoted by the armed 
forced of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the genocide conducted against non-Serb 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina during its aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period 1992-
1995. The term was soon widely accepted by the politicians in Western Europe and United States in 
order to help them justify their non-involvement policy.  
Although the term ―ethnic cleansing‖ is relatively new, the events that according to the current 
definition can be described by this term go back to the ancient times. In a most comprehensive 
historical overview of ethnic cleaning, Bell-Fialkoff (1993: 111), reported that as the first example 
of ethnic cleansing can be considered forced deportation of people carried out by Assyrian ruler 
Tiglath-Pileser III in the eight century BC. Other authors (Mann, 2004; Blum et al. 2007) provided 
overviews of the twentieth century events that can fall into the category of ethnic cleansing. 
According to these overviews, the history of ethnic cleansing started with violent removal of 
Armenian population from the Turkish Empire in 1915, and continued with activities during and 
after the World War II, including the Holocaust as well as expulsion of German population from 
many countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, or expulsion of Arab population during the 
creation of the state of Israel. At the end of the twentieth century, the events that can be described 
by the term ―ethnic cleansing‖ occurred in Rwanda and countries of ex-Yugloslavia. 
This type of displacement is described as a mass forced displacement of people that targets 
individuals with certain characteristics from an affected area non-randomly. Although the causes of 
such displacement are similar to the ones of conflict-induced displacement, they are not the same. 
Ethnic cleansing can take place even if there is no conflict as such (for example, displacement of 
Tibetans and Uyghurs in China, Softestad 1990: 2).  Moreover, in the case of conflict-induced 
displacement, individuals are taking into consideration increased risk due to the conflict and making 
decision whether to migrate or not. However, in the case of ethnic cleansing, individuals are forced 
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to migrate and are not given any option to stay at their place of living. As a result, it is more 
appropriate to place ethnic cleansing within population transfer, defined in this thesis as a broader 
type of migration, rather than within conflict-induced migration. 
The main distinguishing features of this type of migration are that it selects individuals within a 
country non-randomly, on the basis of their ethnic origin and that the first move of these migrants 
from their homes is usually not associated with any migration decision making process. This is 
another reason why current migration theories cannot fully explain this process. The first move, the 
forced eviction, usually takes place within a country. Only after these individuals have been 
displaced, they are in a position to decide whether to remain within a country as internally 
displaced, or to move abroad. The analysis of the ethnic cleansing-induced migration as a two-stage 
process, consisting of forced eviction as a first stage and migration as a second, is an original 
approach of this thesis. On the basis of this distinction, an original theoretical model of ethnic 
cleansing is developed in this thesis. 
The term ―forced eviction‖, as defined in Leckie (1994: 131), involves ―coercive forcing of 
people from their homes and communities against their will and nearly always without their free 
and informed consent‖. Thus, the term ―forced eviction‖ is being used in this thesis in order to 
distinguish the ―no choice‖ type of displacement6 from other types of forced migration which, 
although involving risk factors that force individuals to leave their homes, still might give certain 
degree of freedom to individuals to choose whether to stay or leave (Oruc, 2009). In the second 
stage, those who were forcibly evicted face a decision whether to remain within a country or to 
migrate abroad. The magnitude of international migration and skill composition of these migrants 
will determine the extent of the negative impact of population transfer on the stock of human capital 
in a country. 
                                                 
6
 Not only ethnic cleansing is characterized by the ―no choice‖ forced eviction, but also man-made disasters and natural 
disasters induced migration. For this reason, it is believed that the theory and evidence provided in this thesis is partially 
applicable in the case of these types of population transfer as well. 
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According to Finkelstein (2003), before World War Two, the transfer of population was seen 
as a necessary means to end ethnic conflict. However, after the holocaust, as well as the expulsion 
of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe after the war, these activities were considered as 
crimes against humanity.
7
 Ethnic cleansing during the wars in Balkans in 1990s was a war strategy 
to artificially create a territory with a majority of the population of a warring party‘s ethnic group 
by mass forced resettlement of population of all other ethnic groups (Oruc, 2009). Charges by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against the Bosnian Serbs ethnic 
group‘s political and military leaders include in many cases ethnic cleansing as one of the crimes 
they committed. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly extensive, as the majority 
of municipalities was ―cleansed‖ (meaning that all individuals of other ethnic groups were forced to 
flee their homes), which caused displacement of about 50% of total population of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Half of the displaced, or about 1.2 million people, then decided to emigrate abroad 
(Ibreljic et al., 2006). For this reason, Bosnia-Herzegovina was chosen as an appropriate country 
where the largest part of the household level empirical evidence for the thesis will be collected 
from. 
Although the main aim of ethnic cleansing is ―to eliminate a population from the "homeland" 
in order to create a more secure, ethnically homogeneous state‖ (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110), which 
does not necessarily imply their removal across the state‘s international borders,8 mass 
displacement of people from their homes usually causes significant emigration to other countries. 
Some of these emigrants are highly educated, which increases brain drain from the country. There 
have already been a few studies analysing the determinants of emigration of people as a result of 
mass displacement (Melander and Oberg, 2004; Moore and Shellman, 2007) but there has not been 
                                                 
7
 In the Article 6 of the Nuremberg Trial's Charter of the International Military Tribunal, crimes against humanity are 
defined as ―murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated‖ (taken from Nizic, 1993: 394). 
8
 This can be seen from the figures in the previous paragraph, which show that only a half of the displaced people 
emigrated abroad, while other half remained with the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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any studies to date that have analysed this phenomenon by taking into account skill composition of 
emigrants and thus providing evidence on the magnitude of brain drain as a consequence of ethnic 
cleansing. 
 
1.3. Brain drain in the context of ethnic cleansing 
 
Countries suffering serious destruction of physical capital as a result of conflicts and natural 
disasters tend to face slower pace of development and a widening gap with developed countries. 
Lindgren (2005) has pointed out that conflicts may be considered as major sources of poverty and 
underdevelopment and incur significant losses to a country‘s current economic activity, as well as a 
decline in the capital stock which affect the subsequent economic growth of that country. Direct 
costs of conflict include destruction of physical capital, deaths, serious injuries of the workforce and 
higher military expenditures. Also, there are indirect costs of a conflict which need to be accounted 
for, such as increased economic uncertainty, capital flight, decrease in exports, lost foreign direct 
investments and revenue from tourism, higher inflation and emigration of highly educated 
individuals. The emigration of highly educated has a particularly detrimental effect on subsequent 
economic growth in situations such as conflicts or natural disasters, as it is usually combined with 
the destruction of physical capital. 
The importance of highly educated individuals for economic growth of developing countries 
and the detrimental impact that emigration of the highly educated may have on a country‘s potential 
growth has become very topical after the introduction of the endogenous growth theories, which 
emphasize the impact of human capital on the economic growth of a country. Koser and Van Hear 
(2002: 1) have pointed out that, in contrast to voluntary emigration, ―there has been little serious 
thought about the implications for countries of origin of involuntary migration‖ and as the main 
reason for it stressed the lack of data. Fortunately, a recent project conducted by the World Bank 
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(Docquier and Marfouk, 2004) where a large data set on brain drain from more than 190 countries 
has been collected, gives an opportunity to fill this gap by providing data on the emigration rates 
from these countries disaggregated by skill composition of migrants. This dataset will be used for 
two different empirical studies in this thesis. First, in Chapter 3, for the analysis of the determinants 
of brain drain from countries that experienced conflict and second in Chapter 4, for the analysis of 
consequences of such a brain drain for human capital formation in a country. 
The term ―brain drain‖ was coined in 1950s by the British Royal Society to describe 
emigration of scientists from the United Kingdom and other countries of Europe to the United 
States. The term remains in use to refer to emigration of highly educated individuals from 
developing to developed countries. Difference remains over the definition of the term ―highly 
skilled‖. Some analysis uses this term to refer to emigration of individuals with skills, both 
observable and unobservable, which are higher than average skills in a home
9
 country. Empirically, 
this may cause the problem, particularly if the analysis is based on a home country and potential 
migrants. Although higher skills may be identified through their results at the destination, it may be 
extremely difficult in case of potential migrants. For this reason, most researcher use this term to 
describe emigration of individuals with tertiary education level, as such data on emigrants is much 
easier to collect. Accordingly, the term ―highly skilled‖ and ―highly educated‖ in this thesis will be 
used as synonyms and will refer to the individuals with tertiary education. 
The brain drain represents a decrease in the stock of human capital and a decrease in fiscal 
contributions to a country‘s budget. However, it may also have various positive effects for a home 
country. First, educated migrants send remittances back home, which contributes to human capital 
formation through their positive impact on households‘ income and subsequently on their education 
investments. In particular, diaspora has a range of other positive effects on a country‘s economic 
                                                 
9 
There are different alterative terminologies for distinguishing between countries of individual‘s emigration and 
immigration, such as ―home‖ and ―host‖, ―source‖ and ―destination‖, etc. In this thesis, terms ―home‖ and ―host‖ are 
adopted to distinguish between countries, because return migration will be discussed here and it is expected to make 
distinction more clear as, for example, return migration is migration from ―host‖ to ―home‖ countries. 
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development through facilitation of trade, FDI, tourism and other relations between their home and 
host countries. Also, return migration represents an important channel of transfer of financial and 
human capital, cultural and other assets from host to home country. This thesis is primarily 
interested in the effects of emigration of highly educated individuals on human capital formation in 
a home country and focuses on three channels which directly affect human capital formation, 
namely, (1) the impact of remittances on educational attainment in a home country; (2) the impact 
of migration prospects on investments in education; (3) the impact of the return of highly educated 
individuals (―brain circulation‖) on the stock of human capital. These positive effects on the stock 
of human capital in a home country are known collectively as ―brain gain‖.  
Although the process of migration resulting from ethnic cleansing differs from the voluntary 
migration, as explained later in the description of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, there 
is no clear argument why different positive feedback effects of such migration should be expected.
10
 
Only, the magnitude of such effects might be different for ethnic cleansing. This is purely an 
empirical question and requires comprehensive analysis of the migration data in order to identify 
these differences. To the best of author‘s knowledge, there were no previous empirical studies that 
collected the data specific for ethnic cleansing and compared them with the data for voluntary 
migration, in order to provide empirical evidence of possible differences in the magnitude of these 
effects. Hence, this thesis can be considered as a first study contributing to the analysis of this 
phenomenon. The data collected will be both household level data, which will be collected from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (as one of the most striking examples of ethnic cleansing) and country level 
data, which will distinguish between countries with different conflict history.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 For example, there is no clear reason why remittances sent by forced migrants, ceteris paribus, would have different 
impact on educational attainment than remittances sent by voluntary migrants. But, the total amount of remittances 
inflows can differ, as forced migration is usually larger in magnitude than voluntary migration. 
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1.4. Aims of the thesis 
 
This thesis aims to provide an original contribution to the economic analysis of ethnic 
cleansing and its impact on the development of home countries. There are many possible channels 
through which population transfer can affect economic development of a country. However, 
encompassing all of them is beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence, there is a focus on only one, 
namely the impact on the stock of human capital. The choice of this channel is driven by the three 
features. First, there is the increasing prevalence of the endogenous growth theories, which stress 
the importance of human capital for the economic growth of a country. Second, there is the notion 
that the depletion of human capital stock in a country affected by conflict or natural disasters is 
mainly neglected in measuring costs of these events (Lindgren, 2005). Finally, the analysis of ethnic 
cleansing has been recognized by the terms of this thesis as a gap in the current migration literature, 
which is generally focused on individual, regular migration. There has not previously been an 
attempt to develop a theoretical model that explains the process of migration of a non-random group 
affected by population transfer and to provide evidence on the economic consequences of such 
events for home countries. As the proportion of forced migrants in the total world population of 
migrants is increasing and as the expected global environmental changes predict that population 
transfer will be the most important type of migration in the future, it is timely to provide a 
contribution to the theory of migration and fill the gap identified. This thesis is an attempt to redress 
the balance in a systemic way. 
The extent to which the ethnic conflict will reduce human capital stock in a country through the 
brain drain will depend on the mechanism determining the skill composition of emigrants. The 
―self-selection‖ mechanism of migration was developed and explained by Stark and Taylor (1991). 
The mechanism explains the interaction of factors shaping migration decision and response of 
individuals with different skills to these factors, which affects the skill distribution of migrants. If 
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the outcome of interaction of these factors is that more emigrants are highly than low skilled, then it 
is noted that self-selection is positive, otherwise it is negative. As explained previously, ethnic 
cleansing involves different migration decision making process and different factors affecting such 
decision. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to develop a model to explain the self-selection 
mechanism in the context of ethnic cleansing, using Bosnia-Herzegovina as prime example. 
There are several reasons that call for a separate analysis of the self-selection of forced 
emigrants. First, there is a risk factor introduced in the migration decision. Individuals with 
different personal characteristics may have different attitudes to risk, thus making different 
migration decisions. Second, individuals with different levels of education may have different levels 
of economic motivation for migration in the new context brought by the ethnic cleansing. For 
example, the opportunity costs of remaining in a country where the economy is negatively affected 
by events causing ethnic cleansing should be higher for highly skilled individuals. Third, factors 
that cause non-randomness in selection of individuals into forced displacement may be also related 
to skills of individuals. As reported by many witnesses of these events and according to the 
evidence collected in Gratz (2007), individuals with tertiary education were under attacks at the 
dawn of conflict. This outcome is due to their political activities to some extent, but also as a goal 
of the conflict, to inflict more severe damages on the other side in the conflict.
11
 All this motivates 
development of a separate self-selection model of forced migrants, as well as empirical analysis of 
displacement due to the ethnic cleansing. The specific factors that may influence displacement 
decisions by individuals from conflict areas may affect skill composition of migrants, or the 
magnitude of ―brain drain‖, which subsequently influences the sign of net effects of this migration.  
 
 
  
                                                 
11
 In the recent literature, such activity during ethnic cleansing is termed ―elitocide‖ (Gratz, 2007). 
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
 This thesis aims to provide empirical evidence on the both negative and positive 
consequences of ethnic cleansing, in order to gain an insight into the possible net effect of such 
displacement on human capital formation in a home country. Hence, the empirical work in this 
thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, the negative impact of ethnic cleansing is analysed 
by testing the model of self-selection of migrants from a country affected by ethnic cleansing, i.e. 
estimating the magnitude of brain drain. In the second part, positive impact will be analysed by 
testing models of positive feedback effects of brain drain on human capital formation, through the 
incentive effect and receipt of remittances.  
 In detail, the first part of the study starts with an original model of ethnic cleansing 
developed in this thesis. This model should help the understanding of the process and factors that 
influence the magnitude of brain drain from countries that experienced ethnic cleansing. Then, this 
first part of the study provides empirical evidence of the extent of the brain drain and consists of 
two studies. Initially, this is a micro-level study of determinants of emigration from conflict areas, 
which aims at the identification of possible self-selection mechanism of this type of emigration. The 
empirical model of the determinants of migration as a result of ethnic cleansing is based on the 
previously developed theoretical model. A subsequent study is a macro-level study that estimates 
possible differences in migration rates and test possible differences in the strength of the self-
selection mechanism between countries with different conflict history. Improved understanding of 
the process of ethnic cleansing and factors that influence the magnitude of the brain drain as a 
consequence of a conflict should be useful for estimating potential beneficial effect of this 
movement of individuals with tertiary education on a home country‘s economy. Beine et al. (2006a) 
report the evidence of different impact of ―brain drain‖ for a home country depending on its 
magnitude. They argue that certain conditions, such as low level of brain drain and high level of 
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human capital stock should be met in a country in order to expect net positive effects of ―brain 
drain‖. Therefore, prior to the analysis of economic consequences of ethnic cleansing, the 
characteristics of the process that influence proportions of highly educated individuals in a 
population of forced emigrants should be explained. This would contribute to further analysis of 
consequences of conflict-induced migration and the sign of conflict-induced brain drain, depending 
on its magnitude from countries experiencing a conflict. Both these studies are the first empirical 
contributions to the theoretical model of ethnic cleansing and to the analysis of the determinants of 
brain drain resulting from ethnic cleansing. 
The second part of the thesis involves two empirical studies that are conducted in order to 
provide evidence on the positive effects of ethnic cleansing on human capital formation in a home 
country. There are three main channels through which ethnic cleansing can influence human capital 
formation: the ―incentive effect‖ of migration, where emigration induces increased investments in 
education, which increases the prospects for migration; effect of remittances on the relaxation of 
liquidity constraint for educational investments by remittance receiving household and the impact of 
return migration of highly educated on the stock of human capital. In this thesis, only two of these 
channels are empirically tested because the empirical analysis of the impact of return migration is 
challenging, primarily because of difficulties in collecting the relevant data. One of the two 
empirical studies in the second part of the thesis is a cross-country study on the impact of the 
migration prospects on tertiary education enrolment, based on the incentive effect hypothesis 
developed by Beine et al. (2001). Although it follows the Beine et al. (2001) approach to a large 
extent, its originality is in the fact that it includes a dummy variable for countries which 
experienced conflict. The empirical evidence on the incentive effect in countries experiencing 
conflict is the first known evidence of this type. The other empirical study is a household level 
study of the impact of the receipt of remittances on education investments by a household, based on 
the idea that remittances are expected to relax liquidity constraint households face, thus increasing 
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their investments in the education of their children. Also, this empirical study relies largely on 
previous work on this topic by other authors, but it collects evidence from a country that 
experienced ethnic cleansing, compares two different datasets (one collected by the World Bank 
and another collected by the author of this thesis) and uses innovative econometric technique in 
estimating the relationship between remittances and educational attainment. 
The next chapter presents a review of the relevant literature since this thesis is primarily 
concerned with bridging the gap in the literature on brain drain and the literature on the 
consequences of conflicts. This includes a detailed review of literature on both conflicts and 
migration, while migration literature includes both voluntary and forced migration literature, as well 
as both literature on determinants and literature on consequences of migration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
 
Introduction 
2.1. Determinants of migration 
2.2. Brain drain - determinants 
2.3. Brain drain – consequences 
 2.3.1. Incentive effect: Brain drain or brain gain 
 2.3.2. Remittances and educational attainment 
 2.3.3. Return migration 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
Introduction 
 
A distinctive strand of economics literature on ethnic cleansing does not exist and for the 
purpose of this thesis, the theoretical discussions and empirical work will largely rely on the 
literature on voluntary migration. However, the specific characteristics of the ethnic cleansing shall 
be acknowledged and the theories of voluntary migration will be used to the extent to which they 
can be applied in the cases of ethnic cleansing.  
Historically, the migration literature has been developed from the analysis of determinants 
of migration to determinants of emigration of highly educated and from the analysis of 
consequences of immigration to the analysis of consequences of emigration. Initial migration 
literature has recognized the importance of movement of human capital, where its impact on host 
countries has always seen as positive, while for home countries as negative. The negative impact 
has been mainly limited to fiscal effects of emigration of educated individuals from countries where 
education was highly subsidized. These considerations resulted in the policy proposals such as 
taxing educated immigrants and sending the money back to their home countries (known as 
―Bhagwati tax‖). Several studies (Grubel and Scott, 1966; Berry and Soligo, 1969) also discussed 
welfare implications for a sending country‘s remaining population of emigration of highly educated 
individuals. 
Along with the development of endogenous growth models (Lucas, 1998; Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil, 1992), which extend Solow's (1956) model of economic growth with accumulation of 
human capital, migration literature has tended to focus on the emigration of highly educated and its 
impact on the stock of human capital in a sending country, as a key factor of economic growth of 
these countries. Emigration of the highly educated individuals, as those who possess above average 
level of human capital, clearly represents the depletion of human capital stock in a sending country 
and negatively affects its potential for economic growth. Conversely, the new economic theories of 
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brain drain, which emerged in the last years of the previous century, argue that this emigration of 
highly educated, at the end, do not necessarily always results in the depletion of human capital stock 
in a home country, as the brain drain might induce increased human capital accumulation in that 
country. 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide a critical assessment of different theories 
of migration, particularly the models which attempt to explain determinants or consequences of 
brain drain, in the light of their usefulness in the analysis of ethnic cleansing and its impact on 
human capital formation in a home country. This means that, in the case of determinants of brain 
drain, the focus of this review is on theories that explain skill composition of migrants, whereas for 
the consequences of brain drain the main interest is in theories that explain its impact on human 
capital formation in a home country. Most of the contents of this chapter present a critical review of 
the literature on migration, dividing it into two sections. In the next section, the review of literature 
on determinants of migration and brain drain is presented, with particular reference to models of 
self-selection and empirical evidence from countries that experienced ethnic cleansing. In the 
second section, the literature on the consequences of brain drain is reviewed, with focus on three 
channels of the impact of brain drain on human capital formation in a sending country. For each of 
these three channels, namely the incentive effect, remittances effect and return migration effect, a 
separate critical review of the literature and main models is presented and evaluated for the purpose 
of study of consequences of ethnic cleansing for human capital formation in a home county, along 
with a review of previous empirical evidence on the impact of these three channels. 
 
2.1. Determinants of migration 
 
Theories of voluntary migration are usually divided into two broad groups (Massey et al., 
1993; and Schoorl, 1995). Firstly, the theories which attempt to explain the initiation of migration 
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and secondly theories which attempt to explain the continuation of migration. In the first group, 
four different types of theories are distinguished: Neoclassical theory; bifurcated labour theory; 
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory; and World Systems theory. According to the 
first theory, the Neoclassical economic theory, the main motive for migration is wage difference 
between regions or countries. The migration decision is made by an individual, thus the total 
migration flows are simply the sum of individual income maximization decisions. The seminal 
model that analysed rural-urban migration has been developed by Todaro in 1969, extending and 
formalizing ideas from various authors that followed Lewis (1954). Todaro‘s model assumes that 
the main determinant of the decision of rural worker to migrate is expected wage differential. 
Although this theory is intuitively logical and supported by the evidence of migration flows from 
developing to developed countries, it falls short of explaining all migration flows. In particular, it 
does not have such usefulness in empirical analysis of determinants of forced migration as it does 
not account for possibility of other factors influencing migration besides wage differentials. 
There have been several attempts to extend this model by redesigning the wage differential 
incentive. For example, the relative deprivation model by Stark and Taylor (1989) argues that not 
only absolute wage differentials, but also the relative position of an individual (or household) in the 
community in terms of income affects migration decisions in a sense that individuals who are 
―relatively deprived‖ (have income which is low relative to the average local community income) 
have a stronger incentive to migrate. This extension is useful for the analysis of the ethnic 
cleansing, as the key idea behind the model of ethnic cleansing, which will be presented in the next 
chapter, is that the change in both absolute and relative income of individual, resulting from ethnic 
cleansing, can be considered as one of the key factors explaining emigration decision of individuals 
displaced by a ethnic cleansing. As this theory is particularly relevant for this thesis, it will be 
discussed further in the following section of this chapter, on determinants of brain drain. 
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The bifurcated labour theory explains migration flows from developing to developed 
countries by the dual nature of labour market in developed countries, divided into capital-intensive 
and labour-intensive sectors. The main driving force of migration is demand for labour from 
developing countries by the labour-intensive sector in developed countries. This demand might be 
due to various reasons, such as general labour shortages, need for workers willing to take positions 
at the bottom of job hierarchy and labour shortages in the labour intensive sector. As the focus of 
this theory is the characteristics of labour market in migrants receiving countries, i.e. pull factors of 
migration, it is not well suited for forced migration, where push factors play much more important 
role. 
The New Economics of Labour Migration theories (NELM), on the other hand, put the 
decision making process in a wider context of a household, rather than an individual (Stark and 
Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991). Mincer (1978: 750) was the first to argue that migration decision 
studies are made at the family rather than the individual level, because it is the net family gain 
rather than net personal gain that drives migration of households. Mincer presented a model of 
migration based on the maximization of family, instead of individual, utility. Applying this 
reasoning, the NELM theory explains migration through the risk minimization motive of 
households. The decision is made at the level of a household, which attempts to diversify risk to a 
household‘s income among household members through the migration strategy. Market failures and 
underdeveloped credit markets are found to be the main push factors of emigration from developing 
countries. The problem with this approach in the context of forced migration is that it cannot 
explain how a household can diversify the risk of being endangered between household members. 
Still, it stresses an important feature of migration decision process that is particularly emphasized in 
the context of forced migration. It is the level of decision making, which is not necessarily 
individual, as predicted by previous theories, but is a family or household level. 
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World Systems theory goes further than NELM and puts the migration into the context of 
global interaction between societies. This theory explains migration by the impact of results of these 
interactions such as, for example, international trade which might increase economic inequalities 
between countries (Wallerstein, 1983; Amankwaa, 1995). This approach is seen as having potential 
for explaining forced migration. As these theories see the migration incentives created through 
complex interactions between societies, they further link these incentives with the political situation 
in a country and migration policies. For instance, the interaction between societies may cause 
increased inequality within a developing country, which is correlated with the level of violence in 
that country (Wallerstein, 1983). Moreover, it influences immigration policies of developing 
countries, which, in general, relax the restriction from countries affected by a conflict of natural 
disaster. Therefore, political situations in both home and host countries, as well as interaction 
between them, are recognized by these theories as factors shaping migration flows, which is of 
particular relevance in the context of forced migration. 
Theories explaining the perpetuation of migration attempt to examine why migration flows 
might persist over time, even if the impact of factors causing initial migration has been reduced. 
These theories are, in Massey et al. (1993) and Schoorl (1995) grouped into three different types of 
theories: Network Theory, Institutional Theory; and Migration System Theory. All attempt to 
explain the continuity in the migration process, thus being less relevant for the ethnic cleansing. 
Ethnic cleansing usually occurs within a limited period of time and can be seen as an event, rather 
than a continuous process, such as voluntary migration. Thus, it requires development of specific 
models explaining initiation of this type of migration, but there is no clear argument why we should 
expect differences in the continuation of migration after initial voluntary or forced migration. 
Moreover, these theories are useful in explaining destination choices of migrants, but it will not be 
in the focus of the empirical analysis in this thesis. 
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Network Theory explains continuation of migration through social capital acquired by 
potential migrants through migration of their family members and friends. Migration implies the 
creation of migrant networks where subsequent migration from a particular country is improved by 
activities of these networks which reduce migration costs and increase returns to migration at the 
destination (through increased probability of employment and higher income). 
Institutional Theory argues that the initial migration flow increases activities and 
effectiveness of institutions, both formal and informal, between two countries which facilitate 
subsequent migration. Besides institutions created by networks of migrants, these also include 
institutions that support immigrants and asylum seekers in host countries. These institutions are 
rather more developed for support of asylum seekers, thus it is expected that the role of institutions 
might be more important for perpetuation of migration after initial forced than after voluntary 
migration. However, these theories do not explain how institutions may increase initial migration. 
Regardless, in the context of ethnic cleansing, these theories might be helpful in understanding how 
institutions such as UNHCR facilitate initial emigration from vulnerable regions when, in attempt to 
save lives, they actually increase negative impact on the economy of a country through brain drain. 
 Migration Systems Theory argues that the flows between countries are not primarily 
determined by geographic proximity, but political and economic ties between countries. Countries 
can be part of one or more systems. Systems are stable, but not fixed, as social and economic 
fluctuations and events such as political upheavals may affect membership of a particular country in 
the system. So, the causality is not picked up by these theories. Countries may be within a particular 
migration system due to the colonial past or common language, but the large number of migrants in 
a host country may also influence creation of a system. This may explain how, for example, 
majority of forced migrants flow to developed countries with which a home countries shares 
colonial history or a language, but are not useful in explaining initiation of migration.  
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2.2. Brain drain – determinants 
 
The importance of emigration of highly educated individuals from developing countries has 
been recognized since the early literature on the brain drain. Several studies (Grubel and Scott, 
1966; Berry and Soligo, 1969) discussed welfare implications to a sending country of emigration of 
highly educated individuals, at a rather theoretical level and with different predictions about the 
sign of this impact. This interest in the skill distribution among migrants in the literature was raised 
particularly after the recognition of the importance of human capital for economic growth in 
endogenous growth models (Lucas, 1988). 
Based on the work of Sjaastad (1962), Neoclassical theories see the migration process as an 
attempt of individuals to increase returns to their human capital. Migrants evaluate expected 
benefits, such as discounted earnings and non-monetary returns, against expected costs of 
migration, including both travel costs and non-monetary opportunity and psychological costs and 
make migration decision only if total benefits from migration are larger than total migration costs. 
The model predicts that younger and/or more educated individuals migrate more, thus being useful 
in explaining skill distribution of migrants. 
The distribution of skills among population of migrants has generally been investigated in 
the framework of self-selection models,
12
 which offer explanation of the relationship between 
factors influencing emigration and skill composition of migrants. Hence, if highly educated 
migrants are more responsive to specific determinants of migration in a particular migration 
context, it is said that migrants are positively self-selected. If the opposite is the case and low 
educated migrants are more likely to migrate in a response to specific determinants, then there is a 
negative self-selection of migrants. 
                                                 
12
 The following description of the self-selection model is based on author‘s previous work (Oruc, 2009). 
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In his seminal paper, Borjas (1987: 551) offered a model of self-selection of migrants 
applying the Roy (1951) model in the migration context. The Roy (1951) model is an alternative 
explanation of workers‘ labour market participation decisions. According to this model, individuals‘ 
choice of a sector in which to participate is not exogenous, but a result of income maximization 
strategy, where they self-select into a sector that gives them highest expected earnings. The sign of 
self-selection, or the distribution of skills among individuals, will depend on the variance in 
earnings between sectors. Borjas (1987) applied this model to migration in order to explain the skill 
distribution of migrants, treating countries as alternative sectors. In this two-country model, which 
can be denoted as home and host country, migrants make comparisons between earnings in home 
and host country and those who have higher earnings in a host country are those who actually 
migrate. Both home and host country earnings can be decomposed into a mean wage and a premium 
to individuals‘ skills and abilities, so earnings a potential migrants faces in a home country may be 
expressed as: 
 
000  w          (2.1) 
 
and their earnings to a host country, if they migrate, as: 
 
111  w          (2.2) 
 
where w are earnings in a country, µ mean income in a country and ε de-meaned values of 
workers skills in a particular country, which might be considered as individual‘s ―returns to skills‖. 
Subscripts 0 and 1 denote home and host country, respectively. The ε‘s are assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean, variance ζ2 and correlation coefficient φ. 
An individual chooses to migrate if: 
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0)()( 0101          (2.3) 
 
where π are the costs of emigration. Borjas assumes that these costs are time-equivalent and 
constant across all individuals. Equation (2.3) is simply showing the difference between Equations 
(2.2) and (2.1) minus costs of emigration. It shows that an individual chooses to migrate whenever 
the difference in mean incomes, but also in returns to skills, between two countries is larger than the 
costs of migration. 
The model has ability to explain migration even if mean incomes between home and host 
countries are the same. In that case, individuals compare variance in the returns to skills between 
two countries. The sign of self-selection of migrants thus crucially depends on the wage dispersion 
between highly and low educated in the two countries. The more equal the wage dispersion, or 
income distribution, is in a home country and/or the more unequal is income distribution in a host 
country, then migrants will be positively self-selected with regards to their education level and vice 
versa. As richer countries have generally more equal distribution of income, the model predicts that 
self-selection of migrants by their education level will generally have negative sign. The model has 
been empirically tested by comparing labour market performance of immigrants from Mexico to 
US, as a proxy for their unobservable skills and found evidence of negative self-selection of 
Mexican immigrants in the US (Borjas, 1987). For the purpose of the analysis of ethnic cleansing, 
this model is important in terms of emphasizing the role of wage dispersion between high and low 
educated. Evidence suggests that events causing ethnic cleansing, such as conflict or natural 
disaster, reduces this wage dispersion and inequality
13
 based on individual education levels. The 
                                                 
13
 One of the victims of the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, Fritz Mevs, said to Euronews that people there call this 
event ―the most democratic event that ever happened in the history of Haiti ... The earthquake does not choose good 
neighbourhood, bad neighbourhood, rich neighbourhood‖ (Euronews: Rebuilding Haiti after the quake. 25.01.2010). 
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model would then predict positive self-selection into migration after forced displacement due to a 
conflict or natural disaster taking place. 
The model has several shortcomings (Pedersen et al., 2004: 5). First, it does not take into 
account any out-of-pocket migration costs. It may be expected that these costs, such as switching 
costs, are lower for the highly educated, which may increase positive selectivity of migrants even 
when differences in income distribution between two countries is more favourable for low educated 
workers. Second, the model assumes perfect ability of potential migrant to observe mean incomes 
and returns to skills in two countries. Yet, in reality, the problem of imperfect information exists 
and is already acknowledged by migration literature as one of the factors explaining return 
migration. For the purpose of the analysis of self-selection of forced migrants, this model is a good 
starting point. However, it has to be augmented by factors other than the individual‘s wage which 
operate in the ethnic cleansing settings, in order to explain the self-selection mechanism of this type 
of migration. 
 Several other papers have tested the empirical validity of the migration model proposed by 
Borjas (1987). The main problem with these empirical findings is that they are not consistent with 
their concept of skills. Borjas (1987) considered unobservable skills as a source of differences in 
income which acts as a self-selection mechanism, finding support for predictions of his models on 
the negative self-selection. On the other side, Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) considered observable 
skills or education levels of migrants from Mexico as a source of differences in income and found 
positive self-selection. They used data from the Mexico and US population censuses to examine 
structure of migrants from Mexico to the United States and relationship between education levels 
and economic performance of these migrants compared to their counterparts in Mexico. These two 
empirical findings do not necessarily need to be contradictory. It may be possible that migrants are 
positively self-selected in terms of their education, but among the highly educated population, those 
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with lower unobserved skills actually migrate. So, the distinction between two different sets of 
empirical studies needs to be made clear. 
 Dostie and Leger (2006) built a model in which individuals are selected, in part, on potential 
earnings, i.e. where earnings across different locations are a function of both observable and 
unobservable characteristics. Stark and Taylor (1991) investigated the differences in the role of 
incentives between absolute income and relative deprivation in migration of households, accounting 
for continuities in some and discontinuities in other labour markets.  McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2007a) investigated the impact of migration networks on migration incentives at different skills in 
Mexico-US migration and its impact on the self-selection of these migrants. 
 A lack of data on migration by skills has limited the extent of empirical work on the self-
selection of migrants in terms of their observable skills, i.e. their educational attainment. However, 
recent work on the collection of these data, first by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and then by 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006), has opened the possibility of extensive work on the analysis of the 
determinants of brain drain. Brucker and Defoort (2006), contrary to the prediction of the Borjas 
(1987) model, found evidence of positive self selection even if income inequality in a host country 
is higher than in a home country. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007: 24) investigated the role of 
migrant network in determining self-selection patterns of Mexico-US migration and found that the 
result of this effect in terms of self-selection depends on characteristics of the community. Thus, 
according to their empirical findings, migrants from communities with low migrant networks tend 
to be positively selected and vice versa. Similar importance of migrant networks on determining the 
sign of self-selection was also found in Mora and Taylor (2006: 46), although it was found that this 
influence differs between different sectors of employment (farm versus non-farm). Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2001), in the analysis of self-selection of Mexican migrants to the USA, found that 
improvement in economic conditions on both countries decrease, while more strict immigration 
policies increase the education level of migrants. In the context of ethnic cleansing, findings from 
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this study would suggest that an event causing ethnic cleansing, such as a conflict or natural 
disaster, commonly worsening economic conditions and reducing skills based wage dispersion in a 
home country should increase the skill level of migrants, while relaxed immigration policies 
towards refugees by host countries should decrease it. Still, empirical studies using data about 
migrants from areas affected by a conflict or natural disaster are required for testing these 
assumptions.  
 All previous studies on self-selection have focused on the economic determinants of 
migration and have not taken into account non-economic determinants and how they can affect the 
selection process. Still, Chiswick (2000: 12) states: ―favourable self-selectivity for labour market 
success would be expected to be less intense among those for whom migration is based primarily on 
factors other than their own labour market success‖. Moreover, according to Ibanez and Velez 
(2003), ―unlike results in traditional migration models, better educated households are less willing 
to displace; probably better off households are able to adopt protective measures or have more 
accurate information regarding the opportunities in reception sites and prefer not to displace‖. These 
two quotes are acceptable, but only when related to forced migration by individuals. Once a mass 
forced migration - or ethnic cleansing - takes place, these assumptions will not hold as individuals 
do not have choice of staying on the basis of their risk assessment, but are forcibly evicted from 
their homes. 
The main contribution of this thesis is that it recognized a gap in the literature on forced 
migration and introduces a new model which attempts to explain migration of individuals from 
countries affected by ethnic cleansing, incorporating additional factors and two stages into the 
models of voluntary migration. Compared to the self-selection models of voluntary migration 
(Borjas, 1987), where migration is a one-stage process which is expected to bring increase in 
expected wage to the migrant, in the model proposed in this thesis the migration is modelled in two 
stages. Migrants in the case of ethnic cleansing are assumed to be the ones who do not have an 
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economic incentive to migrate before the ethnic cleansing occurred. As the migration literature 
(Van Hear, 1998; Chiswick, 2000) generally accepts that economic factors of migration in the case 
of conflict or natural disaster do not disappear, although their influence on migration decision may 
be reduced, the model proposed in this thesis accounts for these factors and their change during 
such an event. Once an event has occurred, the expected wage of potential migrants in a home 
country changed. This is the first stage of the migration process. In the second stage, individuals 
compare their expected wage in the case of no ethnic cleansing, the expected wage once it occurred 
and the expected wage if they migrate. The larger the difference in expected wages between 
situations with and without a conflict or ethnic cleansing, the stronger the incentive is for 
individuals to migrate.
14
 The self-selection mechanism in this context is the fact that the difference 
between expected wages in situations with and without an ethnic cleansing event is larger for 
individuals with higher observable skills. Once an event occurs, individuals from affected areas are 
very often forced to displace to other areas. They suffer significant welfare losses. Others, from 
non-affected areas or who were not forced to move to other areas,
15
 are also affected by decrease in 
economic activity in a country. The more educated individuals are, either displaced or non-
displaced, the more significant the income losses are. Besides absolute income, their relative 
position compared to a reference group is also worsened. It might be expected that the highly 
educated have stronger incentive to leave refugee camps and restore their pre-event level of income 
and welfare and relative position in a community. 
Stark and Taylor (1991) argue that, besides absolute income considerations, relative position 
of a household within community also determines migration decision. Their relative deprivation 
model is chosen as a framework in which the model of migration as a result of ethnic cleansing will 
be presented in the following section. This model is appropriate as it accounts for community 
                                                 
14
 The hypothesis that predicts increased propensity to migrate by individuals more affected by ethnic cleansing is 
called ―restoration hypothesis‖ and explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
15
 For example, the ones who in the case of ethnic cleansing lived in areas controlled by their ethnic group, so were not 
evicted. 
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characteristics and individuals‘ perceptions of their position in such a setting, as well as the fact that 
individuals compare their well-being not only to the well-being of others, but also their own in the 
previous point in time.  
The relative deprivation hypothesis was originally developed by Stouffer et al. (1949) in 
order to explain a series of unexpected relationships found in an analysis of satisfaction of US 
soldiers. They found that African American soldiers stationed in Southern USA were more satisfied 
than African American soldiers stationed in Northern USA. The authors‘ explanation was expressed 
through the relative deprivation hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, individuals react to 
objective circumstances on the basis of their subjective comparisons. Thus, African Americans in 
the South, who compare their position to that of other African Americans there, which is generally 
worse than in the North, may be more satisfied with their position than those who compare their 
situation with the situation of other African Americans in the North. This means that individuals‘ 
valuation of its income will depend on the income distribution in the reference group and its 
position within that group. So, the more individuals in the reference group have larger income than 
an individual i, the individual i will be more deprived. Important contribution to the understanding 
and application of the idea of relative deprivation in the context of ethnic cleansing is provided by 
Runciman (1966: 10). He explained relative deprivation of an individual as a situation when four 
conditions are met: 1) an individual does not have X, 2) he sees other, including himself in the 
previous point of time as having X, 3) he wants X and 4) obtaining X is seen as feasible. The 
feeling of deprivation is explained through 1) and 3), where we can see that deprivation is 
individual‘s disutility of not having X. The relativity of the concept arises from 2) and 4), as 
individuals level of deprivation depend on the income of a reference group to which individual 
compares her income. Hence, individual‘s level of deprivation will be a function of the proportion 
of individuals in a reference group who have income above individual‘s income and the mean 
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income of the group.
16
 When applied to migration, the relative deprivation hypothesis states that 
individuals evaluate migration decisions not only on the basis of absolute, but also of relative 
income differences within a community. Individuals compare their income with income of a 
reference group and feel deprived of not having more than they have. This hypothesis predicts 
migration of more relatively deprived individuals, as well as migration from more to less unequal 
societies. 
In the context of ethnic cleansing, the second part of the condition 2) stating that individuals 
also compare their current to previous position becomes particularly relevant. This detail of 
Runciman‘s description of relative deprivation was mainly neglected in the previous literature on 
voluntary migration based on the relative deprivation hypothesis. The condition 2) states that 
individuals do not only compare their position relative to reference group, but also relative to its 
previous position. This outcome means that decrease in individual‘s absolute income and relative 
deprivation as a consequence of an event such as conflict or natural disaster may increase person‘s 
relative deprivation of not having it any more. This, another type of deprivation of an individual 
relative to its previous income level, is a function of the change in absolute and relative income of 
individual as a consequence of such an event. It may be expected that the more severely affected by 
an ethnic cleansing individual is, the more relatively deprived and thus more prone to restore its 
previous well-being she will be. Consequently, migration decision of individuals during ethnic 
cleansing is not only affected by individual‘s deprivation relative to a reference group, but also 
relative to her or his previous position.  
 As identified above, the relative deprivation theory is helpful in the context of this thesis, as 
it allows taking into account not only the current absolute income and relative deprivation levels in 
modelling migration decision of forced migrants, but also the role of change in both absolute 
income and relative deprivation caused by an ethnic cleansing event. It is expected that this change 
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 More detailed technical explanation of the relative deprivation as well as derivation of its function is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
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in absolute income and relative deprivation acts as a self-selection mechanism of ethnic cleansing. 
The higher pre-conflict income of an individual, the more she is affected by ethnic cleansing in 
terms of her relative position during conflict compared to pre-conflict period, hence more likely to 
migrate. As income is in positive correlation with education, it may be expected that ethnic conflict 
increases brain drain from areas affected. However, this assumption needs to be tested empirically. 
The results of empirical test of this assumption are presented in Chapter 4. 
So far, there have been several attempts to develop specific models for forced migration (for 
example, Kirchhoff and Ibanez, 2001 or Schaeffer, 2005). The main characteristic of these models 
was that they introduced a factor of risk into the model developed for voluntary migration, without 
attempting to incorporate all the characteristics of the process of forced migration. Also, there has 
been a number of empirical studies on the determinants of forced displacement, both at micro 
(Ibanez and Velez, 2003; Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2007) and macro level (Davenport et al., 2003; 
Melander & Oberg, 2004; Moore & Shellman, 2006), but without accounting for the education level 
of migrants and consequently without evidence on the self-selection mechanism in the context of 
forced migration. Therefore, this thesis can be considered as a first study that provides evidence on 
the determinants of brain drain from countries in conflict. 
 
2.3. Brain drain – consequences 
 
Emigration of highly educated individuals has for a long time been seen as having 
unidirectional impact on human capital formation, i.e. emigration of highly educated represents 
depletion of human capital in a sending country. Based on this view, the first models of the impact 
of emigration of highly educated individuals (Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995) emphasized 
negative impact of this type of emigration on economic growth of a country. Recent studies 
(Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001, 2006a, 2008) however, 
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argue that the relationship between emigration and human capital formation in a home country is 
actually bi-directional. Emigration of highly educated individuals causes depletion of human capital 
in a home country.
17
 However, the emigration might also have a positive impact on human capital 
formation in a home country. The prospect of emigration and possibly higher wages after migration 
increase incentives to individuals to invest in their human capital.
18
 As not all of these individuals 
will migrate, the stock of human capital may even be higher after emigration of highly educated 
than before. Besides this, there are other channels of positive impact of emigration of highly 
educated individuals on human capital formation in a sending country, such as remittances and 
return migration. Therefore, the sign of the net effect of the relationship between emigration of 
highly educated individuals and human capital formation cannot be determined a priori.  
 
2.3.1. Incentive effect: Brain drain or Brain gain 
 
A traditional argument of migration literature (for example, Bhagwati, 1972; Bhagwati and 
Hamada, 1974) is that migration lowers growth in the home country once the highly educated 
workers emigrate. Mountford (1997) argued that brain drain may actually enhance growth in the 
home country. He developed a model with human capital as a crucial factor of transitional growth. 
The decisions of households to acquire education determine the amount of human capital in a given 
period. As the prospect of higher wages through emigration can stimulate households to acquire 
more education, it can increase the amount of human capital even beyond the amount lost through 
emigration. 
A recent wave of theoretical contributions (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Vidal, 1998; 
Beine et al., 2001, 2006a; Stark and Wang, 2002) argues that migration of highly educated can, 
through expected higher wages abroad, produce more human capital ex-ante than the ex-post loss. 
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 This is called ―drain effect‖ in Beine et al. (2001). 
18
 Beine et al. (2001) call this ―brain effect‖. 
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This argument was in all these papers presented by probabilistic migration models in which the 
observable achievement of a given educational requirement, rather than unobservable individuals‘ 
ability, determines the probability of migration. All the models are based on reasonable assumptions 
of higher return to education abroad and higher probability of emigration for more educated 
workers. Consequently, migration prospects increase the expected return to human capital and 
increase educational investment in the home country. Since more people opt for education, and not 
all of them migrate, this creates the possibility of the net increase of human capital, or net brain 
gain, for the home country.  
The model of ―brain gain‖, explaining the incentive effect, has been presented in Beine et al. 
(2006a). The main argument of this model is that individuals, once migration becomes an option, 
include potential income gains of further education not only in home country, but also in the case of 
migration. As individuals migrate to countries with larger income, the expected returns to education 
are larger if there is a possibility of migration; hence the incentive for education increases. The size 
of this influence is positively related to migration probability and difference in returns to skills 
between two countries. This suggests that poorer countries with higher rates of emigration of highly 
educated are expected to have stronger migration-induced incentive for education. The model is 
based on a set of restrictive assumptions, such as that there is no unskilled migration, migrants are 
risk-neutral and probability is exogenous and determined by a home country.  
Schiff (2005) doubted some of the arguments of the brain gain model presented above and 
offered a different model of brain gain showing that this effect is much lower once some of the 
assumptions of the above model are relaxed. For example, once the possibility of emigration by 
unskilled individuals is introduced, the education incentive effect becomes the difference between 
the skilled and the unskilled migration premium. Second, the probability of migration is not set by 
home, but by host countries and is based on numbers of emigrants rather than the proportion of 
highly educated; therefore it is endogenous. Once an education incentive is present and individuals 
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opt for education, which increases the number of the highly educated, the probability of migration 
decreases for all individuals. This assumption is important for the analysis of ethnic cleansing, but 
in a slightly different manner than presented in Schiff (2005). The model of the incentive effect in 
the context of ethnic cleansing will be explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
In an early version of the model of brain gain, Beine et al. (2006a) assumed that migration 
probability is constant, in order to simplify presentation of the main idea. Schiff (2005) relaxes this 
assumption and shows that, once probability of emigration decreases with increase in the stock of 
human capital, brain gain decreases in each subsequent period, which eventually leads to a zero 
additional schooling as a result of migration incentive in a steady state. However, he assumes 
constant level of brain drain. In the context of ethnic cleansing, mass emigration of highly educated 
individuals in one period causes brain drain to be higher than in other periods. This will increase the 
probability of emigration in subsequent periods by individuals remaining in the country and 
potentially increased brain gain effect. But, as brain drain has been larger in previous period, a 
positive net effect could be expected only after several subsequent periods. 
Data limitations with regards to the emigration rates by education level kept this discussion 
at a rather theoretical level for a long period. The first data set on emigration rates by education 
levels for 50 countries has been created by Carrington and Detragiache (1998). Using these data, 
Beine et al. (2001) estimated the model of brain gain and found positive and significant impact of 
emigration prospects on human capital accumulation in sending countries, especially for countries 
with low initial GDP per capita levels. Beine et al. (2006a) used counterfactual simulations to 
estimate the net effect of the emigration of highly educated people for each country and region. The 
results suggest that only under certain conditions, such as low levels of human capital (below 5%) 
and low migration rates of highly educated individuals (below 20%), the positive net effect of such 
emigration on the stock of human capital in a home country can be expected. 
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More recently, Beine et al. (2006a) used Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data and found 
evidence of a positive effect of migration prospects for highly educated on ex-ante human capital 
levels in a cross-section of 127 developing countries. They found that an elasticity of human capital 
growth to emigration prospects for highly educated individuals is around 5. Similar results were 
obtained when controlling for whether their skills were acquired in the home or in the host country. 
Faini (2003) estimated an equation in which educational achievements were regressed on a 
set of explanatory variables including emigration. The results show that, in contrary to the 
conclusion of Beine et al. (2006a), that increasing the return of tertiary education increases the 
incentive to acquire secondary education. The results did not find an evidence for relationship 
between migration probability for individuals with secondary education and secondary educational 
achievements in the home country. Moreover, increased migration probability for workers with a 
tertiary education has a negative impact on tertiary enrolment in the home country.  
In relation to ethnic cleansing, the main drawback of the model is measuring the probability 
of migration by the stock of emigrants. If ethnic cleansing occurs, the stock of emigrants will 
rapidly increase in a short period of time. But, this will not necessarily increase immigration quotas 
for that country by developed countries, which is something that potential highly educated migrants 
remaining within a home country should be aware of. This outcome will cause the probability of 
emigration from a country affected by ethnic cleansing, if measured by a stock of highly educated 
emigrants, to be much larger in subsequent periods than it actually is and will potentially increase 
estimated brain gain effect as a result of increased migration incentives. For that reason, it would be 
relevant to measure the incentive effect on a subset of countries which were affected by ethnic 
cleansing. 
As a conclusion, even the evidence from Beine et al. (2006a) on the incentive effect has 
shown that a positive outcome is possible only under very restrictive assumption and only for 
countries with specific combination of income levels and emigration rates. Thus, the overall impact 
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of the emigration of highly educated individuals on a human capital stock in a home country is not 
very likely to be positive. The remaining question to be answered in whether the brain drain is even 
more negative in the case of ethnic cleansing, due to its specific features presented above that may 
decrease potential positive influences.  
 
2.3.2. Remittances and educational attainment 
 
 As remittances are becoming the most important source of foreign capital for developing 
countries,
19
 the issue of its effects at both micro and macro level has received attention from 
researchers in migration studies. The literature on remittances has recently redirected its traditional 
focus on the motivation for remitting to the analysis of their use. There are numerous studies which 
analysed the impact of remittances on different aspects of a remittance receiving economy. One of 
the first studies was the Funkhouser‘s (1992) study of impact of remittances on labour supply of 
remittance receiving households, which found that remittances increased self-employment among 
men and reduced labour supply by women in Nicaragua. Chami et al. (2005) provide an evidence of 
negative effect of remittances on growth and productivity. However, recent Docquier and 
Rapoport‘s (2006) study has found evidence of positive impact of remittances on productivity and 
growth, by solving liquidity constraint and financing productive investments. An interesting paper 
has been published recently by Dimova and Wolff (2009) who used a longitudinal data from LSMS 
household surveys from Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to test the relationship between remittances 
and chain migration and found evidence of increased migration among remittances receiving 
households. 
 Besides studies evaluating the impact of remittances on investment in physical assets, there 
is increasing number of studies which analyse impact of remittances on investments in human 
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 The World Bank reports that total remittances flows have surpassed development assistance and foreign direct 
investments in the 1990 and are still the largest flows of foreign capital in the world. 
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capital. These studies argue that remittances positively influence households‘ educational 
investment decisions through the relaxation of liquidity constraint and reducing children‘s labour 
participation (e.g. Moser, 1996). Developing countries are characterised by less efficient credit 
markets than developed countries (Paulson and Townsend, 2000). Imperfect or even missing credit 
markets increase liquidity constraints of households in developing countries as they do not have 
access to long-term loans. Furthermore, as schooling implies a reduction in current income, this 
puts even more pressure on households‘ financial constraints for investment in education. Also, 
education investments have high income elasticity. Hence, they are forced to have children work in 
order to cover consumption and also to invest less in children‘s education forgoing potentially 
profitable investment opportunities (Woodruff and Zeneto, 2001; Mude et al., 2007). In this 
context, remittances as an additional source of household income help alleviate liquidity constraints 
(Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Cox and Ureta, 2003; Docquier and Rapoport, 2005; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2006; Miluka and Dabalen, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). This, in turn, induces 
investment in children‘s education leading to a positive relationship between remittances and 
children‘s educational attainment and a negative relationship between remittances and child labour 
supply. However, if household budget constraints are not binding, remittances should not have any 
significant impact on education expenditures (Miluka and Dabalen, 2007).  
 Still, as remittances are inseparable from the overall migration characteristics of a 
household, they need to be analysed in a broader context of migration and its impact on the 
education of children in these households. So, the income effect of remittances is not the only 
effect. The remittances are sent by migrant parents. Even the income effect is not necessarily a 
simple addition to a household‘s income, but the net of remittances and foregone earnings of a 
migrant member if she/he would have stayed in the country. Thus, the relaxation of liquidity 
constraints is different if a household with no migrants is receiving remittances, compared to 
households receiving remittances from an absent household member. Besides that, Miluka and 
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Dabalen (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008) point out the possibility of the substitution 
effect. According to them, households with migrant networks may have a higher probability of 
emigration. If these households expect higher earnings abroad, they face a higher opportunity cost 
of schooling due to the effect of forgone earnings. Thus, they may decide to emigrate and hence 
invest less or not to invest at all in education in the home country. Consequently, migration 
becomes a competing strategy with education increasing the opportunity cost of education in home 
countries. Therefore, potential migrants may decide not to invest in further education due to 
prospects for future emigration. Furthermore, the effect might be immediate if children are old 
enough to emigrate.  
Another important effect that has to be taken into account is the disruption effect. A set of 
studies argue that emigration usually implies parental absence, which may have a disruptive effect 
on children‘s educational achievement (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Docquier and  Rapoport, 
2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006; Minuka and Dabalen, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). 
In households with migrant heads children face increased non-financial costs of education due to 
the reduction in adult role models, the missing educational input of parents in school work and 
supervision and higher responsibilities in terms of family business. Consequently, children from 
migrant households may have a lower probability of remaining in school, even if financial resources 
are available for education investment, reducing the optimal unconstrained education level 
(McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006). According to the above, analysis of the impact of remittances on 
educational investments of remittances receiving households needs to disentangle the impact of 
different migration-related characteristics of a household.  
 Empirical evidence (e.g. Cox-Edvards and Ureta, 2003) on the relationship between 
remittances and educational attainment was, until recently, simply relating remittances receipt to 
educational attainment of children and assigned any effect found to the remittances. Only recently, 
studies attempt to control for parental absence effects, besides the effect of relaxation of liquidity 
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constraint, thus disentangling between income and disruptive effects (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2006). The evidence of the impact of remittances on educational attainment of children is 
mixed and depends on the approach used. Cox-Edvards and Ureta (2003) have related receipt of 
remittances to school drop-out hazard rates and found negative relationship between these two 
variables. Lopez Cordova (2005) have investigated the impact of remittances in Mexico and 
provided evidence of their positive impact on school attendance, as well as on illiteracy and 
mortality rates of children. Acosta (2006) has investigated the effect of remittances receipts on 
educational investment decisions of households in El Salvador and found that remittances have a 
positive effect on school participation of both male and female children, while it negatively affects 
labour supply by female children only. This result raises the important concern of taking into 
account the gender of children when measuring the strength of the impact of remittances on 
education. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) found no significant impact of remittances on 
education in the Dominican Republic, while accounting for the impact of migration of parents, 
finding that the negative disruptive effect of parent‘s migration is strong and particularly affects 
male children. They further discussed the differential impact of remittances on educational 
attainment of children by their age. According to their findings, remittance receipt has a far more 
significant impact on the educational attainment of female compared to male children. On the other 
hand, a recent study by Cuecuecha (2008) provided evidence of a positive impact of remittances on 
educational attainment in Mexico, but also found an evidence of different impact by gender of 
children. Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008), within the framework of an overlapping generations 
model, have reported evidence on Armenian remittance receiving households, which spend less on 
education than remittance non-receiving households. Leon et al. (2007) have investigated the 
impact of remittances on human capital formation in Ecuador and found a positive effect of 
remittance receipt on school enrolment and reduction of child labour. 
43 
 
 Acosta (2006: 42) has controlled for sample selection endogeneity problems and found that 
the estimated results on the impact of remittances on educational attainment of children are less 
significant, although still positive, compared to previous studies. When controlling for the gender of 
children, Acosta (2006: 40) found a much stronger impact of remittances on the school enrolment of 
girls, while this effect on boys is relatively weak. 
 Other studies (Kandel and Kao, 2001; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003) have analysed the 
relationship between household migration and education of family member left behind, where 
remittances were considered as a factor exerting a positive influence. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
analysed the relationship between migration of a family member and a child education and 
concluded that a positive relationship between these two is driven by remittances. Yang (2004) 
found evidence between currency appreciation and children‘s‘ schooling in the origin country, 
again explaining the positive relationship between these two by the remittances factor. McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2006) found a negative impact of migration of a parent on the educational attainment 
of children. Malone (2007) controlled for the gender of a household head and found evidence that 
female household heads who receive remittances from a male migrant are those who are the most 
likely to invest in the education of children.  
 In terms of the relationship between remittances and brain drain, it might be argued that the 
positive impact of remittances on educational attainment of children in remittances receiving 
households contributes to mitigation of the negative impact of the brain drain, along with the 
migration incentives and return migration effects. Still, what needs to be taken into consideration 
here is that the amount of remittances sent back home does not necessarily increase with the 
magnitude of brain drain; rather the opposite might be the case (Faini, 2006).  
 Motivation for a micro-level study of the impact of remittances on educational attainment in 
a country affected by ethnic cleansing is motivated by the interest in analysis of the influence of 
specific features of forced migration on the relationship between remittances and human capital 
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formation in a home country. It is expected that the context in which remittance receiving 
households are making human capital investment decisions, influence the extent of these decision. 
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that forced migrants generally migrate as a family, thus 
remittances are sent to relatives, rather than to family members from a migrant parent and are 
driven by purely altruistic motives. This implies that the human capital investment might not 
necessarily be a part of a household‘s strategy of diversification of the wage variability and intra-
household income allocation. This might limit the extent of positive impact of remittances on 
educational attainment of children in a remittances receiving household. Alternatively, receipt of 
remittances by relatives instead of family members might limit the negative impact of parental 
absence and thus increase positive impact of remittances on education attainment of children in 
from remittances receiving households in affected countries. Therefore, as the theoretical prediction 
about the overall impact of remittances on human capital formation in a home country affected by a 
conflict or natural disaster is inconclusive, empirical tests of these predictions are necessary for 
better understanding of these relationships in the ethnic cleansing setting. 
 
2.3.3. Return migration 
 
Analysis of return migration in the context of the analysis of the net effect of emigration of 
highly educated individuals on human capital stock in a home country is important for several 
reasons. Once departed, highly educated emigrants may decide to return. Low educated emigrants 
may acquire useful skills while abroad and bring them back to the home country. Also, all migrants 
may bring back both financial and non-financial
20
 instruments that should positively affect the 
educational attainment of their children. For the first type of impact, the ―brain return‖, it is 
important to understand not only the magnitude of the brain drain but also the skills acquisition 
                                                 
20
 It is expected that returnees bring back ―social remittances‖, or increased awareness of the importnance of education, 
which should result in increased educational investments. 
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during the period of stay in a host country. Moreover, appropriate understanding of the magnitude 
of this impact, the self-selection mechanism of return migration, needs to be developed and 
understood. 
 As presented by Cassarino (2004: 255), theoretical approaches to return migration, 
attempting to explain its magnitude and dynamics, could be divided into five different types: 
Neoclassical approach; New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM); structuralism; 
transnationalism; and Social Network Theory (SNT). For the purpose of this thesis, the theories will 
now be explained through focusing on the predictions they make about the self-selection 
mechanism and human capital formation of returnees, as well as through referring to applicability 
of these different approaches in the specific context of ethnic cleansing.  
 `The first approach, based on the Neoclassical economics theory (Borjas and Bratsberg, 
1996; Cohen and Haberfeld, 2001), describes return migration as a result of failure in achieving the 
objectives that caused the initial migration. This negative self-selection hypothesis does not allow 
for a significant brain gain effect. However, it may exist if the accumulation of human capital 
abroad is introduced. The second approach (Dustmann et al., 2008), is also based on migration as a 
strategy of maximization of outcomes in the labour market, but has a completely different 
explanation of return migration. According to their view, return migration is considered as a part of 
the migration process and a natural outcome of the individual‘s consideration of the costs and 
benefits of acquiring human capital in different places. New Economics of Labour Migration, 
assuming that returnees are those whose return is the end of a process of successful migration, 
predicts positive selection of migrants in their unobservable skills, but not necessarily in observable 
skills. These migrants planned return, so their skills are expected to match local needs.  
 The third approach, structuralism, argues that return should not only be analysed from the 
perspective of individual migration experience, but also taking into account the context of return, 
i.e. social and institutional factors in the home country. In the context of ethnic cleansing, this 
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theory acknowledges the importance of contextual factors in a home country for the return of 
migrants. It assumes that, although migrants should be positively selected, their ability to 
successfully employ their human capital is limited, due to opposition of local groups and interests to 
the returnees and their initiatives towards innovations and changes (Cassarino, 2004: 258). 
 Transnationalism and Social Network theory are similar in terms of their explanation of the 
return process and motives for return. They emphasize the role of ties that migrants develop 
between their home and host countries. Their main difference is in terms of their explanations of the 
context and motives by which these ties are developed. According to transnationalism, the ties 
migrants develop between their home and the host country is based on their ethnicity, whereas 
Social Network theory explains these ties through economic and social commonalities and interests. 
In contrary to NELM and structuralism, these two theories do not see the return migration as a 
natural end of the migration process, but rather as a part of continuous circular system of migration. 
So, the return migration of ―successful‖ migrants is not necessarily the end of migration process, as 
argued by the previous approaches, but part of a process of maximization of benefits of acquired 
human capital. In that sense, these explanations of return migration predict a positive impact of 
return migration on the human capital formation in a home country. Migrants are expected to 
acquire more human capital than others and, what is even more important, to acquire skills that 
match local needs more that others would do. 
Dustmann and Weiss (2007: 250) argued that return migration, which occurs despite 
persistent wage differences between host and home country, may be explained by three motives that 
induce migrants to return. First is the returnees‘ preference for consumption in a home country. 
Second is lower purchasing power in a home country. Third, which is of particular interest for us in 
the context of this study, is human capital accumulated in a host country through learning by doing, 
which should have a positive impact on the wages of returnees at home.  
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The empirical literature on self-selection of returnees and the impact of return migration on 
human capital formation is not conclusive.  In recent years, there have been an increasing number of 
studies that, based on different assumptions, provided evidence which supports one or other of the 
previously described theoretical approaches and their predictions on the human capital formation 
effect of return migration. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996: 175) developed a model of return migration 
which predicts the sign of selection strongly influenced by the selection of migration in the first 
place and with the opposite sign. According to them, if migrants were initially positively selected 
towards migration, then returned migrants tend to be negatively selected and vice versa. In a study 
of Tongans and Samoans in Australia, Ahlburg and Brown (1998: 148) have found little evidence 
that migrants with intention to return acquire significantly more physical and human capital. The 
study was based on a survey among migrants still living in Australia, where respondents were asked 
whether they intend to return ever or not. Response rate to this question has been very high, but 
only 7% of respondents answered the question if it will happen in one or 5 years. This suggests that 
most migrants did not have a clear return plan at the time of the survey. Therefore, reliability of the 
data and comparability between the two groups, migrants ―with intention‖ to return and those with 
no intention, is questionable. Dustmann (1996: 234) reported that more than a half of migrants who 
initially expressed their intention to return from Germany did not enact that intention over the 
subsequent nine years. So, the appropriate analysis should focus either on returnees or compare 
capital acquisition by those with a clear time plan of return and those with the return date not set 
yet. 
Besides the impact of return intention on human capital accumulation abroad, several studies 
have investigated its impact on other aspects of the behaviour of potential returnees. The return 
probability of immigrants is found to have a positive impact on their savings behaviour (Galor and 
Stark, 2000: 467). If return migration does not materialize, these higher savings may result either in 
increased income differentials between immigrants and the native-born population or in increased 
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amounts of remittances sent home. Conversely, the impact of return probability on human capital 
formation seems to be negative (Dustmann, 1999; Cortes, 2004). Recently, several studies 
(Dustmann, 2003, 2007) have investigated the intergenerational impact of return migration 
probability on human capital formation. Dustmann (2003: 829) has found a negative correlation 
between the number of children of an immigrant and her/his return intentions. This relationship was 
explained by altruistic motives towards migrants‘ offsprings and their future welfare. Dustmann 
(2007), in a study conducted among immigrants in Germany, found a negative correlation between 
fathers‘ return migration intentions and their investments in sons‘ education. 
Another set of studies used the revealed behaviour of returnees by collecting data on their 
post-return educational and other investment decisions. Ilahi (1999) has provided evidence of a 
positive relationship between migration experience, including accumulated savings and human 
capital and occupational choice of returnees to Pakistan, after controlling for possible endogeneity 
of migrants‘ savings and the choices available to returnees to different areas. McCormick and 
Wahba (2001) provided evidence on the impact of overseas savings and duration of stay on the 
probability that a returnee will engage in entrepreneurial investments, particularly for literate 
returnees, concluding that skill acquisition abroad may matter more than just savings. 
 Cohen and Haberfeld (2001), comparing income levels of migrants from Israel to the United 
States who emigrated in 1970s and returned to Israel to those who migrated at the same time and 
remained in the US, found a difference in their incomes, concluding that there is a negative self-
selection of these migrants. The study restricted the sample of migrants on those with relatively 
short migration experience, thus this result might be biased. Also, when migrants are compared in 
terms of observable skills only, or their educational level, they tend to be positively selected.  
 In an overlapping generations model, where decisions to migrate and decision to return are 
made in a sequence, Mayr and Peri (2008: 24) have shown that return migration and subsequent 
wage increase associated with international experience may be an additional incentive for migrants 
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in sending countries, besides migration and wage differentials between home and host country. The 
incentive effect of the brain gain argument is not necessarily based on permanent migration; instead 
individuals invest in their human capital with the intention of temporary migration abroad and 
return with international experience, where both of these increase returns to their human capital 
investment. They argue that return migration actually contributes significantly to the brain gain 
argument and may turn the brain drain story into the brain gain story. 
 The literature on return migration, although acknowledging heterogeneity of returnees and 
referring occasionally to the specific features of return of forced migrants, has not yet provided a 
separate analysis of return of forced migrants. According to Ghosh (2000: 185), return is ―largely 
influenced by the initial motivations for migration as well as by the duration of the stay abroad and 
particularly by the conditions under which return takes place‖. All three factors influencing return 
migration mentioned in the previous statement are important to explain from the point of view of 
ethnic cleansing. Initial motivations for migration are obviously different among conflict-induced 
migrants. Most of them, as mentioned in Massey et al. (2005), did not have migration intention 
prior to the occurrence of a conflict. Therefore, the theoretical approaches of the Neoclassical and 
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) are of little use in the explanation of return 
migration of conflict-induced migrants.  
 Duration of stay affects behaviour of returned migrants. As Dustmann (1996: 225) pointed 
out, ―investment in human capital is affected by the length of time the migrant stays in the host 
country‖. It also affects the degree of match of these skills to either home or host country. If a 
migrant stays in a host country for a short period of time, it would be costly for her/him to acquire 
skills specific to that country. Therefore, it is more likely that a migrant will acquire skills that 
match the needs of a home country (Dustmann, 1996: 226). In the context of conflict-induced 
migration with ―temporary protection‖ status granted, this theory predicts a positive match of skills 
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acquired and skills needed in a home country. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) reported significant 
return of migrants from the UK and that most return took place within 10 years of their stay. 
  Duration of stay and conditions for return are also different in the case of forced migrants. It 
can be clearly seen from the example of Bosnian migrants in the EU. They have been granted 
―temporary protection‖ status and were ―repatriated‖ soon after the end of the war. If they did not 
have an opportunity to plan their stay abroad, it could be expected that they have not acquired as 
much capital, both physical and human, as voluntary migrants who have clear intentions to return 
and a plan of return. 
 The process of ethnic cleansing is characterized by mass forced displacement of individuals, 
which affects non-random part of population and changes well-being of individuals. This change is 
subsequently shaping their migration decisions. Consequently, the above presented theories 
explaining initiation of voluntary migration are not completely adequate for explanation of ethnic 
cleansing. In order to explain ethnic cleansing successfully, it is required to develop a theoretical 
model of ethnic cleansing, which will be based on the current theories of voluntary migration, but 
will incorporate all the above identified specific features of ethnic cleansing. According to the 
above highlighted part of the Runciman‘s (1966) original quote about relative deprivation and a 
specific two-stage process of ethnic cleansing identified, it was recognized through this literature 
review that the most appropriate theoretical framework for developing a model of ethnic cleansing 
is relative deprivation framework developed by Stark and Taylor. 
 On the other hand, there is no clear argument for not using previously developed models of 
the impact of voluntary migration on human capital formation. Only the magnitude of some of these 
impacts is expected to be different. Therefore, the separate analysis of the channels through which 
the brain drain can influence human capital formation in a home country is required, but the use of 
model from the voluntary migration literature should be sufficient. 
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 Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion of theoretical models of migration and their applicability in the context of 
ethnic cleansing suggest that the most appropriate theoretical approach to the explanation of brain 
drain from a country affected by ethnic cleansing is the extended Neoclassical theory with the 
relative deprivation hypothesis, as well as specific characteristics of ethnic cleansing, incorporated 
into the model. Such a model is expected to have an advantage over using models of forced 
migration developed previously, which did not capture specific features of ethnic cleansing. 
Ibanez and Velez (2005) developed a model of forced migration, based on a model used for the 
analysis of voluntary migration and augmented it by accounting for risk as an additional factor of 
migration. They noted that, despite high levels of violence, some people choose to stay, rather than 
to migrate. In their explanation, they assumed that violence is ―not randomly targeted― (Ibanez and 
Velez, 2005: 10) and that families in their displacement decision making process consider not only 
violence but also other factors, such as traditional economic migration variables. This model may be 
useful in explaining involuntary migration of individuals from countries with high level of political 
instability, where these individual are facing certain probability of threat. Once it is included into 
the utility model of an individual and assuming that individuals prefer less risk, the model predicts 
increased number of involuntary migrants as the level of political instability, or risk, increases. 
However, in the case of ethnic cleansing, there is no probability of threat, but certainty. In the first 
stage of ethnic cleansing, individuals are forcibly evicted from their houses, thus the threat has been 
exercised. In the second stage, individuals decide whether to migrate or not based on a mix of 
economic and risk factors.
21
 What this model correctly points out is that the threat is not randomly 
targeting individual, but in the case of political instability some are more likely to be threatened and 
                                                 
21
 The model of determinants of brain drain as a result of ethnic cleansing will be presented in the next chapter. This 
model is based on models of voluntary migration, as it assumes that individuals, even those who were forcibly evicted, 
base their decision on economic opportunities that will increase their utility after making migration decision. But also, 
they are faced with a certain level of risk, which is additional determinant of their migration decision. 
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in the case of ethnic cleansing individuals with specific characteristics are targeted with a high level 
of certainty. As the revealed evictions are easier to measure than a probability of threat, it is 
expected that the model to be developed in the next chapter will be possible to empirically test more 
easily than in the case of the previous models, such as the one discussed above. 
 There have been several attempts to provide evidence on the relationship between the 
characteristics of conflict and the size of refugee flows or proportions of refugees in the total 
number of displaced persons, based on the analysis of cross-country data sets (Melander & Oberg, 
2004; Davenport et al., 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2006). However, there has not been any attempt 
so far to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of conflict and the magnitude of 
brain drain, i.e. the proportion of individuals with tertiary education in the total population of 
refugees at country level. The Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset allows this type of analysis, by 
focusing on a subset of countries which experienced conflict. The model which will be developed in 
the next chapter can be empirically tested at a cross-country level by using a set of variables such as 
Gini coefficient as a measure of relative deprivation, change in GDP per capita as a measure of the 
change in relative deprivation and number of internally displaced in a country as a variable 
capturing the extent of forced evictions during an ethnic cleansing. 
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Introduction
22
  
 
The brain drain represents a decrease in the stock of human capital and decrease in fiscal 
contributions to a country‘s budget. However, it may also have various positive effects for a home 
country. First, skilled migrants send remittances back home, which contributes to human capital 
formation through positive impact on households‘ income and subsequently on their education 
investments. Moreover, diaspora has a range of other positive effects on a country‘s economic 
development, through facilitation of trade, FDI, tourism and other relations between their home and 
host country. Also, return migration represents an important channel of transfer of financial, human 
capital, cultural and other assets from host to home country. This thesis is primarily interested in the 
effects of emigration of highly educated individuals on human capital formation in a home country 
and focuses on three channels which directly affect human capital formation, as follows: (1) the 
impact of remittances on educational attainment in a home country; (2) the impact of migration 
prospects on investments in education; (3) the impact of return of highly educated individuals 
(―brain circulation‖) on a stock of human capital. These positive effects on the stock of human 
capital in a home country are known collectively as ―brain gain‖. These different channels may be 
presented as a flowchart, in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The work presented in this chapter is to a large extent based on author‘s previous work (Oruc, 2009). 
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Figure 3.1. Flows of effects of migration on human capital formation in a home country 
 
 
 
          Key: 
           Brain drain 
           Incentive effect
           Remittances 
           Return migration
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The arrows numbered above denote different types of empirical analyses
23
 which should be 
pursued in the empirical work that attempts to estimate a possible net effect of forced migration 
(including the one that results from ethnic cleansing). The first analysis, on the negative impact of 
ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital in a country (brain drain), would provide empirical 
evidence of a self-selection mechanism in the case of ethnic cleansing, in order to estimate 
magnitude of brain-drain from countries affected by such event (Arrow 1). Other three arrows 
present the channels of positive feedback effect of brain drain, typically called brain gain effects. 
The first empirical analysis of brain gain and second overall, would test the idea that migration 
prospects induce increased education investments by those remaining at home, thus increasing 
human capital stock and reducing negative effects of brain drain from a home country (Arrow 2). 
                                                 
23
 The net effect of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital cannot be estimated by a single model. The negative 
impact can be simply measured by counting the number of highly skilled emigrants. But, the determinants of such 
numbers should be investigated through an empirical analysis. On the other hand, positive feedback effect of ethnic 
cleansing on the stock of human capital via the brain drain can be only analysed indirectly, through measuring the 
impact of the emigration incentives and of remittances on the acquisition of education in a country. Moreover, due to 
the nature of relationships, some models can be tested only at micro, while others only at macro level. 
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The third empirical analysis and second of brain gain, investigates the positive impact of 
remittances on relaxation of liquidity constraint and increased educational investments by 
remittances receiving households (Arrow 3). Finally, the fourth analysis investigates the return 
migration channel and would consist of two different types of analysis. The first one (Arrow 4a) is 
the analysis of the self-selection of return migrants in terms of their education levels and its impact 
on human capital formation in a home country. Positive self-selection would mean that more highly 
educated migrants return and thus partly mitigate the negative impact of brain drain in the long run. 
The second type of analysis (Arrow 4b) would test the hypothesis that return migrants, after their 
migration experience, have increased awareness of the importance of education
24
 and are more 
likely to invest in the education of their children upon return. Combining the results from all these 
empirical studies should reveal possible net effect of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital 
in a country, which would be calculated as a sum of positive effects (Arrows 2, 3 and 4) minus 
negative effect (Arrow 1). All these empirical analyses, except the ones on return migration, will be 
conducted in this thesis. Unfortunately, the analysis of return migration is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, as the data on return migrants cannot be easily obtained. Consequently, the final output of 
this thesis will not be estimation of the net effect of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital 
in a country, as one of the channels is missing, namely the one on return migration. Still, the four 
different empirical studies on the ethnic cleansing, where at least two of them are the first attempts 
to provide empirical evidence on this topic, will be a great contribution to the literature on the 
economic consequences of ethnic cleansing, as well as of migration and conflicts in general. 
According to the characteristics of the brain gain channels, it is expected that neither forced 
migrants will be considerably different from voluntary migrants after migration, in terms of their 
remittances sending and return migration behaviour, nor that the incentive effect in such countries 
will operate differently. The key difference between these two types of migration with regards to 
                                                 
24
 Or ―social remittances‖, as usually described in the migration literature. 
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the feedback effects is that their size can be different and that the structural break in the magnitude 
of migration flows caused by ethnic cleansing will require more time to offset the negative impact 
of such a brain drain on human capital formation in a country, compared to voluntary migration. 
Consequently, the analysis of the brain gain in the context of ethnic cleansing is primarily an 
empirical question.  
As explained earlier, the migration process is different from voluntary migration, since 
different factors influence the migration decision. Therefore, it is important to take into account 
these differences in the analysis of the brain drain part of the process (Arrow 1 in Figure 3.1). As a 
result, this chapter will first provide the explanation of the differences in the flows of migration 
between ethnic cleansing and voluntary migration and then will develop a theoretical model of 
ethnic cleansing, in order to capture its specific features in the subsequent empirical analysis of the 
brain drain from countries affected. Such empirical analysis would test the predictions of the model 
with relation to the magnitude of brain drain as a result of ethnic cleansing, compared to voluntary 
migration. 
 
3.1. Motivation: Ethnic cleansing as a specific type of migration  
 
As presented in the previous chapter, the migration literature can be generally divided into two 
types based on the view about the sign of net effect that emigration of educated individuals has for 
the home country, or which of the two effects on the human capital stock, brain drain or brain gain, 
is stronger. However, the problem with both types of theories is that they do not make distinction 
between different types of emigration. It is already mentioned that one of the key characteristics of 
ethnic cleansing, which distinguishes it from other types of migration, is the magnitude of 
displacement. This means that it is likely to expect both different time frame necessary to allow for 
possible positive net effect and difference in the magnitude of positive effects of such emigration. 
For instance, the impact of emigration of highly educated individuals on human capital formation 
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through increased incentives for investments in education by those left in a home country, as it 
increases prospects for emigration, may be expected in case of voluntary migration. But, not 
necessarily in the case of ethnic cleansing, since they emigrated not primarily attracted by higher 
expected economic gains. Therefore a separate analysis of this type of emigration should be 
conducted and would bring necessary insight into this problem, by taking into account important 
differences between voluntary and forced migration. Possible differences in the expected net effect 
of migration on human capital formation in a home country, as a result of the differences in the 
magnitude of displacement, are described in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 below. Figure 3.2 presents 
the effect of individual emigration on human capital formation.  
 
Figure 3.2. Brain drain and brain gain in individual type migration 
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In period 0, there is no migration. In period 1, emigration results in reduction of human capital, 
which is below the level of human capital without emigration, i.e. we have brain drain. After period 
1, brain drain brings some positive impact on the human capital through different channels, such as 
incentive effect and remittances. This increases the growth rate of human capital, so in the period 2 
the negative impact of brain drain has been replaced. In the period 3, we could even expect net 
positive impact of emigration on human capital formation. Whether this is actually observed 
depends on the level of positive influences, such as remittances. 
Key: 
Hn – level of human 
capital without migration 
Hm – level of human 
capital with migration 
 
  
Hm 
Hn 
time
e 
59 
 
The second chart presents the effect of mass emigration (such as the one that results from 
ethnic cleansing) on human capital formation. 
Figure 3.3. Brain drain and brain gain in group type migration 
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The process in this case is similar as in the situation of individual migration. The only 
difference is that ethnic cleansing is usually associated with sharp increase in the emigration rates 
for a short period of time. Thus, a shock (e.g. ethnic conflict) in period 1 significantly reduces the 
stock of human capital in a country. Consequently, even if it is assumed that the channels of brain 
gain (incentive effect, remittances effect and return migration effect) in the case of ethnic cleansing 
have the same degree of positive emigration effect on human capital formation as in the case of 
voluntary migration, still the large decrease in the stock of human capital caused by ethnic cleansing 
requires a long time period of positive effects to be present until such a brain drain is offset and the 
positive net effect (difference between brain gain and brain drain) is observed. This is only possible 
if no new large depletion of the stock of human capital is observed in consecutive periods. 
Therefore, it should be generally observed that countries with a more volatile history will have the 
negative net effect of emigration. 
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3.2. Background: Displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1990s  
 
The above section explained how the magnitude of brain drain from ethnic cleansing may 
differ from brain drain in case of voluntary migration, which affects the net effect of this process. In 
order to understand the factors that influence the magnitude of brain drain from ethnic cleansing, 
the theoretical model of ethnic cleansing shall be developed and presented in this chapter. As an 
introduction to it and with the purpose of understanding the process of ethnic cleansing completely 
and all details, a small scale investigation of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 
conflict in 1990s was conducted. This event is chosen as it may be considered as one of the most 
striking examples of ethnic cleansing that is representative not only of ethnic cleansing, but also of 
other types of migrations falling into the broad category of population transfer. The result of this 
investigation is expected to reveal to what extent is the model of voluntary migration suitable for 
the explanation of the process of ethnic cleansing and if not, how it should be extended or amended. 
Before 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a federal state within Yugoslavia, a Republic with very 
mixed ethnic structure. According to the 1991 Census, the country‘s population was composed of 
three main ethnic groups, considered as ―Constituent People‖ of a country: Bosniaks (43%); 
Bosnian Serbs (33%); and Bosnian Croats (18%).
25
 The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
26
 began in 
April 1992 and finished in December 1995, by US backed negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. This war 
has been characterized by mass resettlement of people, as a result of the main goal of some warring 
parties to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing of the territory they control and artificially create a 
possibility to claim control over that territory. As a consequence of such strategies, about half of the 
population was resettled during the war, where approximately 25% was displaced internally and the 
                                                 
25
 This sums up to about 94% of total population. Other ethnic groups, considered as minorities, are Roma, Jews and 
other groups. In total there are 17 different minorities in the country. 
26
 There are different views of opposing parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina about the type of this conflict. For those fighting 
on the government‘s side (mainly Bosniaks), it was aggression by Serbia (international conflict) and for separatists 
(mainly Serbs) it was a civil war. The International Crime Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY), in several of its 
statements and verdicts, declared it was a civil conflict with international features. 
61 
 
other 25% emigrated abroad (MHRR, 2005). The result was almost total division of population 
along ethnic lines. As the above figures show, it was large scale forced displacement of people, 
where the displaced individuals had no choice to remain, but were forced to leave their homes. The 
individuals were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. In the case of natural disasters or some 
development projects, individuals are also non-randomly targeted, but on the basis of their place of 
living. Thus, the forced displacement involves a large part (50% in the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina), but not the entire population. After displacement, individuals chose to stay within the 
country (half of displaced in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina), while others chose to migrate abroad. 
Also, some of those who were not displaced from their houses decide to migrate. The question that 
the theoretical model should answer is what factors influence such different migration decisions. 
In order to investigate specific features of ethnic cleansing that took place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 12 semi-structured interviews
27
 were conducted. Due to the different types of forced 
migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was decided to perform 12 interviews, 3 from each of the 
alternative types of displaced households: refugees; returned refugees; internally displaced; or 
returned internally displaced. Three major cities with highest concentration of displaced people - 
Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka
28
 - were chosen in the first stage of sampling. Potential 
interviewees were then randomly
29
 selected from online phone directories
30
 of three telephone 
services providers from these cities in the second stage. Then, each of them was asked several brief 
questions, related to their ethnic origin, current displacement status and willingness to take part in 
the interview. In each group, three households were chosen from a different ethnic group and in the 
whole group of 12 interviewees, half of them were female, half highly educated and half displaced 
                                                 
27
 The questionnaire used in these semi-structured interviews in provided in Appendix 3.1. 
28
 Here, Sarajevo has been the main displacement destination site for ethnic Bosniaks, Mostar for ethnic Croats and 
Banja Luka for ethnic Serbs. 
29
 The purpose of the survey was not to collect a large number of responses, but just initial information about the 
magnitude of ethnic cleansing conducted by each warring party, in order to have at least some evidence on this, instead 
of taking a subjective position. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample was not of particular importance. At 
least certain degree of unbiasedness was achieved through random selection. 
30
 In a country without Census and street address directories, this was the best possible source for selection of 
respondents. Thus, the possible selection bias of choosing respondents who have a phone can only be acknowledged 
and accepted in such circumstances. 
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from non-urban areas. The main objectives of semi-structured interviews were to identify 
differences in the motives and the patterns of displacement between internally displaced and 
refugees. Moreover, it provided useful information about the differences in migration decision 
making between individuals with different levels of education. 
Nine respondents explained that they were forced to move and that they went to the closest 
place which they considered as a ―safe haven‖.31 Then, they were in a position to make a decision 
where to move. Other three interviewees were living in a municipality which has been under the 
control of their ethnic group. Thus, these interviewees have not faced a direct threat to their lives. 
They explained that their motive for migration was primarily economic, but can also be considered 
as affected by the war, which reduced the options available. The choice of the final destination was 
influenced by the ―network effect‖, since two thirds of respondents, both internally displaced and 
refugees, stated that they had relatives or close friends living at their final destination. Interviewees 
were also asked several questions about the process of displacement. The set of questions in this 
section of the questionnaire were slightly different, as they were adjusted according to individual 
displacement experience.  The majority of cases of displacement have taken place in a family 
context. Sometimes, a male household head decided to stay and fight and then joined the rest of the 
family after some time. Returned refugees and returned internally displaced persons were also asked 
questions on their return experience. The results of these interviews did not reveal any clear 
differences in demographic characteristics between displaced and returned displaced households, 
which indicates that the decision to displace and decision to return were two different decision 
influenced by different factors.
32
 
In assessing the process of displacement of individuals from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it has 
been found through this small scale investigation, two types of individuals can be distinguished: 
those who were forced to displace and those who did not, but faced indirect threats and worsened 
                                                 
31
 A ―safe haven‖ was any place which was controlled by a group of the same ethnicity as respondent's. In such a place, 
they were facing indirect threat, but at least not certainty of being killed. 
32
 This may be used as an argument for separate analysis of these two processes, displacement and return of migrants. 
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economic situation. In the example of displacement from Bosnia-Herzegovina, two different types 
of situations in which individuals found themselves at the beginning of the war can be 
distinguished. The first type, which can be called type A situation, is the one in which individuals 
were living in a municipality controlled by authorities of the same ethnic group, thus they were not 
faced with forced eviction. The level of indirect threat to households has been different, depending 
on the proximity of the place to the fighting zones. However, the threat has been random, meaning 
that all individuals in one place, regardless of their ethnicity or other characteristics, were facing the 
same level of threat. Type B situation is the one where individuals were living in the area controlled 
by a group of a different ethnicity, thus being faced with forced eviction.
33
 These people usually did 
not have a choice to stay and also were generally not allowed to take any valuables with them.
34
 
This type of displacement mainly took place in the first few months of the war. This type of 
displacement was non-random, but dependent on the combination of household‘s characteristics and 
control of a municipality by a specific ethnic group. It is accepted that there were some households 
which were living in type B situation, but decided not to leave; in spite of the risk such decision has 
carried. But, these were occasional cases and it is expected that creating a variable by combining 
available data on ethnic origin and type of a local government in a municipality will capture the vast 
majority of cases. This variable should capture the effect of first ―no-choice‖ displacement, or 
―forced eviction‖ and take into account loss of physical capital and other characteristics of the new 
situation which may affect further displacement decisions made by these households. Although 
some households crossed the border immediately after being forced to leave these municipalities, 
the common pattern was that households leaving these places were displaced to the nearest 
                                                 
33
 According ot the available data on the displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, almost 100% of individuals who were in 
a type B situation, were forced to leave their homes during the conflict. In addition, there have been takeovers of some 
municipalities by an opposing ethnic group. Since other ethnic groups have already been evicted, this takeover usually 
implied eviction of the total population of the municipality, just at different points of time. 
34
 The type B situation can be compared to a flooded area, or an area affected by a development project. These 
similarities give an argument for using the evidence from the ethnic cleansing displacement for explanation of 
displacement as a result of natural disasters and development projects. 
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municipality controlled by authorities of their ethnic group first. From that new destination, 
households were then making further displacement decisions. 
There has been certain amount of displacement observed by individuals being in type A 
situation, besides households displaced from B type situations. As explained previously, an event 
such as conflict or natural disaster reduces economic opportunities to all individuals and introduced 
indirect threats. For these reasons, some households although not being forcibly evicted from their 
homes decided to migrate abroad. The entire process of ethnic cleansing, including both forced 
displacement and subsequent migration by the evicted and non-evicted, can be presented in Figure 
3.2. below, which is drawn in the form of a decision tree. 
 
Figure 3.4. The pattern of displacement during a conflict 
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In Figure 3.4, the blocks represent types of situation in which a household finds itself as a 
conflict occurs, broken arrows exogenous change and full arrows endogenous change in the well-
being of households, both absolute and relative. Arrows labelled by M1 represent changes in the 
well-being due to the event causing forced displacement, such as a conflict or natural disaster and 
those labelled by M2 the change due to the migration. The above figure presents the pattern of 
displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as described in the presentation of the results of semi-
structural interviews, as well as the idea of two-stage process of the ethnic cleansing, which is the 
main contribution of the theoretical model developed below. The first block (0) is a pre-event 
position of households, in terms of their well-being. As the event occurs, people move from 0 to 1 
(the move presented by two broken arrows denoted by M1 from the block 0 to two blocks at the 
middle level of figure). The two types of situations in which households may find themselves in are 
distinguished, the one when households find themselves in a more ―friendly‖ environment (type A 
position), such as a municipality controlled by their ethnic group (block 1A) or the one when they 
find themselves in a more ―hostile‖ environment (type B position), such as a municipality 
controlled by another ethnic group (block 1B). The households from the block A (type A position) 
were not forced to displace, but their well-being wais affected by the conflict, both in absolute and 
relative terms. Those from the block B (type B position) were forced to displace to the nearest 
municipality controlled by their ethnic group. After this change in well-being (which, for some, 
includes forced displacement), households were making decision whether to stay in the (pre-war or 
new) municipality to displace elsewhere within the country (block 2A), or to migrate abroad (block 
2B). 
 The distinction between the two types of situations in which households find themselves are 
important for the correct identification of the extent to which the well-being of households with 
different characteristics was changed. This is important for measuring the size of relative 
deprivation of households when they compare their position during conflict (stage 1) with pre-
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conflict position (stage 0). According to Figure 3.1, there are two types of forced migrants in the 
case of ethnic cleansing: namely those who were affected by the conflict and decide to leave their 
homes, in order to reduce the risk and/or for economic motives; and those who, once forced to leave 
their homes and lost their property, decide whether to be internally displaced (by staying in a place 
of their immediate displacement or to move to another place within a country) or to move abroad. 
Thus, the forced evictions, in addition to the occurrence of conflict, cause much more significant 
decrease in the well-being of households than just the occurrence of the conflict. The well-being is 
changed both in terms of absolute income and relative position within a reference group. According 
to the Neoclassical theory of migration, larger migration from countries affected by a conflict is 
expected because the absolute income of the vast majority of individuals is negatively affected by 
the conflict, so the pre-war utility of migration may change from being lower to becoming higher 
than utility of staying. Also, the individuals who were forcibly evicted are expected to be more 
likely to migrate, as they suffered more significant losses in terms of their absolute income and the 
gain from migration by these individuals, or their expected wage differential is higher than by those 
who were not forcibly displaced. In addition to this, the relative deprivation hypothesis states that 
the migration decision will depend not only on the change in absolute income, but also on the 
change in individual‘s relative position within a reference group. As a large proportion of 
individuals were affected, either by forced displacement or by reduced economic opportunities, the 
relative deprivation of each individual relative to the reference group will not necessarily increase 
for all individuals. Therefore, the relative deprivation hypothesis does not predict increased overall 
number of migrants, but instead predicts positive self-selection of migrants, or their skill 
composition. Furthermore, it suggests that we can equally observe migration by both those who 
were and those who were not forcibly displaced. 
Based on the results of the investigation of process of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by conducting a small scale survey of households‘ displacement experience, presented above, 
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specific features of ethnic cleansing were identified. The interviews confirmed the fact that 
individuals were forcibly evicted from their homes, they were non-randomly targeted and that the 
well-being of the entire population was negatively affected by the conflict. However, the absolute 
income of those who were forcibly evicted was much more severely affected than of those who 
were not. These specific features were then used as a platform to develop a formal model of ethnic 
cleansing. It is a type of migration characterized by forced evictions of part, but not of the entire 
population. The affected individuals are a non-randomly chosen segment of the population. 
Individuals with characteristics such as ethnic origin in the case of conflict, or place of living in the 
case of disasters and some development projects, are forced to flee. They were not given any option 
to stay. Also, those who were not displaced were affected by the worsened economic situation and 
increased risk. Then, some individuals from both groups, those who were and those who were not 
forcibly displaced, make their migration decision. Accordingly, the model of ethnic cleansing, 
which will be developed in the next section, should incorporate these facts: the two-stage process in 
particular; non-random targeting; influence of both absolute change in income and relative 
deprivation; as well as the factor of risk. 
As defined previously, the main aim of this thesis is to analyse factors affecting migration of 
highly educated individuals and the feedback effect of this migration on human capital formation in 
a home country affected by ethnic cleansing, so it is of particular interest to understand how does an 
ethnic cleansing affect the skill composition of migrants. If it is assumed that highly educated 
people had higher income and were less relatively deprived (or, in other words, they had higher 
level of relative satisfaction), then it could be expected that they suffer greater losses in terms of 
absolute income, but also of their relative satisfaction than low educated individuals. Also, their 
relative deprivation compared to the position before the event causing ethnic cleansing increases 
(more), compared to the low educated. If individuals with tertiary education incurred greater 
welfare losses of emigration as a result of war (and/or being forced to move), they may be more 
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prone to emigrate in order to restore those losses. This may then act as a self-selection mechanism 
of ethnic cleansing. So, according to the Neoclassical models of migration, we should observe 
increased number of individuals migrating from areas affected by a conflict, but cannot predict their 
skills composition. According to the relative deprivation hypothesis, briefly described in the 
previous chapter, a positive self-selection of individuals in the case of ethnic cleansing should be 
observed. This means that the ethnic cleansing increases total emigration from a country by 
decreasing the absolute income of individuals (Neoclassical models), but also the emigration rates 
of highly educated individuals by decreasing their relative position within the society (relative 
deprivation hypothesis). Empirically, this would mean that the observed outcome, on average, is a 
larger proportion of highly educated individuals outside the country as a result of ethnic cleansing, 
compared to voluntary migration. The empirical test of this hypothesis is made possible by recently 
collected data on the skill composition of immigrants in OECD countries by Docquier and Marfouk 
(2006). 
 
3.3. Economic model of ethnic cleansing 
 
The pattern of displacement from Bosnia-Herzegovina described above and presented in Figure 
3.1, reveals that ethnic cleansing, compared to voluntary migration, involves large scale forced 
evictions of individual, where those who were evicted are non-randomly targeted and that such 
event changes both absolute and relative income of individuals. Individuals compare their pre- and 
post-ethnic cleansing well-being and their migration decisions are affected by the differences 
between their well-being in the two periods. These specific features of ethnic cleansing are not 
taken into consideration in the models of voluntary migration, presented in Chapter 2. As a 
consequence, a model for ethnic cleansing needs to be developed.  
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The following model of the ethnic cleansing is based on Stark and Taylor (1991), in which a 
relative deprivation hypothesis is presented. Some of the steps of mathematical transformation were 
applied in the same way as in their model, in order to make these two comparable, to point out the 
main features of the new model and to show how it differs from voluntary migration models, such 
as the one presented in the Stark and Taylor (1991). One of the key differences is that the model 
proposed in this thesis is presented as a two-stage process. In the first stage, households‘ utility is 
exogenously affected by conflict (change from 0 to 1A in Figure 3.1). In the second stage, 
households‘ utility is changed as a result of their endogenous migration decision (change from 1A 
to either 2A or 2B in Figure 3.1), where the migration decision of a household is based on the 
comparison of its income and relative deprivation before (Stage 1) and after (Stage 2) migration, but 
conditional on these values before ethnic cleansing (Stage 0). The most important feature of the 
proposed model is a new hypothesis, based on the original Runciman‘s explanation of the relative 
deprivation and findings of descriptive analysis of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 
―restoration hypothesis‖, which is incorporated into the model. 
The relative deprivation hypothesis, introduced in the migration context by Stark and Taylor 
(1991), states that households evaluate migration decisions not only on the basis of absolute, but 
also of relative income differences within a community. Households evaluate their position relative 
to the community and feel deprived of having commodities that households richer than them have. 
The further below the average community income the household earns, then the more prone to 
migrate (in order to improve their relative income position in a community). Under the assumption 
of a continuous income distribution, where each income unit can be represented by a range (x, x + 
Δx) and where Δx→0, the relative deprivation function of a household is presented by the following 
equation: 
 
           (3.1)  
h
i
y
y
i dxxFgRD )](1[
70 
 
 
Here, RDi denotes the relative deprivation of household i, yi income of household i, yh the 
highest income in the reference group, x represents an income unit (or Runciman‘s X), F(x) the 
cumulative distribution of income in a reference group (Lorenz curve) and 1 - F(x) the percentage 
of households whose income is higher than x. Equation (3.1) represents the area below the Lorenz 
curve between household‘s position and position of the richest person in a community. This shows 
that a relative deprivation of an individual can be reduced by either increase in his income or by 
decrease in income of the richer individuals. Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) provided a proof that the 
right-hand side of Equation (3.1) can be decomposed into the product of proportion of household 
whose income is higher than that of a household i and their mean excess income. Hence, this 
hypothesis suggest that, given absolute income levels and expected gains from migration, 
individuals who feel more deprived are more likely to migrate. Moreover, migration flows should 
be in direction from societies with higher to societies with lower income inequality. In addition to 
this, if we extent this idea onto the additional part of Runciman's original quote related to 
individual's comparison of their well-being to the one in some previous point of time,
35
 mentioned 
in Chapter 2, then we should expect that those who were affected by ethnic cleansing event more 
severely, are expected to feel more deprived in term of their current to pre-conflict position and thus 
are more likely to migrate. 
This insight suggests a need for introducing a new hypothesis into the migration models. The 
―restoration hypothesis‖ is based on the observation that an ethnic cleansing event affects 
households‘ well-being. The event works as a shock to the economy of a country and results in 
decrease in economic activity, increase of prices, fall of real wages, etc. which causes decrease in 
the value of the income element of a household‘s utility function. Consequently, conflicts generally 
                                                 
35
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this part of Runciman‘s original explanation of relative deprivation was generally 
neglected in the migration literature, because of the characteristics of voluntary migration. Once the ethnic cleansing is 
described as a two-stage process where the second stage decision is conditional on the first stage changes in income and 
relative deprivation, this part of the Runciman‘s explanation becomes particularly relevant. 
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increase the level of relative deprivation of households compared to their position in pre-conflict 
period, so they are therefore expected to increase overall migration from areas affected by conflict. 
The more the well-being worsened, the more likely they should be to migrate abroad in order to 
restore
36
 their pre-event well-being. As presented in the Figure 3.1, some households may 
experience additional decrease of both absolute income and relative position within a community 
(which affects their relative deprivation) through the losses of site-specific capital due to forced 
eviction and displacement (change from 1B to 1A). These additional losses are not random, since 
only households of specific characteristics were facing forced displacement. Based on the 
restoration hypothesis, it may be expected that all households experience certain welfare losses due 
to conflict and that those which experience more significant losses, both absolute and relative, are 
more prone to migrate in order to restore pre-event level of utility. It should be also expected that 
households which were richer before the war will suffer larger absolute losses due to the war. 
Moreover, regarding the relative deprivation, it could be expected that richer households are worse-
off in terms of the increase in their relative deprivation (or decrease in the relative satisfaction), 
while poorer households may be even better-off in terms of change in relative deprivation, as a 
result of negative impact of a conflict on overall welfare. Thus, the ―restoration hypothesis‖ predicts 
that individuals who migrate as a result of their absolute income differences and relative 
deprivation, will be positively selected in terms of their income and accordingly in terms of their 
level of education. This is of particular importance for the analysis of the impact of ethnic cleansing 
on the magnitude of brain drain from the affected country. 
Following Stark and Taylor‘s (1991) hypothetical example, it is assumed initially that half of 
the population in a village have income of 150 income units and other half 100 income units, while 
income in a town is 200 units. If, due to a shock, the income of the first group falls from 150 to 100 
and of the other group from 100 to 80, decrease of migration by households from a group with 
                                                 
36
 The term ―restore‖ used here does not mean that the model assumes that individuals will be equally well-off after 
migration as before the ethnic cleansing, but it assumes that individuals are expected to be better-off after migration 
than they would be if they decide not to migrate.  
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income of 80 may be observed. Although they experience an absolute decrease in income, their 
relative position due to the decrease in the average income of the reference group has actually 
improved. However, a group with higher relative income has experienced decrease in both absolute 
income and relative position. Therefore, they would be now more inclined to migrate to a town in 
order to restore both their absolute income and their relative position. In the case of refugees, it may 
be expected that households with higher pre-war income may be less able to adapt to new 
conditions brought by a conflict then households with lower income, thus having additional motives 
for migration. These insights should be incorporated into the model of ethnic cleansing now. 
 In any model of migration, assuming that individuals are rational economic agents, we 
should expect that they will decide to migrate only if: 
 
0iid UU           (3.2) 
 
where Uid denotes utility of a household i after migration and Ui0 its utility with no migration. 
According to the Neoclassical economic theory, the utility is primarily based on the wage, thus 
wage differential between two countries is the main driving force of migration. But, as explained 
above, individual‘s utility is based on the absolute income, but also relative deprivation and its 
change between two periods, as well as indirect risk. So, for the explanation of ethnic cleansing, we 
need to incorporate both the relative deprivation hypothesis developed by Stark and Taylor (1991) 
and restoration hypothesis proposed here, in order to develop a model which will generate 
satisfactory predictions about this type of migration process. 
So, the utility of an individual is then: 
 
),,( ijijijij XRDYUU         (3.3) 
δUij / δYij > 0,  
73 
 
δUij / δRDij < 0 and  
δUij / δXij < 0 
 
where U denotes utility, Y income, RD relative deprivation, X level of risk (ranging between 0 
= no risk and 1 = maximum risk), subscript i the individual observation
37
 and subscript j the 
displacement decision, j=0, 1, 2, where 0 is the pre-ethnic cleansing situation (the same as stage 0 
in Figure 3.2), 1 is a situation during-the-war and before displacement, where we have decrease in 
utility due to the conflict as well as forced evictions (Stage 1 in Figure 3.4) and 2 is case of 
migration (Stage 2 in Figure 3.4). The first part of Equation (3.3) shows that the household‘s utility 
is a function of his income, relative deprivation and the level of risk. The second part of the 
Equation explains that their utility is increasing function of income and decreasing function of 
relative deprivation and risk. 
At this point, it is assumed that Ui0 > Ui2 > Ui1, where Ui0 denotes household‘s utility before 
occurrence of conflict, Ui1 its new utility, after the start of conflict and Ui2 utility after migration. 
This means that households, which were in the country when a conflict or a natural disaster 
happened, were in the country because their utility of staying was higher than utility of migrating, 
so were not potential migrants. This assumption excludes the possibility of ―bogus refugees‖.38 But, 
as an event occurs, the utility of households changes, which induces migration of households that 
would otherwise not migrate. 
 The net utility loss from war (affecting all households in a country) and non-optional choice 
displacement (affecting a selected group of households) is then: 
 
                                                 
37
 Individual observation in this model and subsequent empirical estimation is a household. The reason for it is that the 
analysis of the process of ethnic cleansing revealed that the migration decision is generally made at the household level, 
since the risk cannot be diversified between household members, as income in the case of voluntary migration. Also, the 
data used in this thesis show that in the most cases entire households emigrated. 
38
 ―Bogus refugees‖ are defined as individuals who intend to migrate voluntarily and, in the case of a conflict, are using 
the current political situation in a country in order to claim their rights for refugee status in a host country. 
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U1 < U0,  
Y1 < Y0,  
X1 > X0 and 
ΔRD1 < (ΔY1 - ΔX1) 
 
 This equation represents the first stage of the conflict-induced migration process. Equation 
(3.4) shows that the utility after the event (such as conflict or natural disaster) decreases compared 
to the pre-event situation, because the income is lower and risk is higher. For relative deprivation, it 
is difficult to make assumption about its sign, but it can be expected that (most of) households are 
not likely to be better-off once the event occurs. This condition is required to have the difference 
between U1 and U0 always negative, regardless of the direction of change in RD.  
As presented above, RD is a non-linear function of cumulative income of a reference group. In 
order to include RD into the model and make the necessary mathematical operations, a 
transformation of Equation (3.1) from a definite integral into linear form is required. Following 
Stark and Taylor (1991), this is done by first-order Taylor-series transformation of Equation (3.1) 
around Y0.
39
 The Taylor-series transformation approximates a small change in RD by a product of a 
small change in the household‘s income and the first order derivative of his RD with respect to 
income. After this transformation, Y1 can be replaced by Y0 + w1 and RD1 by RD0 + RD’0w1, where 
w1= Y1 - Y0 is the household‘s income loss from conflict and RD’ a derivative of RD with respect to 
Y. Also, X1 can be now expressed as X0 + r1, where r1 is the increase in risk a household faces as a 
result of conflict. The income loss of conflict (w1), when original Runciman‘s explanation of 
                                                 
39
 This is merely an approximation of the non-linear Lorenz curve by linear tangent on it at point of household i‘s 
income. This transformation will therefore hold only in cases of small changes in Y. Unfortunately, this might affect 
precision of estimation of the impact of large decrease in income on the migration decision. 
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relative deprivation is applied, is actually relative deprivation of households based on their 
comparison of current and pre-conflict well-being. The larger the loss, according to the restoration 
hypothesis, then the more deprived households will be and therefore more prone to migrate. When 
substituting these approximations into Equation (3.4), the utility can be expressed as a function of 
Y0, RD0, X0, w1 and r1. It is assumed here that w1 < 0, or Y1 < Y0, meaning that income of all 
individuals are negatively affected by a conflict or disaster, although to different extent, depending 
whether an individual was in a position of type A or type B (Figure 3.1). There may be some 
exceptions,
40
 but it is expected that majority of households will be worse-off in terms of income 
after the occurrence of the conflict (it changes from 0 to 1A in Figure 1). Also, it may be assumed 
that, for the majority of people, except those at the bottom of income distribution, relative 
deprivation decreases because of decline in the average income, which may have a positive impact 
on migration of the individuals with tertiary education, because their ―positive‖ relative deprivation 
(or relative satisfaction) actually decreases (ΔRD < 0). Finally, it is assumed that r1 > 0, or X1 > X0, 
which means that risk increases with occurrence of a conflict or a disaster. 
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Equation (3.5) shows that a change in utility from U0 to U1, as a consequence of a conflict or 
natural disaster (which, for some households, includes forced evictions) is a function of initial 
income, initial relative deprivation, as well as decrease in absolute income and increase in risk 
during the event. After the household experienced such decrease in the utility, the situation in terms 
of the difference between the utility of staying and utility of migrating abroad changes, so the 
original positive difference between the utility of staying compared to the utility of migrating 
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 For example, smugglers who abuse difficulties caused by a conflict and get rich by reselling goods with extremely 
high margin. 
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(U0>U2) can turn into negative (U1<U2). So, some of them, in the second stage of the ethnic 
cleansing process described in Figure 3.1, decide to migrate. The net utility gain from migration is 
then: 
 
),,(),,( 111222122 XRDYUXRDYUUUU       (3.6) 
          
Y2 > Y1, or 
RD2 > RD1, or         
X2 > X1 
 
The first part of Equation (3.6) is similar to Equation (3.4). Only, Equation (3.4) represents the 
change in the individual‘s utility in the first stage of ethnic cleansing, whereas Equation (3.6) is for 
the stage 2, which is related to migration. It is also assumed here that the individuals are rational 
economic agents, so at least one of the inequalities from the second part of Equation (3.6.) should 
hold in order to observe migration by an individual. This means that an individual migrates if he 
expects to increase his utility by migrating, which will increase at least one of the elements of his 
utility, either absolute income, or relative satisfaction, or security. 
If the change of relative deprivation in the second stage is approximated by its Taylor-series 
expansion and its value is replaced by the values from the stage 1 and their change between the two 
stages, as we did in transformation of Equation (3.4) into (3.5) and also the values from the stage 1 
by their approximations from Equation (3.5), Equation (3.6) will look like: 
 
),,(),',( 11121211212 XRDYUrXwRDRDwYUU     (3.7) 
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Equation (3.4) represents the change in the utility as a result of forced evictions (Stage 1) and 
Equation (3.7) represents the change in the utility as a result of eviction-induced migration (Stage 
2). However, as Runciman (1966: 10), in his original explanation of relative deprivation stated, 
individuals do not only compare their current situation with the reference group, but also with their 
own situation in some previous time period. Applied in the context of ethnic cleansing as a two-
stage process, it will mean that the change in utility of individual as a result of migration, presented 
in Equation (3.7), will not depend only on the absolute income and relative deprivation from the 
stage 1, before migration, but also on these values in the stage 0, before forced evictions, as 
hypothesized above through the ―restoration‖ hypothesis. Consequently, it is necessary to 
incorporate such a hypothesis into the final model of migration as a result of ethnic cleansing, by 
replacing values from the stage 1 in Equation (3.7) by values from the stage 0 plus change between 
stages 0 and 1, which are presented in Equation (3.5). 
By replacing these values, Equation (3.7) is presented as follows: 
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   (3.8) 
            
The final model of the ethnic cleansing is presented by Equation (3.9). The model shows that 
the eviction-induced migration decision depends on the difference between the current level of 
utility (stage1) and utility of migration (stage 2), but conditional on the pre-conflict level of utility 
(stage 0). 
 
),,,,,',',,,( 2121021101002 rrwwXwRDwRDRDRDYU     (3.9) 
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Equation (3.9) that is obtained after the transformations applied, reveals that the migration 
decision in the ethnic cleansing setting, when incorporating the effect of relative deprivation and 
relative loss of utility during the event (and, for some households, also forced eviction) depends on: 
the initial income level (Y0); initial relative deprivation (RD0) and relative deprivation after the 
forced eviction (RD1); initial level of security (S0), change in income due to the event (w1) and 
income gain of migration (w2); difference in relative deprivation not only between the situation 
before and after migration ( 21 'wRD ), but also the change caused by the event and, for some, forced 
evictions ( 10 'wRD ),  as well as risk increase as a consequence of an event (r1) and risk decrease as a 
result of migration (r2). Variable Y0 is standard income variable of migration models. The relative 
deprivation hypothesis is captured by RD0 and RD1, while the restoration hypothesis is presented in 
the model by variables w1 and w2. Finally, the risk factors influencing eviction-induced migration 
are also included, by variables X0, r1 and r2. 
The theoretical model presented above has a number of important features. First, compared to 
the model of Stark and Taylor (1991), this model incorporates the risk factor. Therefore, it may be 
considered as a more appropriate model to be used in the context of forced migration, instead of 
models developed for explanation of the process of voluntary migration. Second, compared to the 
previously developed models of forced migration, such as Kirchhoff and Ibanez (2001) model, it is 
more suitable for the ethnic cleansing as it does not only include risk (or probability of threat) as 
additional motive for migration, but also acknowledges that the threat was certain and has been 
already exercised towards a non-random part of the population. This makes the model more 
appropriate for the explanation of the process of ethnic cleansing compared to the models of 
conflict-induced migration. Third, the ethnic cleansing in this model is presented as a two-stage 
process of migration. It takes into account that individual‘s utility was affected as a result of a 
conflict or a disaster. Finally, this model along with the risk factor incorporates two hypotheses that 
are considered important factors influencing forced migration decision process, namely relative 
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deprivation of Stark and Taylor (1991) and a new ―restoration‖ hypothesis proposed in this thesis. 
Individuals compare their relative position to not only the reference group in a single period of time, 
but also to their own position in the previous point of time. Thus, migration decision is influenced 
by both pre-event income and relative deprivation (Y0 and RD0), but also the change in both of these 
(wi and RDiwi) during the ethnic cleansing. 
The model can be tested empirically both at the household and cross-country level. At the 
household level, household‘s and community‘s incomes give information about absolute and 
relative position of a household within a society and an information whether a household was 
forcibly displaced during an event such as conflict or a disaster can be used as a proxy measure of a 
change in the relative deprivation. At the cross-country level, GDP and its difference before and 
after event are measure of absolute income and its change, respectively. Measures of inequality, 
such as Gini or Theil coefficient, can be used a proxies for relative deprivation. Change in these 
coefficients measures change in relative deprivation. The extent of ethnic cleansing can be captured 
by a number of internally displaced individuals within a country. The level of risk to all individuals 
(after some were forcibly evicted) can be measured by the information on the total number of deaths 
during a conflict or a disaster. 
 
 3.4. Models of brain gain in the context of ethnic cleansing 
 
 The previous discussion has explained how the ethnic cleansing can have negative impact on 
the stock of human capital. However, the new brain gain theories argue that such emigration can 
induce reverse positive impact on the stock of human capital. The literature has identified several 
channels through which the negative effects of brain drain for a home country may be mitigated by 
positive reverse effect of brain drain on human capital formation in a home country. These channels 
are: the incentive effect, where migration prospects induce more individuals to invest in education; 
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remittances effect, where receipt of remittances increases income of remittances receiving 
households and relaxes liquidity constraints they are facing, thus making possible their increased 
education investments; and return migration of highly educated individuals and their impact on 
subsequent human capital formation in a home country, through their increased propensity to invest 
in education upon return. These different channels were presented in Figure 3.1. The arrows 2, 3 
and 4 of Figure 3.1 show the types and direction of impact of different channels of brain gain. Two 
of these channels will be empirically tested in Chapter 5. The first empirical analysis tests the idea 
that migration prospects induce increased education investments by those remaining at home, thus 
increasing human capital stock and reducing negative effects of brain drain from a home country 
(Arrow 2). The second empirical analysis investigates the positive impact of remittances on 
relaxation of liquidity constraint and increased educational investments by remittances receiving 
households (Arrow 3). The third analysis (Arrows 4a and 4b), which would test the impact return 
migration on human capital formation will not be conducted, as such type of empirical work is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, primarily due to the data availability issues.  
 
3.4.1. Incentive effect of brain drain 
 
 The model of ―brain gain‖, explaining the incentive effect, has been presented previously in 
Beine et al. (2006a). It assumed that there is no unskilled migration, migrants are risk-neutral and 
that the probability of migration is exogenous and determined by the situation in a home country. If 
the wage in a period before making the education investment decision is denoted by wt and the 
wage in the period after acquiring education by wt+1, education acquired by h (where h is 
normalized to 1) and costs of education by c, then in the absence of emigration an individual will 
invest in education if: 
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11   tttt wwhwcw         (3.10) 
 
So, the incentive for education is: 
 
0)1(1  chwt         (3.11) 
 
This is simply a home country‘s returns to education. Once the possibility of migration enters 
the wage equation, then Equation (3.10) becomes: 
 
1
*
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where p is probability of migration and w*t+1 wage in a host country. The incentive for 
education with migration probability is now: 
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*
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The second term of the equation, ph(w*t+1 – wt+1), is additional schooling incentive for 
potential emigrants once migration possibility is introduced. As p>0, this implies that migration 
probability to a country with higher returns to education increases expected returns to education, 
compared to no migration. The size of this positive influence is positively related to migration 
probability and differences in returns to education between two countries. This analysis suggests 
that poorer countries with higher rates of educated emigrants are expected to have stronger 
migration-induced incentive for education.  
Schiff (2005) doubted the arguments of Beine et al. (2006a) model and presented different 
models of brain gain showing that this effect is much lower once some of the assumptions of the 
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above model are relaxed. First, once the possibility of emigration by low educated individuals is 
introduced, the education incentive effect is the difference between the migration premiums for high 
and low educated individuals. Second, the probability of migration is not set by home countries, as 
assumed in Beine et al. (2006a), but actually by host countries. Third, the probability is based on 
receiving countries‘ immigration quotas, rather than the proportion of highly educated. Hence, once 
the education incentive is present and individuals opt for education, which increases the number of 
highly educated, the probability of migration decreases for all individuals. Therefore, the 
probability of migration cannot be considered as exogenous. This assumption is important for the 
analysis of ethnic cleansing, but in a slightly different manner than presented in Schiff (2005). If 
human capital stock in a country is denoted by S, education investment with no migration prospects 
by E, the number of highly educated emigrants from a country (brain drain) by BD and additional 
emigration-induced education (brain gain) by BG, then the net effect in time t of emigration of 
highly educated in time t-1 is: 
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This means that the positive impact on the stock of human capital in a country affected by 
brain drain is expected if the additional schooling due to the incentive effect of migration is larger 
than the decrease in the stock of human capital due to the brain drain. 
In order to simplify the entire model, Beine et al. (2006a) assumed that migration probability is 
constant. Schiff (2005) relaxes this assumption and shows that, once probability of emigration 
decreases with increase in the stock of human capital, BG decreases in each subsequent period, 
which eventually leads to a zero additional schooling as a result of migration incentive in a steady 
state. However, he assumes constant BD. In the context of ethnic cleansing, mass emigration of 
highly educated individuals in one period causes BD to be higher in one than in other periods. This 
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actually increases the probability of emigration in subsequent periods by individuals remaining in 
the country and potentially increased brain gain effect (BG) in each period after the ethnic 
cleansing. However, as brain drain caused by ethnic cleansing has been large in the previous period, 
the positive net effect could be expected only after several subsequent periods. Thus, although the 
incentive effect is expected in the case of ethnic cleansing as well, still it should be, on average, 
weaker than in the case of voluntary migration, once the migration probability is approximated by 
the stock of highly educated emigrants from a country. 
Additionally, in the context of ethnic cleansing, the drawback of such an approach is 
measuring the probability of migration by the stock of emigrants. If ethnic cleansing occurs, the 
stock of emigrants will rapidly increase in a short period of time. However, this will not necessarily 
increase immigration quotas for that country by developed countries, which is something that 
potential highly educated migrants remaining within a home country should be aware of. This will 
cause the probability of emigration from a country affected by ethnic cleansing, if measured by a 
stock of highly educated emigrants, to be much larger in subsequent periods than it actually is and 
will potentially increase expected brain gain effect as a result of increased migration incentives. If 
the incentive effect is averaged over different groups of countries, both those with voluntary and 
those with forced migration, it could give misleading results. For that reason, the incentive effect 
should be measured by distinguishing between these two groups. This would provide better insight 
into the extent of this effect in a subset of countries which were affected by ethnic cleansing, as well 
as the differences between two types of migration. 
Based on the previous discussion, the empirical analysis of the incentive effect should follow 
the above model and would be simply re-estimation of the Beine et al. (2006a or 2008) regression 
model on a sub-sample of conflict-countries, with additional variables capturing severity of conflict 
in each country. The specification of the empirical model to be estimated, list of potential 
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explanatory variables and other alternative aspects of the empirical analysis that draw on previous 
empirical studies, is presented in the next chapter. 
  
 3.4.2. Remittances and human capital formation 
 
 Remittances are considered as one of the key channels
41
 mentioned in the arguments that 
brain drain might have a positive impact on human capital formation in a home country. As 
described in Chapter 2, the main argument that remittances can positively influence households‘ 
educational investment decisions is that receipt of remittances relaxes liquidity constraints for 
education investments and reduces children‘s labour participation in remittance receiving household 
(e.g. Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Cox and Ureta, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). However, 
if household budget constraints are not binding, remittances should not have any significant impact 
on education expenditures (Miluka and Dabalen, 2007).  
Notwithstanding, the income effect of remittances is not the only effect. Another important 
effect that has to be taken into account is the disruptive effect. The remittances are mainly sent by 
migrant parents. In households with migrant heads children face increased non-financial costs of 
education due to the reduction in adult role models, the missing educational input of parents in 
school work and supervision and higher responsibilities in terms of family business. Consequently, 
children from migrant households may have a lower probability of remaining in school, even if 
financial resources are available for education investment, reducing the optimal unconstrained 
education level (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006). A set of studies argue that emigration usually 
implies parental absence which may have a disruptive effect on children‘s educational achievement 
(Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006; 
Minuka and Dabalen, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). Thus, the impact of remittances is 
                                                 
41
 Other channels, as described in the previous chapter and also presented here, include the incentive effect and the 
effect of return migration. 
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different for household without migrants receiving them, compared to households receiving 
remittances from absent household member.  
Analysis of the impact of remittances on educational investments of remittances receiving 
households needs to disentangle the impact of different migration-related characteristics of a 
household. In that sense, we can distinguish four types of households, according to two 
characteristics: 1) whether they have migrants or not and 2) whether they receive remittances or not. 
These different types of households are expected to be affected to a different extent by different 
influences presented above. The types of households and their likely effects on educational 
investments are presented in the matrix below. 
 
Table 3.1. Types of households based on the receipt of remittances and migration status 
Type of household With migrants Without migrants 
Receives 
remittances 
 
1. Net income gain 
2. Disruption effect 
 
1. Income gain 
No remittances 
 
1. Income loss 
2. Disruption effect 
 
No effect 
 
Once both possible effects are taken into account, it can be expected that the net effect of 
receiving remittances on household‘s educational investment is a difference between the positive 
impact of relaxation of liquidity constraint and negative impact of parental absence. 
 The motivation for a micro-level study of impact of remittances on educational attainment in 
a country affected by conflict is the interest in the analysis of the influence of specific features of 
conflict-induced migration on the relationship between remittances and human capital formation in 
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a home country. It is expected that the context in which remittances receiving households are 
making human capital investment decisions influence the extent of these decisions. Moreover, 
empirical evidence suggests that conflict-induced migrants generally migrate as a family, thus 
remittances are sent to relatives driven by purely altruistic motives, rather than to family members 
from a migrant parent. This implies that the human capital investment might not necessarily be a 
part of a household‘s risk diversification and intra-household income allocation. This might limit 
the extent of the positive impact of remittances on the educational attainment of children in a 
remittances receiving household. On the other hand, the receipt of remittances by relatives instead 
of family members might limit the negative impact of parental absence and thus increase the 
positive impact of remittances on education attainment of children in remittances receiving 
households in conflict countries. Therefore, as the theoretical prediction about the overall impact of 
remittances on human capital formation in a home country affected by conflict is inconclusive, 
empirical tests of these predictions are necessary for better understanding of these relationships in 
the conflict-induced migration setting. The empirical analysis of this channel of brain gain is 
presented in the next chapter.  
 
3.4.3. Return migration 
 
Analysis of return migration in the context of the analysis of the net effect of emigration of 
highly educated individuals on human capital stock in a home country is important for several 
reasons. Once left, highly educated emigrants may decide to return. Low educated emigrants may 
acquire useful skills while abroad and bring them back to the home country. Also, all migrants may 
bring back both financial and non-financial instruments (such as ―social remittances‖) that should 
positively affect the educational attainment of their children. For the first type of impact, the ―brain 
return‖, it is important to understand not only the magnitude of the brain drain but also the skills 
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acquisition during the period of stay in a host country. Moreover, appropriate understanding of the 
magnitude of this impact, the self-selection mechanism of return migration need to be developed 
and understood. 
As described in the introductory part of this chapter and presented in Figure 3.1, the analysis of 
return migration could be made in two different directions. First, it should analyse the self-selection 
mechanism of return migration of conflict-induced migrants (―brain return‖), taking into 
consideration specific features of their migration and context of their (often forced) return (arrow 4a 
in Figure 3.1). Second analysis should deal with the impact of migration experience on educational 
investments of returnees, or ―social remittances‖ effect (arrow 4b in Figure 3.1). This thesis will 
empirically test the incentive effect and the effect of remittances on educational attainment of 
children. A separate analysis of return migration is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is intended 
direction of future research. But, the effect of ―social remittances‖ will be investigated through the 
analysis of the impact of remittances, by including a variable on the migration experience of 
households. 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 This chapter presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of the net effect of ethnic 
cleansing on the stock of human capital in a country affected. As described in the first section of the 
chapter, ethnic cleansing causes a brain drain, which reduces human capital in a country. However, 
there are also positive feedback effects (brain gain) on human capital formation in a country that 
result from this brain drain. Therefore, the analysis that attempts to explain the net effect of ethnic 
cleansing on human capital stock needs to take into consideration both negative and positive effects. 
 In the second section of this chapter, the theoretical model of brain drain as a result of ethnic 
cleansing is developed. This model is the main theoretical contribution of this thesis. It explains 
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ethnic cleansing as a two-stage process, where individuals are forcibly evicted without the option to 
stay in the first stage and then they make migration decision in the second stage. The migration 
decision in the second stage is explained in the framework of relative deprivation model. Here, the 
model assumes that individuals do not only evaluate their well-being relative to a reference group, 
but also relative to their well-being in the period before they were evicted. Based on this 
assumption, the model hypothesizes that individuals who are more severely affected by a conflict 
will have higher incentive to migrate. This hypothesis is called the ―restoration‖ hypothesis and is 
an additional theoretical contribution of this thesis. As more educated individuals are, on average, 
more severely affected by a conflict, the model predicts positive self-selection of migrants from 
areas affected by ethnic cleansing. Hence, the ethnic cleansing causes increased brain drain. The 
extent to which ethnic cleansing increases brain drain, thus decreasing the stock of human capital in 
a country, needs to be tested empirically. The empirical test of this model is presented in the next 
chapter. 
 In the third section, models of brain gain are presented. As described in the introduction to 
this chapter, brain drain can also have certain positive feedback effects on human capital formation 
in a country. These effects need to be taken into account when measuring the overall impact of 
ethnic cleansing on human capital stock in a country. The channels through which brain drain has a 
positive feedback effect are the incentive effect of migration on education investments, the impact 
of remittances on educational attainment of children and return migration. All these channels are 
described and applicability of models, developed for the context of voluntary migration, that 
explain effect of these channels in the context of ethnic cleansing is discussed. Different 
modifications of these models that need to be considered when being applied in the specific context 
of ethnic cleansing were presented, which can also be considered as additional theoretical 
contribution of this thesis. Results of empirical estimations of these models will be presented in 
Chapter 5. 
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 4.1. Introduction 
  
 Ethnic cleansing, as defined previously, causes both negative and positive effects on the 
stock of human capital in a country. Besides highly educated individuals killed during a process of 
ethnic cleansing,
42
 many highly educated individuals decide to emigrate abroad. This is known as 
brain drain. In the recent migration literature (Muntford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997; Beine et al., 2001) 
brain drain as a negative effect of migration on the stock of human capital in a country is considered 
as one side of the coin, while positive feedback effects of this emigration on the stock of human 
capital in a home country are also acknowledged. The concept of positive effects of migration is 
known as brain gain and includes effects of incentives produced by migration and of remittances on 
education investment, as well as positive impact of return migration on the stock of human capital 
in the country. The sign of the net effect of ethnic cleansing on human capital stock will 
consequently depend on the magnitude of each of these different factors and cannot be determined a 
priori. As explained in the introduction, brain drain can be measured by simply collecting the data 
about the number of highly educated emigrants from a country. But, the effect of brain gain needs 
to be estimated. In order to provide appropriate evidence about the sign of the net effect of ethnic 
cleansing on the stock of human capital in the country, this thesis will not only measure, but also try 
to estimate effects of different determinants on brain drain figures. The theoretical model of the 
determinants of brain drain from countries that experienced ethnic cleansing was developed and 
presented in Chapter 3. The model will be empirically tested in this chapter, while the empirical 
evidence on the brain gain will be presented in the next chapter. 
 The theoretical model, developed on the basis of evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina about 
the process of displacement as a result of ―ethnic cleansing‖ and presented in Equation (3.9), shows 
                                                 
42
 A process of ethnic cleansing is very often accompanied by conflict and „merges with deportation and genocide‖. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, ethnic cleansing started before the war, but then turned into a conflict as ethnic 
groups suffering ethnic cleansing responded by organized resistance.  
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that the migration decision by the individual who was displaced during an ethnic cleansing is a 
function of her or his absolute income (Y), change in absolute income during migration (w), relative 
deprivation (RD) and its change during migration (RD’w), but conditional on these values before 
the cleansing and their changes as a result of ethnic cleansing, as well as of the risk the individual is 
facing during this process (X). According to the two hypotheses specified in Chapter 3 and 
incorporated into the theoretical model, namely the relative deprivation and the restoration 
hypothesis, the model predicts that individuals who were more severely affected by the ethnic 
cleansing are more likely to migrate. This means that the change in income and/or in relative 
deprivation is expected to be negatively correlated with the migration of an individual. Moreover, 
the initial level of income is expected to have a positive and the initial level of relative deprivation 
negative, correlation with the migration decision of an individual. When the education levels of 
individuals is considered, the more educated are expected to be more severely affected by the ethnic 
cleansing in terms of the change in both their income and relative deprivation, therefore the model 
predicts that they should be more likely to migrate. This means that the more severe the ethnic 
cleansing was, the more brain drain it caused. Expressed in the migration terminology, this means 
that the model suggests positive self-selection of forced migrants from countries affected by ethnic 
cleansing. 
 In order to test this model, empirical data on the migration from countries affected by a 
conflict are needed. For the purpose of providing an empirical test of the theoretical model from 
Chapter 3, two empirical studies will be conducted in this thesis and presented in the following 
sections of this chapter. The first study is a household-level study of the revealed migration 
behaviour of individuals during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. There is a 
household level dataset available for this country, which was collected through the World Bank‘s 
Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS). The dataset for this country is not perfect,
43
 as it 
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 Detailed explanation of the dataset and its shortcomings is provided in the next section, while solutions for improving 
the current situation regarding data availability will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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contains information about the survey year‘s, but not the pre-conflict, income and relative 
deprivation of individuals. But, neither do datasets from other countries contain such data, so a 
better alternative was not available. 
 The second study that will be presented in this chapter is a cross-country analysis of the 
determinants of brain drain. As the data availability for the micro-level study allows for the 
inclusion of dummy variables only, the results from that study will be qualitative in nature, but will 
provide useful information about the direction of the impact of the changes in absolute income and 
relative deprivation on the migration decision. However, the macro level study should reveal the 
size of the impact of ethnic cleansing on the magnitude of the brain drain from a country. Also, by 
making a comparison between countries that were and countries that were not affected by a conflict, 
this study should provide information on the differences between voluntary and forced migration, in 
terms of not only total emigration rates but also the skill composition of migrants. The cross-
country (or macro level) study of the impact of conflicts on the stock of human capital in a country 
will be conducted by using the set of variables for which the data were collected from the databases 
such as World Development Indicators and the World Income Inequality Database. The final 
section of this chapter will provide conclusions that can be drawn about the relationship between 
ethnic cleansing and brain drain. 
 
 4.2. Micro – level study: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
 4.2.1. The model 
 
 The model presented in the previous chapter explains the process of migration in the specific 
context of ethnic cleansing as a two stage process, where individuals were forcibly evicted from 
their homes and/or their well being was severely affected by a conflict in the first stage and then in 
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the second stage they make their migration decision considering their current and pre-conflict well-
being. The main aim of this empirical study is to provide evidence on the determinants of the 
migration decision of a household in the second stage of the process. Accordingly, the dependent 
variable in the empirical model should be expressed as a probability of making such a decision. The 
revealed behaviour of households, or information whether they made such a decision or not, will be 
used to construct the values of the dependent variable. The estimation method to be used in this 
empirical study will be a logit model.
44
 Assuming that households make their migration decision in 
order to maximize their utility and based on Equation (3.6), the probability that they will migrate 
abroad
45
 is: 
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Here, the subscript 2 denotes that a household chooses to migrate abroad and 1 that it 
chooses to stay within a country (in her homes if not evicted and as internally displaced if evicted). 
Variables Y, RD and X, the same as in Chapter 3, denote household‘s income, relative deprivation 
and the level of risk they face, respectively. 
Equation (4.2), based on the transformations used in Chapter 3, can also be expressed as: 
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 where, according to Equations (3.7) and (3.8), ΔU2 is expressed as: 
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 The dependent variable is binary. There is no clear argument in the econometric literature whether the logit or the 
probit model should be preferred, thus this study follows the Stark and Taylor (1991) approach and chooses the logit 
model. 
45
 These households can also decide to displace internally, but this is not relevant in the context of the thesis, as only 
migration across borders is considered as a brain drain. Another reason why a simple instead of multinomial logit was 
used is that the dataset did not contain information about household‘s moves during the war, after they were forcibly 
evicted or not. Therefore, this thesis uses the binary logit model, instead of multinomial logit used in Stark and Taylor 
(1991). 
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 Here Y, RD and X are as defined in Equation (4.1), while RD‘0 and RD‘1 are changes in 
relative deprivation during conflict and after migration, respectively. Subscript 1 refers to the level 
of a variable after forced eviction and subscript 0 refers to the level of a variable before forced 
eviction. 
 Data availability allows only the approximation of values of changes in income, relative 
deprivation and risk. In previous empirical work (e.g. Stark and Taylor, 1991), the variables used as 
proxies for income, relative deprivation and risk were different household and community 
characteristics. If the changes in the income (wi), relative deprivation (RD’) and risk (ri) in Equation 
(3.9) are substituted by the set of household (Hi) and community characteristics (Ci), then the 
probability of migrating abroad is 
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If the logit reference category is no migration, then the logit equation is given by: 
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The model in linear form, which is to be estimated, is: 
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 The expression on the left-hand side is the dependent variable of the logit model, interpreted 
as the log odds-ratio. As mentioned previously, the data from the LSMS survey
46
 were collected in 
2001, while the process of ethnic cleansing happened in the period 1992-1995. This dataset contains 
information about households‘ income and other characteristics in 2001. But, there were no data 
about the characteristics of individuals in 1992, before the process of ethnic cleansing started. 
Therefore, the proxy variables had to be constructed from the available data. The characteristics of 
the data and the construction of variables are explained in the next section. 
 
 4.2.2. Data 
 
For the purpose of testing the model developed in Chapter 3, household level data on its 
demographic characteristics, information on whether a household was displaced during the conflict, 
as well as the income levels of both the household and the community (necessary for measuring the 
degree of relative deprivation for each household) are required. Data on the demographic 
characteristics of households, as well as on their displacement status were taken from the World 
Bank‘s Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted among 5,400 households in 25 
municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2001.
47
 This dataset is obtained from the World Bank. The 
LSMS survey collected responses to the questions on migration from all members of a household 
older than 15. However, in general, the displacement decision tends to be made predominantly at 
the household level.
48
 As a result, it was decided these data will be analysed at the level of 
household, thus having 5,400 observations. Unfortunately, for the purpose of this thesis, in 2,839 
                                                 
46
 These data were the best possible alternative dataset for the purpose of this study. 
47
 There are more recent data available, but they are not relevant in our case, since this study is primarily interested in 
information from 1992 that this survey provides. Also, the surveys after 2001 contain responses from 3,000 households, 
thus the 2001 survey has been chosen as preferred because of the richness of the data from 5,400 households. 
48
 This is confirmed by the results of semi-structured interviews. Most of the respondents have stated that they have 
been displaced together with other members of a household. 
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out of 5,400 questionnaires, there has not been a response to the question on the current 
displacement status of a household, thus making it impossible to determine the value of the 
dependent variable. Besides this information, there were many other responses missing for these 
households, particularly to the questions from the Module 8 (on migration). As a result, the 
observations for these households were excluded from the dataset, as they could not have been used 
in the following analysis.  
The LSMS survey was conducted among (displaced and non-displaced) households living in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2001 and thus included four sub-groups of displaced households (beside a 
group of non-displaced): ―internally displaced‖49; ―returned internally displaced‖50; ―returned 
refugees‖51; and ―returned refugees - internally displaced‖.52 However, as the survey was conducted 
among households living in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment of survey, it did not include 
refugees in the sample. If this group of displaced people would not be included in the dataset, it 
would create a systematic sample bias, as those who decided to migrate abroad and then to remain 
in a host country are not necessarily a non-randomly selected group of people. In order to have a 
more representative dataset, which will contain information about households from all alternative 
displacement statuses, it was decided that a separate survey should be conducted among Bosnian 
refugees still living outside the country. This survey used part of the LSMS Survey questionnaire in 
order to make these data comparable to the data from the LSMS. The survey was conducted via e-
mail
53
 and 465 usable responses to the questionnaire,
54
 out of 915 collected in total, were received. 
                                                 
49
 These are households which were displaced during the war, but did not return to their pre-war place of living in 2001. 
50
 These are internally displaced households which returned to their pre-war place of living. 
51
 Household which emigrated abroad and then returned to their pre-war place of living after the war. 
52
 Some refugees have not been able to return to the place of their pre-war living after they have been repatriated to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, their status is changed from ―refugees‖ to ―internally displaced‖. In order to distinguish 
them from internally displaced who did not leave their country during the war, these households were put into category 
called ―refugees-internally displaced‖. 
53
 It is necessary to acknowledge the potential bias in a survey based on e-mail, particularly regarding the average 
education, age and ethnic origin of the sample – the descriptive analysis of the data have shown that this group has more 
years of education, are younger and the majority of them are Bosniaks. But, a survey of a population currently living in 
more than 50 countries and all 5 continents could not have been conducted in any other way. Also, these data were 
merged with LSMS data on returned refugees and treated as a single ―refugees‖ group, which reduced this bias in the 
subsequent regression analysis.  
54
 The questionnaire used for this survey is provided in Appendix 3.2. 
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Since the two surveys were conducted at different times and the primary interest of this 
thesis is the situation in 1992, changes to the responses were made in order to make them match the 
situation in 1992. For example, all responses to the question on age were recalculated to obtain the 
respondent‘s age in 1992. The responses to the question from the LSMS survey on the actual age of 
the respondent have shown that the youngest head of a household in the sample is 20 years old. In 
the case of the own survey, conducted in 2007 via e-mail, without possibility to completely control 
who will be the respondent, a number of responses were collected from individuals who were 
younger than 20 in 1992. However, on the basis of information about the age of the youngest 
household head in 1992 from the LSMS survey, it has been decided to exclude all observations 
from the own survey where heads of a household were younger than 20 in 1992. This way, the final 
dataset contained information about household which existed at the beginning of the war. At the 
end, the combined dataset, by using data collected from the LSMS and from our own survey, 
contains information on 2,798 households.  
The dataset has several drawbacks that need to be acknowledged, as far as this thesis is 
concerned. The survey was conducted in 2001 and all the information relate to a household‘s 
current situation. Although some information, such as household‘s place of living before the war, 
were available, while other time-invariant information such as age, gender and ethnicity can also be 
used, still some very important information was missing. Consequently, the available information 
was combined in order to create the best possible proxy variables from the limited data and to make 
the empirical analysis possible. The process of finding the best compromise between the 
information required by the theoretical model and the data available in order to develop a testable 
empirical model is graphically presented in the Table 4.1. (arrows representing the links between 
specific data available, variable of the theoretical model and variable of the empirical model). 
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Table 4.1. Relationships between the theoretical model, data and empirical model. 
Theoretical model  Empirical model  Data 
Income  
Household‘s head 
education (EDU), age 
(AGE) and a dummy 
variable for female headed 
households (FHH) 
 
 
 
 
Household‘s head 
education (highest 
degree completed), age 
and gender 
Relative deprivation  
Interaction variable 
between income
55
 and type 
of place of living 
(EDUURB) 
 
 
 
 
Type of place of living, 
if it's urban, semi-urban 
or rural 
Change in income 
 
A dummy variable for 
forced eviction (FE) 
 
 
 
Ethnicity of 
household's head
56
 
  
Interaction variable 
between income and 
dummy variable for forced 
eviction (EDUFE) 
 Municipality of living 
Change in relative 
deprivation 
 
Interaction variable 
between relative 
deprivation variable and 
dummy variable for forced 
eviction (EDUURBFE) 
  
 
 One of the key data missing in this dataset is the information on a household‘s and 
community level income in 1992.
57
 This does not allow creation of the key variables on income, 
relative deprivation and changes of both for each household by using quantitative data collected by 
                                                 
55
 In order to simplify the model by avoiding making a large number of interaction variables, only one of the proxy 
variables for income, namely education was used to create interaction variable between income and type of place of 
living as a proxy for relative deprivation. 
56
 This variable was not available in the LSMS survey from 2001, but was in the ―Living in BiH‖ survey from 2002. As 
the same households were interviewed in both surveys, this variable was imported from 2002 into the 2001 survey‘s 
dataset, under the assumption that ethnicity is stable over time. 
57
 The year when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started and when majority of forced evictions took place. 
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the survey. The best that can be done is creation of qualitative variables that will still allow us to 
measure differences in the average value of the dependent variable between groups with different 
values of the independent variables. This way, the estimation results should at least inform us about 
the direction, if not the size, of the impact of the hypothesized determinants of the forced migration 
decision. The dataset contains information about the household‘s size, household head‘s gender, age 
and education level, as well as place of living (whether it is an urban, semi-urban or rural area).
58
 
As these variables are important determinants of household‘s income, they can be used to 
approximate income and level of relative deprivation of a household immediately before the war. 
As a result, the data about household characteristics available in the dataset were used to construct 
proxy variables for these determinants of the migration decision. In the case of income, the only 
information about households useful for approximating true values of income were age (AGE), 
gender (FHH) and education level (EDU) of the head of household. These variables are included in 
the model in order to capture the effect of the initial income level of the household
59
. In the case of 
relative deprivation, additional useful information was the type of place of living of a household 
immediately before the war, distinguishing between urban, semi-urban and rural areas. This 
information approximates average community income, which is higher in urban than in rural areas. 
This means that, by creating an interaction variable between household‘s income (EDU) and 
average community income (URBAN), we will get a variable that should approximate the level of 
relative deprivation of households with different income levels living in different areas (EDUURB).  
The variable on the change in income has been created by the interaction of the proxy 
variables on the household‘s head income with the variable indicating whether a household was 
                                                 
58
 The division of municipalities into urban, semi-urban and rural areas in the LSMS dataset followed the latest 1991 
Census, where the municipalities were divided into these three groups based on the predominant source of income in a 
municipality. Consequently, this variable, based on income, is appropriate proxy for a community income and can be 
used to construct a measure of relative deprivation of a household as its income position relative to other households in 
a community. 
59
 It should be acknowledged that these variables can only serve as proxies. For example, studies about inequality in 
former Yugoslavia (e.g. Estrin, 2010: 132) report that income inequality was fairly low, and that existing wage 
differentials were based more on profitability of enterprise and were sectors-specific, rather than depending on 
education levels.  
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forcibly evicted (EDUFE). In a similar way, an interaction variable between the relative deprivation 
measure (EDUURB) and a variable indicating whether a household was forcibly evicted (FE) was 
created (EDUURBFE). These two variables are introduced to distinguish between different groups 
according to the extent of the change in their absolute income and relative deprivation. It can be 
expected that, once the ethnic cleansing occurs, the ones who had higher absolute income were 
more severely affected in terms of absolute income, but the ones who were forcibly evicted even 
more than those who were not. Also, the relative deprivation of households with higher level of 
relative satisfaction before the conflict is expected to increase, whereas for the ones who were 
already deprived it can even decrease once the absolute income of those above them on the income 
distribution scale has decreased. Hence, according to the assumption that the same set of factors 
influences the extent to which absolute income will decrease and relative deprivation increase after 
the forced evictions and move in the opposite direction after migration, a positive sign of the 
dummy variables for income and relative deprivation, constructed from this information on 
household characteristics, would confirm the predictions from the Neoclassical models of migration 
and the relative deprivation hypothesis. Also, if the results of the empirical model show that the 
ones who suffered more significant losses in terms of absolute income and relative deprivation are 
more likely to migrate, it would confirm the ―restoration hypothesis‖. So, although the data 
available did not allow creation of quantitative variables, they still allow qualitative tests of the 
hypotheses of the theoretical model. 
Moreover, the datasets used here
60
 do not contain exact information on whether a household 
was forcibly evicted or not.
61
 It contains information on a respondent‘s ethnicity and place of living 
immediately before the war. The information about the ethnic group controlling each municipality 
was collected by the author separately from this survey. As the LSMS survey was conducted in 25 
                                                 
60
 The LSMS dataset does not contain it, so this information was not collected in the own survey, for the purpose of 
comparability. 
61
 There is an answer to a question on reason of displacement during the war, whether it was because of war of because 
of other reasons, but it does not allow clear distinction as to whether a household was forcibly evicted or not. 
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municipalities, these were identified as being controlled by a particular group on the basis of 
information from various local reports about the war in these municipalities. In addition, there were 
several additional municipalities mentioned in our own survey. The data about these municipalities 
were collected in the same way as for municipalities from the LSMS survey.
62
 If the information 
about a household‘s ethnicity is matched with whether it was in the beginning of war living in a 
municipality that was controlled by a different ethnic group, we can derive information on whether 
a household was facing forced eviction (certainty that a threat will be exercised) or not. 
Additionally, if a municipality was taken over by another ethnic group during the war, then all 
households from such municipalities were considered as being forcibly evicted (FE), as households 
from different ethnic groups were forcibly evicted from the same municipality in different periods 
of time. Moreover, this information was additionally checked by using each household‘s responses 
to the survey question about their displacement status in 2001,
63
 in order to derive information on 
forced eviction.  
Finally, a control variable for the pre-conflict migration experience of a household head 
(ME), which is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the place of living of household‘s head 
immediately before the war was different from her/his place of birth, is included in the model. It can 
be expected that households with a head who has previous migration experience are more likely to 
migrate, ceteris paribus (Ibanez and Velez, 2003). 
The model to be estimated is then: 
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 (4.7)
 
 
where: 
                                                 
62
 Detailed list of municipalities and their division on the basis of ethnic group controlling it, for the purpose of giving 
an opportunity to readers to check the validity of such divisions, is provided in Appendix 4.1. 
63
 The survey year. 
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
 - the dependent variable, expressed as a log odds ratio of the probability of migrating 
abroad over a probability of staying within a country, 
EDUi – a variable for the education level of a head of household, which is expressed as a set of 
indicative variables. The set contains four indicative variables on the highest level of education of a 
respondent: primary (PE), secondary (SE) and tertiary (including postgraduate) education (TE). No 
education is a reference category,
64
 
AGEi – age of a household head, in years, 
FHHi – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a head of household is female, 0 if male, 
FEi – a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household was forcibly evicted during the war, 0 
otherwise, 
URBi - a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household was living in an urban municipality 
immediately before the war, otherwise 0, 
EDUURBi – an interaction variable between EDU and URB, expected to capture the difference in 
relative deprivation between different groups of households, 
EDUFEi – an interaction variable between EDU and FE, expected to capture the change in absolute 
income, 
URBFEi – an interaction variable between URB and FE, 
EDUURBFEi – an interaction variable between EDU, URB and FE, expected to capture the change 
in relative deprivation, 
ui – error term. 
 
Table of descriptive statistics for each variable are provided in the table below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Relationship between these empirical variables and variables from the theoretical model is described in the Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical estimation 
Variable description 
Variable 
name 
Obs Mean 
Dependent variable (if household migrates or not) Y 3359 0.17 
Dummy variable for female headed household FHH 3369 0.27 
Age of household head, in years AGE 3369 45.24 
Dummy variable for household head with tertiary education EDU 3029 0.18 
Dummy variable, taking value of 1 if  household lived in 
urban municipality before the war 
URB 2051 0.60 
Dummy variable, taking value of 1 if household was 
forcibly evicted during the war 
FE 3027 0.21 
Dummy variable, taking value of 1 if household's head has 
pre-war migration experience 
ME 3213 0.29 
  
 The dataset contains information on the education level by a highest degree completed. So, 
it was decided to use dummy variables for different levels of education, instead of a continuous 
variable for years of education. The rationale for this is that the effect of education on the 
probability of emigration does not change with every year of education linearly and that this effect 
is better captured by controlling for differences between different levels, rather than years, of 
education. In other words, between group differences in education are more significant than within 
group differences. In addition to that, it was decided to include only one instead of several dummy 
variables. So, a variable for education (EDU) indicates whether a household‘s head completed post-
secondary education. A positive (negative) sign of the coefficient on the education variable should 
suggest that more educated households are more (less) likely to emigrate abroad, which would give 
an answer to our question about the potential selection mechanism in the process of conflict-
induced migration. The more likely a highly educated individual is to migrate, the more severe 
depletion of human capital (brain drain) ethnic cleansing will cause. This finding would be further 
supported by the cross-country analysis of determinants of the magnitude of brain drain. Age of 
household‘s head (AGE) is expected to have a negative impact on the migration probability. With 
regards to the gender of a household‘s head (FHH), it is not quite clear what to expect a priori, 
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because this variable may influence the migration decision in two different ways, affecting it in 
opposite directions. Household with a female head may be more risk averse (particularly regarding 
the children) and be more prone to emigrate. But, on the other side, female headed household may 
be less mobile and have higher family-level costs of displacement. A dummy variable on whether 
household head has changed her/his place of living between birth and 1992 (ME) has been created 
from responses to the question about their place of living when born and in 1992, in order to control 
for their migration experience. Here, we should expect a positive sign for the coefficient on this 
variable. Besides these, interaction variables between these variables are also included in the model. 
First, interaction between education level of a household‘s head and household‘s place of living 
before the war (EDUURB) was included to capture the effect of relative deprivation of a household, 
as a household‘s income relative to a community income. Second, interaction term between 
education and forced eviction (EDUFE) and one between EDUFE and place of living 
(EDUURBFE) are included to measure the effect of change in income and change in relative 
deprivation of a household as a results of war, depending whether it was forcibly evicted or not. As 
the restoration hypothesis predicts that those who suffered larger losses in both income and relative 
deprivation are expected to have higher migration probability. Finally, an interaction between place 
of living of a household and whether it was forcibly displaced or not (URBFE) is used to 
distinguish between different categories of households, as will be explained subsequently. 
 Inclusion of interaction variables changes the meaning of the original variables in the way 
that it represents the omitted category from the interaction term. Therefore, the interpretation of 
coefficients cannot be done separately, as they indicate differences between different categories, but 
they need to be summed up if we want to calculate the average odds ratios or probabilities for each 
category. For instance, if we have a model with two dummy variables, D1 and D2 and an interaction 
term between them, this can be represented by a following equation: 
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 iuxDDDDy  21322110       (4.8) 
 
then the relationship between the coefficients and different categories represented by the original 
and interaction variables can be described as presented in the tables below. 
 
Table 4.3. Relationship between variables and categories 
 D2=0 D2=1 
D1=0 β0 β0+ β2 
D1=1 β0+ β1 β0+ β1+ β2+ β3 
 
 Table 4.3 should help clarify the way to interpret these coefficients. For example, once the 
interaction between education and place of living (EDUURB) is included, the original variable for 
education (EDU) represents the effect of education on the migration probability for a reference 
category of place of living, which is non-urban (rural or mixed). In the same way, a coefficient for 
households from urban areas (URB) represents the category of low educated (reference category for 
education). Once triple interactions are included, then even double interactions change their 
meaning, as they now represent only a category omitted from the triple interaction. Thus, with triple 
interaction we have eight different categories. For this reason, the results in the next section will be 
presented not only as original coefficients but also as average odds ratios and probabilities for each 
category. 
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 4.2.3. Results 
 
The estimated results of the logit estimation of the model, with two different specifications 
of the education variable, expresses as odds ratios (and standards errors in parentheses) are provided 
in the Table 4.4.
65
 
 
Table 4.4. Results of the logit model estimation 
Variable description Variable name Log odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio Probability
66
 
Dependent variable (= 1 if household 
migrates abroad) 
Y    
Female headed household FHH 0.879*** 
(0.149) 
2.409 
(0.359) 
0.707 
Age of household head AGE -0.042*** 
(0.007) 
0.959 
(0.007) 
0.490 
Education of a household's head (=1 if 
household head has tertiary education) 
EDU 2.074*** 
(0.537) 
7.955 
(4.275) 
0.888 
If household lived in urban 
municipality before the war 
URB 1.503*** 
(0.251) 
4.493 
(1.128) 
0.818 
If household was forcibly evicted 
during the war 
FE 1.703*** 
(0.288) 
5.489 
(1.580) 
0.846 
If household's head has pre-war 
migration experience 
ME -1.579*** 
(0.154) 
0.206 
(0.032) 
0.171 
Interaction between education and 
forced eviction variables 
EDUFE -0.529 
(1.005) 
1.636 
(1.645) 
0.621 
Interaction between education and 
urban 
EDUURB 0.492 
(0.572) 
0.589 
(0.337) 
0.371 
Interaction between tertiary urban and 
forced eviction 
URBFE 0.182 
(0.361) 
1.199 
(0.433) 
0.545 
Interaction between education, urban 
and forced eviction 
EDUURBFE 0.052 
(1.074) 
1.053 
(1.131) 
0.513 
Intercept CONS -0.759** 
(0.336) 
  
Number of observations  1,575   
Pseudo R
2
  0.342   
LR chi-squared (10)  680.34   
Correctly classified (%)  79.87   
*** significant at 1% level of significance 
** significant at 5% level of significance 
 
 Positive sign of the log odds ratio (or, equally, the value of odds ratio above 1) of probability 
to migrate abroad for the coefficient of the household head‘s gender variable (FHH) and negative 
sign for the coefficients of age variable (AGE) suggests that household with female and younger 
                                                 
65
 Detailed results of the model estimation are provided in Appendix 4.2. 
66
 Probability is calculated as Odds ratio/(1+Odds ratio). 
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household head are more likely to migrate abroad than to stay. This is what we could expect, as 
younger individuals are more prone to migrate, while female headed households might be more risk 
averse and therefore more likely to migrate. In addition to that, households without a male head 
involved in fighting are not bound to stay by such a commitment of a household head. As explained 
previously, the other coefficients presented in table 4.4 cannot be interpreted in the usual way, since 
the introduction of interaction terms changes their original meaning and they now measure 
differences between different groups. For that reason, the odds ratios and probabilities are 
calculated for each alternative category, which should make interpretation easier. These new values 
are presented in the Table 4.5. 
  
Table 4.5. Results of the logit model estimation, by category 
Category 
number 
Category description Coefficients used Log odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio
67
 Probability 
1 Low educated, from non-urban 
areas, not evicted 
β0 -0.759** 
(0.336) 
0.468 0.319 
2 Low educated, from urban 
areas, not evicted 
β0+β4 0.744** 
(0.299) 
2.104 0.678 
3 Highly educated, from non-
urban areas, not evicted 
β0+β1 1.315** 
(0.559) 
3.725 0.788 
4 Highly educated, from urban 
areas, not evicted 
β0+β1+β4+ β5 2.289*** 
(0.341) 
9.865 0.965 
5 Low educated, from non-urban 
areas, evicted 
β0+β6 0.944*** 
(0.330) 
2.571 0.720 
6 Low educated, from urban 
areas, evicted 
β0+β4+ β6+ β8 2.628*** 
(0.358) 
13.853 0.933 
7 Highly educated, from non-
urban areas, evicted 
β0+β1+ β6+ β7 3.510*** 
(0.877) 
33.448 0.971 
8 Highly educated, from urban 
areas, evicted 
β0+β1+β4+β5+β6+β7+ 
β8+β9 
3.707*** 
(1.164) 
40.731 0.976 
*** significant at 1% level of significance 
** significant at 5% level of significance 
Note: Calculations performed using STATA lincom command. 
                                                 
67
 The odds ratio for a category is calculated as an exponential value of the sum of log odds ratios (original coefficients) 
for that category. 
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 The estimated probabilities, when appropriate different categories are compared, suggest 
that it is more likely that a household will decide to migrate if they are from urban areas, if the 
household head is more educated and if they were forcibly evicted during the war. This is in line 
with the predictions of the model presented in Chapter 3. For example, a comparison between 
categories 3 and 1, 4 and 2, 7 and 5, or 8 and 6, suggest that the probability of migration increases 
for highly educated, holding constant other category characteristics. This, in addition to the 
probabilities estimated for variables on household‘s head age and gender,68 suggests that the 
households with higher income are more likely to migrate. For relative deprivation, categories 2 to 
1, 4 to 3, 6 to 5, or 8 to 7, should be compared. The comparison shows that a probability between 
two categories differing in their place of living only (ceteris paribus) is higher for categories which 
are from urban areas. Besides that, the coefficient expressed as a log odds ratio for the interaction 
term between education and urban area is positive, which suggests that individuals who were less 
relatively deprived before the conflict are more likely to migrate. The evidence presented, both for 
income and relative deprivation, can be explained by the fact that households, once they make 
migration decision, compare their current (Stage 1 from Figure 3.1) situation with expected gains 
from migration. Also, their relative deprivation is measured as their relative position compared to 
their previous (pre-war) level, rather than their position within a reference group. This is explained 
through the ―restoration hypothesis‖ and expressed as a change in income and relative deprivation 
between stages 0 and 1 in the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3. Finally, if we compare 
category 5 to 1, 6 to 2, 7 to 3 or 8 to 4, we will see that the ones who were evicted are more likely to 
emigrate abroad. This also captures the effect of a change in income and relative deprivation on the 
migration probability. As richer households and households from urban areas, initially having a 
higher level of income and a lower level of relative deprivation are expected to have more severe 
depletion of both, also the households which were evicted, regardless of their education or place of 
                                                 
68
 All the three variables were used as proxies of household's income. 
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living, are expected to be more severely affected than households which were not evicted. This also 
confirms the prediction of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. 
The micro level study presented above has provided evidence on the self-selection 
mechanism operating in a specific setting of conflict-induced migration settings and affecting the 
selection of individuals into migrants by their education level. The evidence presented suggests that 
the sign of self-selection is, as in the case of voluntary migration, positive. Households who 
experienced more severe impact of a conflict on their absolute and relative position within a 
community, according to the ―restoration‖ hypothesis are expected to be more likely to migrate. The 
ones with better absolute and relative position within a community are generally more educated, 
which increases brain drain from such a country. But, as migration rates are generally higher during 
a conflict, this does not yet reveal if the selection mechanism in the case of conflict-induced 
migration is of different size compared to voluntary migration. Higher rates of migration usually 
bring higher brain drain, but we are also interested to see whether the proportion of highly educated 
emigrants from countries in conflict is larger than in the case of voluntary migration. In order to 
perform such estimation, it is necessary to conduct further analysis, where emigration rates of 
highly educated from countries which experiences conflict would be compared to those of countries 
which did not experience it. This will be done in the next section, by using country level data, in 
order to provide additional evidence on the size of relationship between these factors and the 
magnitude of ―brain drain‖ from a country. It should also enable comparison of the size of the effect 
of these factors between cases of voluntary and forced migration.  
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 4.3. Macro – level study 
 
 4.3.1. Model and data 
 
There have been relatively few attempts to provide evidence on the relationship between the 
characteristics of conflict and the size of refugee flows or proportions of refugees in the total 
number of displaced persons, based on the analysis of cross-country data sets (Melander and Oberg, 
2004; Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2006). Also, there has not been any attempt yet 
to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of conflict and the magnitude of brain 
drain, i.e. the proportion of individuals with tertiary education in the total population of refugees at 
country level. This mainly reflects the lack of available of data on the brain drain. Yet the recently 
collected dataset on the stock of immigrants from more than 190 countries in OECD countries by 
education levels (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006), which makes possible derivation of emigration 
rates of highly educated individuals by country, gives an opportunity to perform such an analysis. 
The very first attempt to estimate the determinants of brain drain by using the Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006) dataset was a paper by Beine et al. (2008). They regressed skilled emigration rates 
by country on a set of explanatory variables expected to capture both push and pull factors of brain 
drain, with particular focus on controlling for the differences between small and large states. They 
found significant differences in the brain drain between countries of different size. 
The idea behind the empirical analysis in this section is very similar to the Beine et al. 
(2008). Their approach was followed in order to make comparison between their and own results 
possible. If inclusion of variables that distinguish between different types of migration (voluntary or 
forced) improve the explanatory power of the Beine et al. (2008) model, it would be a good 
justification of the study conducted here and prove the key idea behind this thesis, that forced 
migration is different from voluntary, in which case the theoretical models of voluntary migration 
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are not appropriate to explain forced migration. But, besides following their approach, the present 
model goes further by including additional variables of the specific model of forced migration, 
developed in this thesis. In the empirical estimation presented below, not only the differences in the 
absolute income will be included as factors influencing brain drain, but also the differences in 
relative deprivation of migrants between different countries, as well as the magnitude of forced 
evictions during a conflict, which is based on the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. 
The empirical strategy employed in this section will, for the reasons explained earlier, 
follow the strategy used in Beine et al. (2008). Besides that, alternative estimation methods, such as 
natural experiment, would be used in order to test the robustness of the model and provide 
additional information about the hypothesized relationships. 
The model to be estimated is: 
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it uWARGINIPOPGDPCGDPCm  543
2
21    (4.8) 
 
 
where: 
s
itm - emigration rates of highly educated individuals from country i to the OECD countries in a 
period t, 
itGDP and 
2
itGDP - GDP per capita and its squared value of country i in period t, to capture the 
effect of differences in absolute income between the country of origin and some OECD country 
(destination of migrants), 
POPit –size of country in period t, measured as population of the country, to control for the 
differences in size of countries, 
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GINIit – Gini coefficient of a country in period t, as a measure of inequality in a country, to capture 
the effect of differences in relative deprivation between a country of origin and some OECD 
country (destination of migrants), 
iWAR - one of the alternative variables for characteristics of conflict, such as number of battle-
related deaths in country i in period of ten years prior to the year analysed (BRD), duration of 
conflict during the period of ten years before year when migration rates were measured (WARY) 
and a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a country was in conflict during the period of ten 
years before the year when migration rates were measured (WARDV), to measure the differences in 
emigration rates by education levels between countries with different type of migration (voluntary 
or forced), 
uit – time variant error term. 
 
For the dependent variable ( sitm ), this study uses the emigration rate of individuals with 
tertiary education – the proportion of refugees with tertiary education in the total stock of 
individuals with tertiary education in a sending country. The idea behind using such a dependent 
variable is specified on a theoretical basis for the influence of different factors on numbers of 
refugees and the micro level study suggesting that individuals with different education levels 
respond differently to such displacement incentives. Accordingly, it should be found that, 
comparing two periods, change in emigration rates from countries which experienced conflicts have 
shown a different pattern than change in emigration rates from countries which did not experience a 
conflict between the two periods. The emigration rates in Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset are 
calculated by the following formula: 
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where: 
j
stm ,  - emigration rate of individuals of education level s from country j at time t, 
j
stM , - stock of emigrants of education level s from country j at time t, 
j
stN , - stock of individuals of education level s in a country j (non-migrants) at time t. 
s = l, m, h (l=primary education, m=secondary education and h=tertiary education) 
 
Consequently, the emigration rate denotes the intensity of emigration by education level 
from a home country to OECD countries. These data are available for the years 1990 and 2000 
only, which limits the number of alternative estimation methods to be used here. As Beine et al. 
(2008) used random effect model estimation; the analysis will be based on the methods for panel 
data. Possible alternatives are estimation of the model using first differenced data and a natural 
experiment approach. 
Variables for initial values of GDP per capita ( 90GDPC ) and its squared value
69
 ( 290GDPC ) 
are included to control for the incentive effect of the differences in absolute income between the 
home and the host country. The poorer the home country, then the larger is the difference in the 
expected returns to education and hence more individuals will tend to migrate. However, as the 
economic conditions in a home country improve, the incentive effect is weakening, thus decreasing 
migration rates. However, previous studies on migration suggest the presence of a ―migration 
hump‖.70 For this reason, GDPC2 is introduced in the model, along with GDPC.  
                                                 
69
 Squared term for GDP is used to control for possible non-linear effect of country's income on the magnitude of brain 
drain. 
70
 The term ―migration hump‖ was introduced by Martin and Taylor (1996) to explain the shape of the relationship 
between economic development and migration from a country. At low levels of income in the country, individuals lack 
resources to cover migration costs, therefore do not migrate. As the level of economic development increases the 
income of individuals, more individuals can cover migration costs and migration rate from a country increases. But, 
after a certain point of economic development, high levels of income weaken push factors of migration, meaning that 
the expected wage difference between the home and host country decreases. Consequently, migration rate from 
114 
 
Size of a country (POPi90), expressed in terms of country‘s population, is used as a proxy for 
the country‘s openness toward international flows of goods, capital and people. It has been observed 
that small countries are usually more open to these flows and therefore are expected to have larger 
rates of emigration of highly educated individuals, ceteris paribus. Also, descriptive analysis of the 
data shows that the majority of leading countries in terms of the emigration rates are very small 
countries. This suggests that we should control for a country‘s size.  
A variable for inequality (GINI) is a measure of relative deprivation from the theoretical 
model presented in Chapter 3 and according to the predictions of the model, is expected to capture 
the effect of relative deprivation on migration decision. We expect a positive relationship here, as 
more inequality in a country causes a higher level of relative deprivation among the population of a 
country, on average. 
Besides the above variables, Beine et al. (2008) used three proxies for a country‘s push 
factors, namely ethnic fractionalization and indicators of governance and economic freedom. In this 
study, the variable for war (WAR) will be included. This variable is expected to replace other 
factors of political instability and risks used in Beine et al. (2008) model, by capturing their effect 
through the war variable. Finally, Beine et al. (2008) also used variables for distance between a 
country of origin of migrants and closest OECD country and a dummy variable indicating whether a 
country had colonial links with any of OECD countries, as proxies for migration costs. These 
variables were not included in our model, as they are not relevant policy variables and they are 
time-invariant, so cannot be used in fixed effects estimation. 
The study will combine three different data sets. The first one, Docquier and Marfouk 
(2004) dataset contains the data on immigration to all OECD countries by level of education and by 
sending country for 1990 and 2000, collected from the census data of OECD countries. The number 
                                                                                                                                                                  
countries at higher stages of development decreases. This creates an inverse U shape in the relationship between 
economic development and migration. 
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of emigrants, selection and emigration rates are reported.
71
 The data are far from perfect. The data 
on the stock of immigrants only in member countries of the OECD are available and there is no data 
for immigrants in non-OECD countries. Also, the data are not annual flows, but stocks in two 
periods. This means that we cannot analyse the relationship between annual flows of refugees and 
the characteristics of a conflict in that particular year, but only changes in the stock between 1990 
and 2000 as a result of conflicts in a country during 1990s. Thus, these data contain voluntary and 
involuntary migrants for countries which have not experienced a conflict during the entire period 
between 1990 and 2000. As a consequence of the dissolution of the former Soviet Block, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, not all countries appear in the lists for both years. Out of 174 
countries in 1990, 3 did not exist in 2000 (Yugoslavia, USSR and Czechoslovakia). Also, there is a 
list of countries which gained independence in 1990s and the data for 1990 for these countries were 
not available. So these countries were excluded from the list as well.  
The second dataset is from the Uppsala University‘s Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP), which provides information on the characteristics of conflict, which we use for creation of 
the variables for risk levels during a conflict, expressed as number of battle-related deaths during 
the conflict. In this data set, the location of conflict does not always coincide with the territory 
affected by a conflict and with the country of refuge from the Docquier and Marfouk dataset, 
particularly in the case of territorial disputes. Therefore, all the locations conflict were checked 
additionally and characteristics of a conflict (number of battle-related deaths) were associated to the 
territory which has been affected by the war. For example, a war between Burkina Faso and Mali 
arising from the Agacher Strip dispute affected mainly this region and refugees from that region in 
OECD countries were counted as emigrants from Burkina Faso (the Agacher Strip is still a part of 
Burkina Faso). 
                                                 
71
 Explanations and formulas for selection rate and emigration rate are provided in the previous page. 
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The third dataset is the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset, from which the data 
for creation of variables on GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient and population were obtained. The 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 4.6. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the macro model 
Variable description Variable 
name 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Emigration rates of highly 
educated from country i to 
OECD countries, in percentages 
ERH 300 20.712 22.838 0.17 96.73 
GDP per capita of a country, in 
thousand US dollars 
GDPC 300 8.531 8.978 0.359 48.217 
 Population of a country, in 
millions 
POP 300 34.864 126.742 0.038 1262.474 
 Gini coefficient GINI 217 41.283 10.218 22.7 64.3 
 Battle related deaths during the 
previous decade, in thousands 
BRD 229 34.778 159.122 0 1264 
 Duration of war in previous 
decade, in years 
WARD 300 1.803 3.320 0 10 
 A dummy variable taking value 
of 1 if a country was in war in 
previous decade 
WARDV 300 0.386       
 
One of the interesting findings of all previous studies is that only countries directly affected 
by fighting have experienced significant increases in forced migration. Therefore, the analysis 
should cover only countries which experienced conflict on their territory. Accordingly, the variable 
for war is be based on the location of conflict. For instance, countries such as the allies in the Gulf 
War, such as the United States, the United Kingdom or Sweden, are not expected to experience 
increase in emigration flows as a consequence of their involvement in that war. Out of these 150 
countries, 65 of them were recorded in the Uppsala University‘s dataset as those which experienced 
conflict during the 1990s.  
According to data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the 
period 1955 and 1995, the top five destinations of refugees were: Iran; Pakistan; Zaire (now 
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Democratic Republic of Congo); Somalia; and Sudan (Moore and Shellman, 2004). As these data 
imply, most refugees simply cross the border. All of these countries are outside the OECD. 
―Refugees are overwhelmingly concentrated in the poorest countries‖ (Castles and Loughna, 2003). 
Therefore, it may be questionable whether the data from Docquier and Marfouk's (2004) dataset can 
be used, which is limited to the data on immigrants with tertiary education to OECD countries only. 
However, according to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), more than 85% of the total population of 
emigrants with tertiary education are in OECD countries. Thus, the data used in this study may be 
considered as representative, particularly regarding reported emigration rates. But, in the case of 
using selection rates, it can be only assumed that the data from OECD countries are representative 
for the total population of emigrants from a particular country in all other countries. This may be a 
strong assumption, given the UNHCR data mentioned above. 
The possibility of an upwards bias to the effect of a conflict on emigration of individuals 
with tertiary education is accepted, since the data covers only OECD countries. These countries 
may attract a higher proportion of individuals with tertiary education in the total population of 
refugees to these countries compared to other countries of refuge, particularly neighbouring states 
which usually host a significant part of the total refugee population of a particular country. 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
The model presented above was, as in Beine et al. (2008), estimated by a random effect 
model. Although it might be appropriate to use random effect, still OLS, fixed and random effects 
models will be estimated here in order to perform diagnostic tests for choosing the most appropriate 
estimator.  The approach used here is general-to-specific. The first model that was estimated had all 
potential variables included and then the ones that were not significant were excluded from the 
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model. The results of the model with the parsimonious specification, estimated by three alternative 
methods, with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, are presented in the Table 4.5 below.
72
 
 
Table 4.7. Results of the estimation of the macro model 
Variable OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
Dependent variable: emigration rate of highly 
educated from a country to OCED countries (%) 
   
GDP per capita, in $ thousands  -0.225 
(0.157) 
-0.356* 
(0.207) 
-0.301** 
(0.101) 
Gini coefficient 0.086 
(0.129) 
-0.117 
(0.087) 
-0.065 
(0.081) 
Population of a country, in millions -0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
Dummy variable indicating whether a country was 
in conflict in the previous decade 
1.696 
(2.587) 
3.949** 
(1.721) 
3.543** 
(1.594) 
Dummy variable for 2000 1.566 
(2.405) 
0.265 
(0.962) 
0.492 
(0.751) 
Intercept 14.260** 
(6.253) 
21.994*** 
(3.339) 
21.793*** 
(3.697) 
Number of observations 217 217 217 
Adjusted R2    
*** significant at 1% level of significance 
** significant at 5% level of significance 
* significant at 10% level of significance 
 
The model was estimated by using three different specifications of the conflict variable, as 
explained earlier. The dummy variable indicating whether a country was in war in previous decade 
performed the best in these models, therefore was chosen as the most appropriate one. The variable 
for squared GDP per capita was also used in the general model, but was excluded due to its 
insignificance. This suggests that the ―migration hump‖ hypothesis is not supported by our data.73  
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 Detailed results of the model estimation are provided in Appendix 4.3. 
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 Alternative explanation is that this is just due to the high correlation between this variable and GDP per capita. 
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Beine et al. (2008) suggest using logarithmic transformation of variables, which might help 
to reduce possible problems of non-normality and outliers. For instance, China and India are 
naturally outliers in terms of their population. But, the test for the normality of the residuals from 
the levels model does not suggest any problem; hence this transformation was not used. Besides 
this, the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of fixed effects 
estimation was conducted. The results of the test suggest that heteroskedasticity is present in the 
residuals. Consequently, the estimation was performed by computing cluster robust standard errors. 
 Different tests for the choice of the model were performed.
74
 First, the results of the F test 
for the joint significance of fixed effects suggest that fixed effects model is preferred over OLS, as 
the estimated value of the test statistic is much larger than the critical value (and the probability of 
committing error by rejecting hypothesis of no joint significance of fixed effects is very low, well 
below any standard level of significance). Then, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
was used to test to compare random effects and OLS models. Again, the estimated test statistics 
strongly suggests that random effects model is preferred over OLS. So, effects models are more 
appropriate. The final choice to be made is between fixed and random effects. For that purpose, the 
Hausman test was performed. The result suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
consistency of the random effect estimates and therefore should use fixed effect estimation instead.  
Coefficients on all the alternative estimations have the expected sign. We expect that 
emigration rates decrease with increase in GDP per capita, as increase in GDP reduces the incentive 
for migration. In the preferred model, the one estimated by the fixed effects, the estimated 
coefficient on the GDP per capita suggests that increase in GDP per capita by $1,000 will decrease 
emigration rate of the highly educated by 0,36%, which is a plausible result and similar to the 
figures obtained n previous studies (e.g. Beine et al., 2008). Countries with smaller populations 
have higher emigration rates of the highly educated. For every additional million of inhabitants, 
                                                 
74
 All the results of diagnostics tests are provided in Appendix 4.3. 
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countries experience 0.02% lower emigration rates. This is also in line with all the previous studies. 
As discussed above, small countries are generally more open to all international flows, including 
migration. Therefore, it should be expected that emigration rates of the highly educated from small 
countries are larger, on average. But, this assumption is not supported by our results, as the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. The Gini 
coefficient does not appear to be statistically significant, which may be due to the quality of the 
data. But, it is not too insignificant (p-value of the coefficient is about 0.17) and it has the expected 
sign and therefore it was not excluded from the models, as it still contributes to the explanatory 
power of the model. The main variable of our interest, a dummy variable indicating whether a 
country was previously in conflict, is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that countries that experienced conflict have, on average, almost 4% 
higher emigration rates of the highly educated than the ones which did not experience conflict (i.e. 
emigration from these countries is predominantly voluntary). This suggests that countries which 
experience conflict and countries which did not experience it significantly differ in terms of their 
average emigration rates of the highly educated. As our theoretical model predicts, conflict 
increases brain drain. This is additional support to the argument that conflicts have particularly 
negative consequences for the stock of human capital in a country affected. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is an attempt to develop a theoretical model 
of conflict-induced migration, which would capture its specific features that distinguish this from 
other types of migration. This model was presented in Chapter 3. In order to test the model, this 
thesis provides two different analyses, based on two different datasets. The first is a micro level 
study on the determinants of displacement, based on household level data and the other is a macro 
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level study of the relationship between the type of migration (whether it is voluntary or forced) and 
magnitude of brain drain from a particular country. Findings from the micro-level study suggest that 
ethnic cleansing, characterized by forced eviction, increases probability of migration, particularly of 
highly educated. So, forced emigrants are, according to these findings, also positively self-selected 
in terms of their education level, as voluntary migrants. Findings from the macro-level study 
suggest that countries which experienced a conflict have, in general, produced more migrants with 
tertiary education, in total and in the proportions of total number of emigrants, thus losing the most 
valuable factor of economic growth. These two findings combined, confirm the predictions of the 
theoretical model, that ethnic cleansing has more severe negative consequences for the stock of 
human capital in a country than voluntary migration. These findings also suggest that conflict do 
not only produce increased emigration figures, but may increase proportion of individuals with 
tertiary education among these emigrants as well. It needs to be taken into account in the analysis of 
the overall consequences of conflict, as human capital depletion will have significant negative 
impact on the post-conflict recovery of a country. 
As the new literature on the brain drain argues, the emigration of highly educated 
individuals, besides depleting the stock of human capital in a home country, can also have positive 
reverse effects on the human capital formation, through increasing incentive for education by 
introducing migration prospects, or through the increased inflows of remittances that relax liquidity 
constraint for educational investments by households. These channels of positive impact of ethnic 
cleansing on human capital formation in a country will be investigated in the next chapter. 
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 Introduction 
 
The recent economics literature on migration and brain drain (Stark, 1997; Beine et al., 
2001, 2006a) argues that the emigration
75
 of highly educated individuals does not necessarily 
reduce the stock of human capital in a country, as brain drain may have positive feedback effects on 
the formation of human capital, through different channels. The main channels discussed in the 
literature and described in detail in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1) are: the ―incentive effect‖, whereby 
increased incentives for investments in education increase prospects for migration; the ―remittances 
effect‖, whereby the receipt of remittances increases household‘s income, thus increasing their 
invested in education; and the ―return migration effect‖, whereby migrants return with human 
capital acquired abroad and also continue to invest in education upon return. The previous empirical 
evidence on the effect of brain drain on human capital formation in a home country (Beine et al., 
2006a;  Schiff, 2005; Beine et al., 2006b) was inconclusive. Moreover, the empirical studies did not 
distinguish between different types of migration. Therefore, in order to properly investigate the 
impact of brain drain on human capital formation in countries that suffered from ethnic cleansing, 
empirical analysis using data from such countries is required. 
This chapter presents the findings from two separate empirical studies, which test the brain 
gain arguments by analysing two different channels of the impact of brain drain on human capital 
formation. In the first section, the Beine et al. (2006a) model of the brain gain is empirically tested 
by controlling for the type of migration (if a country was in conflict during the period investigated). 
The model uses country level data and regresses the stock of human capital in a country on a set of 
explanatory variables, including the emigration rate of the highly educated (brain drain) and the 
type of migration. The findings of this study are expected to reveal the extent of the impact of the 
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 Including voluntary and forced migration. As explained in the discussion of the positive effects of migration as a 
result of ethnic cleansing in Chapter 3, the theory does not suggest differences in the expected positive effects of this 
type of migration, compared to voluntary migration. Still, empirically, the magnitude of such effects may be different, 
therefore this chapter presents evidence on it. 
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―incentive effect‖ (the first of the three main channels mentioned above) in the context of ethnic 
cleansing. In the second study, household data from Bosnia-Herzegovina were used in order to 
analyse the potential impact of the receipt of remittances on household‘s education investment 
decisions. The analysis should provide economic insight into the second main channel of the impact 
of brain drain on human capital formation in a home country, the ―remittances effect‖. The third 
main channel, the one on return migration is not analysed, due to the lack of appropriate data 
available. This third channel can only be suggested as a potential direction for further research. 
 
 5.1. The incentive effect 
 
 5.1.1. Description of the effect 
 
The theoretical model of ―brain gain‖, which explains the incentive effect, is developed by 
Beine et al. (2006a). The model and its applicability in the context of ethnic cleansing was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The main argument of this model is that, once migration possibility is 
introduced, it will produce additional schooling incentive for potential emigrants. However, as 
explained in Chapter 3, it is based on a set of assumptions that do not necessarily hold in the case of 
the ethnic cleansing; the main one is that potential migrants realize that more education increases 
their migration prospects. The migrants from ethnic cleansing were not selected by the host 
countries on the basis of their education level, but were provided an asylum as refugees. Therefore, 
empirical evidence taking into account the differences between voluntary and forced migration is 
required for gaining insight into the incentive effect and the net effect of emigration due to the 
ethnic conflict on human capital formation in a home country.  
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In the previous empirical work (e.g. Beine et al., 2006a), emigration rates of highly educated 
individuals
76
 were used to describe the migration probability. These values may be appropriate for 
explanation of migration with relatively stable emigration rates. But, in the case of ethnic cleansing, 
significant increase in the number of migrants is observed. This, even if the proportion of highly 
educated emigrants in the total number of emigrants
77
 remains stable, will increase the emigration 
rate of the highly educated. Consequently, if the new emigration rate is used as a variable that 
approximates migration probability, it will wrongly assume that the probability of emigration for 
the remaining highly educated individuals in a country rapidly increased and that individuals 
observe such increase. The model then predicts that, according to the incentive effect hypothesis, 
human capital in countries affected by ethnic cleansing increases at much higher rates than in other 
countries. This may not be true for a number of reasons. First, forced emigrants currently residing in 
developing countries did not emigrate because they are highly educated, but because they were 
forced to migrate. This means that emigration rates do not properly reflect results of restrictive and 
selective immigration policies and thus the migration probability for the highly educated. Second, 
the difference between migration probability and emigration rates may be observable by individuals 
in a home country, thus not giving them as strong an incentive as would be predicted by the 
empirical model that uses emigration rates as a proxy for migration probability. Finally, countries in 
conflict usually suffered destruction of the facilities of the education system, thus the post-conflict 
environment may be such to not allow the full utilization of the incentive effect created by 
emigration of highly educated people during the conflict. All these suggest that the incentive effect 
should not be as strong as the theoretical model, initially developed for the context of voluntary 
migration, would predict and therefore requires controlling for the type of migration in the 
empirical analysis. The magnitude of the estimated impact of the migration on human capital 
formation in a home country is therefore expected to be less positive for forced migration than in 
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 The emigration rate of highly educated is expressed as a proportion of highly educated emigrants in the population of 
highly educated individuals from a country (including emigrants). 
77
 This term is called ―selection rate‖ in Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
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the case of voluntary migration and this difference can be explained by either a different degree of 
awareness of potential migrants about the migration prospects brought by additional education, or 
by the fact that capacities for formation of human capital in a home country are negatively affected 
by a conflict, thus the potential of the incentive effect cannot be exploited fully. 
 
 5.1.2. The baseline model 
 
The empirical analysis of the incentive effect in the case of ethnic cleansing will generally 
follow the approach applied in Beine et al. (2006a) in their analysis of the same effect in the context 
of voluntary migration. The arguments mentioned previously and explained in detail in the 
theoretical discussion of the incentive effect presented in Chapter 3 suggest that the model of the 
incentive effect does not differ significantly between voluntary and forced migration, although the 
magnitude of the effect might be different. For these reasons, a variable that will distinguish 
between different types of migration from different countries will be introduced in the model. The 
baseline regression model to be estimated will be the same as in Beine et al. (2006a), with one 
additional variable on the type of migration from a country. The model is: 
 
iuCDVCDVRM
LATDSSADDENSpHH

 
007906906
5490390290100090 )ln()ln()ln(
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  (5.1) 
 
where: 
)ln( 0090 H - the dependent variable, expressed as a log value of the change in the stock of human 
capital in a country between 1990 and 2000, 
)ln( 90H - log of initial stock of human capital in a country in 1990, 
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)ln( 90p - variable for migration probability, expressed as a log of the highly educated emigration 
rate in 1990, 
90DENS  - population density in a country in 1990, 
SSAD  - dummy variable for South American countries, 
LATD  - dummy variable for countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
90RM  - inflow of remittances to a country in 1990, expressed as a share of GDP 
90CDV  - a dummy variable taking value 1 if a country was at war during a decade before 1990 
(from 1980 to 1989), zero otherwise, 
00CDV  - a dummy variable taking value 1 if a country was at war during a decade before 2000 
(from 1990 to 1999), zero otherwise, 
iu  - a random error term. 
 
The dependent variable in the model proposed by Beine et al. (2006a) is the log change of 
the human capital stock in a home country between two periods (ΔH00-90), where human capital is 
measured as a proportion of highly educated individuals
78
 in the population. This variable is 
regressed on a set of variables proposed by the theoretical model of the incentive effect, developed 
in Chapter 3. The key variable is migration probability at the beginning of the period (p90). In the 
empirical model, it enters as an emigration rate from a country, measured as a proportion of highly 
educated emigrants in the total stock of highly educated individuals in a home country, including 
emigrants.  
The emigration rates corrected by the age of entry are used, where only individuals 
emigrating at age 22 or above were included in the calculation of the emigration rates. That is, only 
migrants who acquired their education in a home country and then emigrated are taken into account 
                                                 
78
 As highly educated individuals are considered those who have 12 or more years of education. 
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and not those who acquired their education after migration. Although the Beine et al. (2006a) study 
does not reveal any significant differences in results where all migrants or only those of age 22 and 
above were included, here the choice of corrected rates was made according to the belief that these 
figures measure actual brain drain more accurately. According to its definition, the brain drain is 
emigration of the highly educated, not the ―will be‖ highly educated. Also, if we assume that the 
stock of highly educated emigrants is a proxy for actual migration probability, resulting from 
immigration restrictions, then we should exclude those emigrating before their age of 22, as 
emigration of low educated individuals who acquire their education after migration should not 
affect probabilities for emigration of highly educated individuals. 
Other independent variables included in the Beine et al. (2006a) model are: initial stock of 
human capital in a country (H90); population density (DENS90); remittances (RM90); and two 
regional dummies, for Latin America (LATD) and for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSAD). Initial stock of 
human capital, measured as a proportion of highly educated individual in a population, enters the 
model in order to control for a potential catching-up effect, i.e. the negative sign of the coefficient 
of this variable should indicate convergence trends in the human capital levels among countries. 
The population density is a proxy for the costs of acquiring education. Increase in population 
density is expected to decrease distance to schools and thus education expenditures. Remittances, 
expresses in the model as remittances per capita
79
, are expected to have a positive impact on the 
relaxation of liquidity constraints.
80
  
Besides the variables used in Beine et al. (2006a), two additional variables controlling for 
the type of migration were included.
81
 As discussed in the theoretical model in Chapter 3, although 
                                                 
79
 In fact, in the Beine et al. (2009) model, they are presented in the model explanation as a share of GDP and then in 
the results reported as remittances per capita. In an e-mail conversation with the author (Michel Beine), his explanation 
of this ambiguity was that he thinks it is remittances as a share of GDP. 
80 
We may expect that this effect is not linear, but the poorer the country is, the stronger this impact should be, ceteris 
paribus. This argues for inclusion of the interaction variable between initial levels of remittances and GDP 
(rem90gdp90). But, once we include this variable, it significantly reduces the sample size; therefore the model was not 
estimated and reported. 
81
 This modelling strategy follows the Beine et al. (2009) approach in making a distinction between small and large 
countries. But, as will be presented in the discussion of alternative estimation strategies (next section), this approach 
129 
 
the presence and the direction of the incentive effect arising from forced migration on human 
capital formation in a home country is expected to be similar to voluntary migration, still its 
magnitude may differ, due to either different impressions of potential migrants about migration 
prospects or due to the decreased capacities of countries affected by a conflict to utilize such an 
opportunity for formation of human capital. Therefore, two variables that should capture the effect 
of conflict on migration are included in the model. First is a variable on conflict before 1990 
(CDV90). It is expected to control for the impact of conflict-induced migration on the true migration 
probabilities for the highly educated, which may not be properly expressed by the stock of 
emigrants. Another variable is for a conflict between 1990 and 1999 (CDV00). This variable is 
expected to capture the impact of conflict on the capacity of a country to produce new human 
capital. Both variables are expresses as dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if a country 
experiences conflict in a given period and zero otherwise.
82
 In order to compare the results without 
and with a variable that controls for the type of migration, three different models will be estimated. 
Model 1 will be an estimation of the Beine et al. (2006a) model. Replication of their results in this 
thesis will be done with the purpose of comparison with the new models estimated here. Model 2 
will, in addition to the Beine et al. (2006a) variables, estimate the model with one additional 
variable to control for the impact of the type of migration on the emigration rates of the highly 
educated. The variable is CDV90. Also, Model 3 will, besides variable CDV90, also include variable 
CDV00, which is expected to capture the effect of the country‘s capacity to utilize the incentive 
effect created by emigration in order to increase production of human capital in a country. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
was found to be inappropriate, as it does not capture the differences in size of the incentive effect between different 
countries. 
82
 Alternative specifications of these two variables, such as average annual battle-deaths of a conflict during a given 
period and total battle deaths during the conflict as a proportion of population of a country, were used, but all of them 
appear to be highly insignificant and reduce the value of R
2
 once they entering the model. 
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5.1.3. Data 
 
The data used for the purpose of this empirical study are taken from the same sources as the 
ones used in Beine et al. (2006a) study, for comparative purposes. The purpose of such comparison 
is that the results from empirical analysis that does not distinguish between types of migration (in 
Beine et al., 2006a) will be compared to the results from the analysis that follows, which is specific 
in a way that  it makes distinction between voluntary and forced migration. As explained above, the 
entire analysis here is based on the assumption that models such as the one in Beine et al. (2006a) 
suffer from omitted variable bias by not making such distinction between different types of 
migration. Data on GDP and GNI, life expectancy at birth, population size and density and 
remittances are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009). For the human 
capital levels and emigration rates by education level, there are two alternative datasets that could 
have been used in this study. First, there is the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset on the 
emigration rates by education level of migrants from 175 countries in 1990 and 195 countries in 
2000 to all OECD countries. Second, there is the Defoort (2006) panel dataset for emigration rates 
by education level of migrants from 195 developing countries to the six major receiving OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States) for six periods 
between 1975 and 2000. Unfortunately, as refugees are found to be less concentrated than voluntary 
migrants and are more likely to remain in the neighbourhood of their countries, hence less likely to 
move to the OECD countries, the Defoort (2006) dataset might not be well representative, so we 
believe that the figures from the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset represent emigration rates of 
the highly educated from countries in conflict more accurately. As a result, the human capital stock 
and emigration rates data are taken from this dataset. The formula for the emigration rate is: 
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Where: 
j
stm ,  - emigration rate of individuals of education level s from country j at time t, 
j
stM , - stock of emigrants of education level s from country j at time t, 
j
stN , - stock of individuals of education level s in a country j (non-migrants) at time t. 
s = l, m, h (l=primary education, m=secondary education and h=tertiary education) 
 
Consequently, the emigration rate denotes the intensity of emigration by education level 
from a home country to OECD countries.
83
 The formation of human capital between two periods 
(ΔHa,00-90) is the dependent variable in all the models to be estimated in this study and is expressed 
as the log change of the human capital stock in a home country between two periods. 
In addition to Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset, this study uses Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP)
84
 dataset in order to create variables about conflict.
85
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 This variable was also used by Beine et al. (2009). 
84
 Version 4-2008 of the dataset was used here. The dataset contains information about the intensity of conflict as well, 
which allows creation of continuous variable. However, as the main purpose of the study is to analyse differences 
between countries with different type of emigration, not the effect of intensity of conflict on human capital formation, 
use of dummy variables was considered as more appropriate. 
85
 The main characteristics of the two datasets used for this study, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset and Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP)85 dataset, are explained in the previous chapter, as these two dataset were used for the 
cross-country study of the determinants of brain drain.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable description Variable name N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Emigration rates at the beginning of 
the period, in percentages 
P90 168 18.21 22.59 0.10 93.50 
Emigration rates at the end of the 
period, in percentages 
P00 168 16.62 18.82 0.30 81.90 
Initial stock of human capital in a 
country, in percentages 
HA90 127 6.53 5.80 0.10 24.80 
Stock of human capital in a country at 
the end of period, in percentages 
HA00 127 9.30 7.74 0.40 31.60 
Population of a country at the 
beginning of the period, in millions 
POP90 146 31.60 119.74 0.02 1,135.19 
Inflows of remittances to a country in 
1990, , in million $ 
RM90 103 663.31 1,175.44 1.00 5,075.00 
GDP per capita at the beginning of the 
period, in $ 
GDPPC90 141 4,247.83 7,096.07 97.76 35,490.56 
Population density in a country at the 
beginning of the period, in thousands
86
 
DENS90 146 94.56 156.52 1.34 1,125.00 
Valid N (listwise)  49     
 
Table 5.1 shows that the countries included in the sample differ significantly in terms of 
their emigration rates as well as their stock of human capital. As we can see, the average stock of 
human capital increased between the two periods, which was expected. Also, we see that in our 
sample, 32% of countries experience a conflict during the decade preceding 1990 and 31% of 
countries experienced conflict during the period between 1990 and 2000. The only figure that might 
be somewhat surprising is that the average emigration rates are lower in the second period, although 
different trends are generally reported throughout the world. The only explanation is that, as the 
data on emigration rates cover OECD countries only, the emigration rates are declining to OECD 
countries and increasing to other parts of the world. 
 
                                                 
86
 This variable was expressed in thousands, since reporting them as in Beine et al. (2006) produces estimates that are 
not easily readable. All other variables are expresses in the same way as in Beine et al. (2006) for comparative 
purposes. 
133 
 
 5.1.4. Results 
 
 The summary results of the estimations of three alternative specifications of the baseline 
model from Equation (5.1), where robust standard errors
87
 are in parentheses, are presented in Table 
5.2.
88
 The first specification (Model 1) is the Beine et al. (2006a) model, which is presented by 
Equation (5.1), only without the two dummy variables on conflict.
89
 The second specification 
(Model 2) introduces a dummy variable on conflict before 1990 into the model, while the third 
specification (Model 3) also includes a dummy variable on conflict between 1990 and 2000. All the 
three models are estimated by OLS, for comparative purposes. Alternative estimation strategies are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87
 Robust standard errors are reported because the tests for heteroskedasticity strongly (with very low p-value of the 
test) suggest that the assumption of the constant variance of residuals is violated in the model used. The results of the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and White‘s test for heteroskedasticity, both estimated in STATA, are provided in 
Appendix 5.1. 
88
 Detailed results of the estimation of this model are provided in Appendix 5.1. 
89
 Also, without variable on remittances, as this variable reduces the sample size and is not statistically significant in 
any of the specifications. This was also found in Beine et al. (2006), so they also excluded this variable in further 
reported results of the model. 
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Table 5.2. OLS estimation results of the baseline model 
Dependent variable: Change in the log of 
stock of human capital in a country between 
two periods (1990 and 2000) 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Emigration rates at the beginning of the 
period (p90) 
0.048** 
(0.02) 
0.050** 
(0.02) 
0.050** 
(0.02) 
Initial stock of human capital in a country 
(H90) 
-0.237*** 
(0.04) 
-0.248*** 
(0.04) 
-0.257*** 
(0.04) 
Population density (DENS90) -0.063 
(0.14) 
-0.064 
(0.13) 
-0.052 
(0.13) 
Regional dummy for Latin America (LATD) 0.028 
(0.06) 
0.029 
(0.06) 
0.032 
(0.07) 
Regional dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSAD) 
-0.375*** 
(0.08) 
-0.393*** 
(0.08) 
-0.396*** 
(0.08) 
A dummy for countries experiencing conflict 
before 1990 (CDV90) 
  -0.108** 
(0.05) 
-0.083* 
(0.04) 
A dummy for countries experiencing conflict 
between 1990 and 2000 (CDV00) 
    -0.066 
(0.05) 
Intercept -0.092 
(0.08) 
-0.074 
(0.07) 
-0.093 
(0.08) 
Number of observations 122 122 122 
R
2
 0.42 0.44 0.44 
Overall F-test 9.19 8.05 7.13 
*** statistically significant at 1% level, 
** statistically significant at 5% level, 
* statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
The results presented in the Table 5.2 show that the estimated coefficients have the same 
sign and similar size throughout different specifications. The signs obtained are the same as in 
Beine et al. (2006a) and are expected. Moreover, the estimated values of coefficients do not change 
considerably between the specifications. The Ramsey RESET test statistic for omitted variables is 
slightly above the 5% level of statistical significance level in the first model specification and below 
1% level in other specifications. These results suggest that a problem of omitted variables might 
exist in the model estimated. Notwithstanding, the current theory on the incentive effect of brain 
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drain does not give any suggestion about potential additional explanatory variables that should be 
included in the model. The checks for variance inflation and correlation do not suggest any 
significant problem with correlations between regressors included in the model.
90
  
Estimated coefficients of the variables used on Beine et al. (2006a) have very similar values 
to the ones reported by Beine et al. (2006a) in all model specification, which suggests that the 
model is robust and not sensitive to the inclusion of our conflict variables. First, the variable 
capturing the incentive effect, the initial emigration rates of the highly educated from a home 
country to OECD countries (p90) is statistically significant at the 5% level and positive in all models 
estimated. As interpreted in Beine et al. (2006a), this value suggests that doubled migration 
propensity increases human capital formation in a country by 5%. This clearly suggests that the 
incentive effect positively influenced the formation of human capital in a country. Second, the 
initial stock of human capital in a country (H90) is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
negative in all three specifications reported, suggesting convergence in levels of human capital 
between countries over the period analysed. The population density (dens90) does not appear to be 
statistically significant. A regional dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa reveals relatively lower 
performance of countries from this region in human capital formation, compared to other regions. 
The key variable of the above specifications, the dummy variable on the conflict before 
1990 (CDV90) in the reported Model 2 specification is statistically significant at standard levels of 
significance. This suggests that the human capital formation increases at a slower pace in countries 
that were affected by a conflict compared to the countries with the same emigration rates (the 
migration probability) that were not affected. The negative sign on the variable suggests that the 
average increase in the human capital between two periods will be lower for countries that 
experienced conflict in the period before. Alternatively, in terms of the brain drain, this means that 
conflict-induced migration of highly educated individuals will have less positive impact on human 
                                                 
90
 Results of post-estimation tests run after each of the model estimated are provided in Appendices 5.1. to 5.3, after the 
reported estimation results. 
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capital formation in a home country in subsequent periods. Thus, the incentive effect of the same 
size may be expected to have weaker effect in countries that experienced conflict (and produced 
refugees). On the other hand, the dummy variable on conflict during the period (cdv00) is not 
statistically significant. This result suggests that, although it may be expected, the formation of 
human capital is not significantly affected by the existence of current conflict in a country.  
Still, such a model specification, although measuring the differences between countries that 
did and those that did not experience conflict in their human capital accumulation (dummy variables 
for conflict), is not capable to show differences in the size of the incentive effect between these two 
types of countries, which is the main aim of this analysis. In order to capture these differences, an 
interaction variable between the incentive effect and the dummy variable for conflict needs to be 
introduced. This new model specification will be estimated by alternative methods in the following 
section. 
 
 5.1.5. Estimation of alternative specifications 
 
In addition to the baseline model from Equation (5.1), four alternative specifications will be 
estimated, based on the following arguments. This analysis is based on the second specification of 
the baseline model (Model 2), as the results in the previous section justify inclusion of such a 
variable, but not the additional variable included in the Model 3. This specification be will 
augmented by an additional variable that should capture the differences in the size of the incentive 
effect between different countries, which is an interaction term between the incentive effect and a 
dummy variable for conflict in 80s (p90CDV90). This model (Model 4) will be estimated by OLS 
first, in order to see the difference in its results compared to models without this variable (Models 1 
to 3). Then, the new model will be estimated by new methods, proposed by both the authors in their 
subsequent work and by critics of their initial model estimated in the previous section (Schiff, 2005; 
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Groizard and Llull, 2007). These authors raised several issues related to the model that may affect 
the internal validity of the estimated results. First, Schiff (2005) argues that the probability of 
migration is not necessarily exogenous. Immigration policies in developing countries are set based 
on quotas, rather than on proportions of the highly educated in a country. This means that the 
increase in human capital will decrease migration probability for all the highly educated individuals 
remaining in a home country. The solution proposed by Beine et al. (2006a) is an instrumental 
variable approach, where the potential exogenous instruments affecting probability of migration are 
population size of a country and number of emigrants living in OECD countries at the beginning of 
the period.
91
 The argument for inclusion of the population size of a country is that small countries 
tend to be more open,
92
 which makes this instrument relevant and the size of a country is not 
expected to affect human capital formation, so the instrument is exogenous. The argument for 
inclusion of the initial stock of emigrants is that it is expected to be positively correlated with the 
probability of migration, as a larger migrant stock decreases costs of migration and increases 
expected wages after migration, but is not expected to affect human capital formation. So, Model 5 
to be estimated will be the instrumental variable approach to the estimation of the baseline model 
presented in Equation (5.1), where the initial population (pop90) and number of emigrants living in 
OECD countries at the beginning of the period (MT90) will be used as instruments for the 
probability of migration. The summary results of this estimation are presented in the second column 
of the Table 5.3 and detailed results are provided in Appendix 5.5. The reported standard errors are 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, as the tests of heteroskedasticity for all 
different specifications of the model suggest that the variance of residuals is not constant, therefore 
the homoskedastic standard errors are not appropriate.  
                                                 
91
 Also, some other variables were considered as potential instruments, such as life expectancy at birth (capturing 
general living conditions in a country), the initial level of GDP per capita and a variable for racial tensions (capturing 
―push‖ factors91 of migration), but were discarded because of likely endogeneity of these variables. 
92
 Analysis of the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset shows negative correlation between size and migration rates 
from a country. Also, small countries tend to be more open in terms of other international flows, namely trade and 
financial. 
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The argument used by Beine et al. (2006a) to justify the instrumental variable approach 
seems plausible. Still, the estimation methods that address potential endogeneity, such as 
instrumental variable approach, should not be performed by default, as these estimation methods 
will produce less efficient estimators than the OLS method if the variable which we believe to be 
endogenous is actually exogenous (Wooldridge, 2003: 483). Therefore, before using this method we 
need to test for endogeneity of the variable. The method proposed by Davidson and McKinnon 
(1993), known as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, is to include residuals from the first-stage model as 
a regressor in the second-stage model. If the estimated coefficient of the residual is statistically 
significant, then the OLS estimates are not consistent and the use of the instrumental variable 
approach is justified. The estimated coefficient in this case is statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance,
93
 which suggests that the regressors are endogenous and that the instrumental variable 
approach should be used. 
Moreover, the instruments used in the estimation are valid only if two conditions are met. 
First is instrument relevance, meaning that the variable used as an instrument should be correlated 
with the endogenous variable from the original model; and, secsond id instrument exogeneity, 
meaning that an instrument is not correlated with the error term of the original model. If an 
instrument is not relevant, then the estimated coefficients will be even more biased than those 
estimated by OLS (Baum et al., 2007: 20). A more recent literature (Stock and Yogo, 2005) argues 
that even when instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable, the instrumental variable 
estimation will perform poorly. Consequently, in order to confirm relevance of the instruments used 
in this analysis, both tests for under-identification and weak identification are performed.
94
 The 
computed value of the F-test is 28.09, which is above the ―rule of thumb‖ value of 10,95 suggesting 
that neither under-identification nor weak identification of instrument is a problem at any standard 
                                                 
93
 Actually, the computed p–value of the test statistics is very close to 0. The detailed results of this diagnostic test are 
provided in Appendix 5.5. 
94
 Detailed results of these tests are presented in Appendix 5.5. 
95
 Angrist and Pischke (2009) proved that even the value of F-statistics that is well below 10 can be acceptable in the 
case of multiple instruments and developed an alternative first-stage F-test for such situations. 
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level of significance.
96
 The test of instrument exogeneity is also performed. The computed p-value 
of the Wooldridge robust test score statistic suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term. This means that the second condition for a valid instrument is met: the instruments used 
in the model are not correlated with the error term of the original regression. 
Second issue that may affect the internal validity of the estimated results is that it may be 
expected that the incentive effect is not homogenous across countries. Beine et al. (2006a) suspect 
that the impact of the migration prospects on human capital formation may be different in countries 
with low levels compared to countries high levels of income. As the migration prospects raise 
expected returns to education, the difference between these returns without and with migration and 
thus the incentive effect, is expected to be stronger in poorer countries. For that reason, Beine et al. 
(2006a) introduced an interactive term between the emigration rate and a dummy variable for 
countries with GNI below certain poverty level, where three different thresholds were used. 
Although their empirical results did not reveal any statistical significance of this interactive 
variable, this argument may be used for inclusion of an interaction term between the severity of 
conflict and the poverty level dummy variable
97
 (CDV90GNID90) into Model 6, as the impact of the 
conflict on human capital formation may be non-linear across countries at different levels of 
income. 
Third, the simplified theoretical model sets the migration prospects of low educated 
individuals to zero. This presumes that the mechanism set out in the theoretical model is based on 
absolute migration propensity. However, in reality, it is more likely that relative migration prospects 
affect human capital formation. Consequently, if the assumption of no migration of low educated is 
relaxed then low educated migration rates should be included in the empirical model. The solution 
                                                 
96
 Actually, the p-value of this test is 0.000.  
97
 Beine et al. used different thresholds for this dummy variable, such as $500, $700 and $900, but the result remain the 
same. So, in this study, the threshold of $500 was chosen, This means that a dummy variable for poverty (GNID90) 
takes value of 1 of a country has GNI per capita above $500. 
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proposed in Beine et al. (2009) is the ratio of highly educated over low educated emigration rates at 
the beginning of the period (ps90pu90). So, Model 7 is Model 4 augmented by the variable ps90pu90. 
Besides the above mentioned critiques, which were taken into account in subsequent 
analysis and different estimation of the model presented in the following text, the Groizard and 
Llull (2007) critique of the Beine et al. (2006a) model was also analysed, but not chosen as one of 
our possible alternative estimation methods. Groizard and Llull (2007) reestimated Beine et al. 
(2006a) model by excluding the initial human capital level and found that the incentive effect 
disappears when this variable is excluded. Their explanation is that the positive effect of emigration 
rates found in Beine et al. (2006a) is a result of the bias introduced by inclusion of the initial level 
of human capital, which is an endogenous variable resulting from possible reverse causal effect of 
the emigration rates on the stock of human capital, expressed as proportion of highly educated 
people in the total population. We disagree with such an argument, as a growth model without a 
variable on initial level of dependent variable suffers from significant omitted variable bias and 
such results cannot be considered reliable.  
The summary results of the three alternative specifications (Models 4 to 7) are presented in 
the Table 5.3.
98
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 The STATA outputs of the model estimations and post-estimation tests for the models 4 to 7 are presented in 
Appendices 5.4 to 5.7. 
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Table 5.3. Alternative models: estimation results  
Dependent variable: Change in the log of stock of human 
capital in a country between two periods (1990 and 2000) 
Model 4 
OLS 
Model 5 
IV (2SLSL) 
Model 6 
OLS 
Model 7 
OLS 
Log of emigration rates at the beginning of the period 
(lnp90) 
0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.203*** 
(0.054) 
0.057** 
(0.024) 
0.042 
(0.028) 
Log of initial stock of human capital in a country (lnh90) -0.247 
(0.037) 
-0.255*** 
(0.033) 
-0.283*** 
(0.040) 
-0.222*** 
(0.040) 
Population density (DENS90) -0.069 
(0.132) 
-0.088 
(0.199) 
-0.017 
(0.127) 
-0.053 
(0.115) 
Regional dummy for Latin America (LATD) 0.028 
(0.063) 
-0.099 
(0.101) 
0.051 
(0.067) 
0.040 
(0.063) 
Regional dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSAD) -0.391*** 
(0.083) 
-0.337*** 
(0.080) 
-0.348*** 
(0.076) 
-0.340*** 
(0.078) 
A dummy for countries experiencing conflict in 1980s 
(CDV90) 
-0.148 
(0.093) 
 -0.512*** 
(0.171) 
-0.071 
(0.100) 
 -0.092 
(0.090)  
Interaction term between p90 and CDV90 (p90CDV90) -0.017 
(0.034) 
-0.166** 
(0.068) 
-0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(0.038) 
A dummy for poor countries (GNID90)    0.226** 
(0.088) 
  
Interaction between conflict in 1980s and a dummy for 
poverty (CDV90GNID90) 
   -0.073 
(0.093) 
 
 
Ratio between highly and low educated emigration rates 
(ps90/pu90) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
Intercept -0.064 
(0.077) 
0.149*** 
(0.11) 
-0.362*** 
(0.132) 
-0.072 
(0.089) 
Number of observations  122 122 111 
R
2
 0.44 0.24
99
 0.49 0.42 
Overall F-test 6.96  6.78 6.51 
Test of linear combination of variables lnp90 and p90CDV90  0.037 
(0.023) 
  
*** statistically significant at 1% level, 
** statistically significant at 5% level, 
* statistically significant at 10% level. 
                                                 
99
 Measure of fit reported for the estimation of Model 5 (instrumental variable regression) in the Table 5.3. is 
uncentered R
2
. 
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 The results for the variables which appear in the baseline and alternative specifications are 
consistent over the specifications. The signs and statistical significance of the coefficients remain 
the same, while their size changes slightly. The most significant change on the coefficients of key 
variables is when the instrumental approach is used instead of OSL. As the above mentioned results 
of diagnostic test have shown, the OLS method is not appropriate and instrumental approach should 
be used, a migration probability is an endogenous variable. Therefore, the following interpretation 
of the results and conclusions will primarily rely on the coefficients estimated by the instrumental 
variable method. The results suggest that the use of inappropriate method actually underestimates 
the impact of the incentive effect of voluntary migration and suggest that doubling migration 
propensity increases the stock of human capital by 5%, while the more appropriate instrumental 
approach suggests it will increase by 20%.  
The coefficient of the variable on conflict (CDV90) is significant and negative in the 
alternative specifications, as they were in the baseline model (Table 5.2). But, it has to be noted 
when interpreting this coefficient that it, once the interaction term is included, represents the 
omitted category from the interaction term. In this case, coefficient of the variable lnp90 measures 
the incentive effect for countries that were not in conflict,
100
 while the interaction term shows the 
difference in the size of that effect between two groups of countries. The size of the coefficient for 
lnp90 variable is considerably larger compared to the model where the interaction term is not 
included, while the sign of the interaction term is negative. The results, presented in the table 5.2., 
suggest that, once the interaction term that controls for the differences between countries in terms of 
their recent history of conflict on their territory is included, the size of the incentive effect in 
countries that did not experience conflict in recent history (and record voluntary emigration flows) 
is considerably larger than if we approximate this effect across different countries. When the 
coefficient is estimated as an average for different countries, the impact of migration prospects on 
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 Dummy variable for conflict (CDV90) takes value of 1 if country was in conflict, therefore the omitted category 
(value of 0) is that cooutry was not in conflict. 
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human capital formation in a country is estimated to be around 5%. The estimated coefficient for 
the interaction term on the other hand, that controls for the differences in the incentive effect 
between the two types of countries, shows that the difference is negative, i.e. countries that were in 
conflict have a substantially lower incentive effect. The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
term is -0.16. As the interaction term measures the difference in the effect between the two groups 
of countries, then the actual measured value of the incentive effect for countries that were 
previously in conflict is 0.04. This means that doubling migration prospects in countries that did not 
experience conflict in previous decade will increase the stock of human capital by 20%, but by only 
4% in countries that experienced conflict in previous decade. When we further estimate the linear 
combination of the two estimators (p90 and p90CDV90), we can see that the effect is not statistically 
significant at standard levels of significance.
101
 This suggests that, although the incentive effect 
average across the countries is positive and statistically significant, it actually exists for countries 
that were not in conflict (and is much larger than when averaged), but for countries that were in 
conflict the incentive effect it actually does not exist at all. This is expected result according to the 
predictions made in the theoretical discussion of the model developed for voluntary migration and 
its appropriateness in the context of ethnic cleansing, which was provided in Chapter 3. 
The interaction term between variables on conflict and poverty included in the Model 5 does 
not appear as statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of conflict on human capital 
formation does not differ considerably between poor and rich countries. The coefficients of the 
incentive effect variable (p90) and initial human capital stock variable (H90) are statistically 
significant and have the same sign across all different model specifications. The variable controlling 
for the emigration of low educated (ps90pu90) included in the Model 6 is also not statistically 
significant. This means that the migration of low educated individuals does not have a significant 
effect on the formation of human capital in a home country.  
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 Result of the test of linear combination of estimators p90 and p90CDV90  (lincom command in STATA) is presented in 
Table 5.3. 
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The issue of possible omitted variable bias should be acknowledged here. Some of the 
variables that should have been included in the models above in order to avoid this bias are 
remittances and government policies regarding education investments. Unfortunately, data 
availability did not allow the inclusion of these variables. However, the results reported can still be 
considered robust for two reasons. First, the coefficient of the variable for remittances was not 
significant in previous empirical studies (e.g. Beine et al., 2006) and therefore the non-inclusion of 
that variable should not cause omitted variable bias in the model. Second, although the estimated 
effect can be considered as a composite effect, there is no reason to expect differences in the effect 
of remittances or increased educational investments by governments between countries that did and 
the ones that did not experience conflict. Therefore, the estimated difference in the effect of 
interaction term between migration probability and history of conflict (p90CDV90) can still be 
attributed to the difference of the impact of incentive effect. 
 
 
5.2. The remittances effect 
 
5.2.1. Description of the effect  
 
The findings from the macro level empirical analysis of the incentive effect suggest that the 
impact of migration on human capital formation in countries that were previously in conflict is 
positive but weaker than in countries that did not experience a conflict. This confirms the 
hypothesis of the incentive effect of migration, where migration prospects influence increase in 
educational investments by individuals who intend to migrate, but only in countries that were not 
previously in conflict or, in other words, which experience voluntary migration. However, in the 
case of the countries that experienced conflict and forced migration, this effect does not exist. The 
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theory of brain gain suggests that remittances and return migration can also have a positive impact 
on the human capital formation. But, the results from the macro level models, such as the one 
estimated above, fail to find any significant impact of remittances and return migration
102
 on human 
capital formation. But, for more subtle analysis of the brain gain argument, it was decided to 
perform additional micro level analysis by using evidence from a country that experienced ethnic 
cleansing recently, in addition to the cross-country evidence of the incentive effect presented in the 
previous section. As micro level data on return migration are not available and extremely difficult to 
collect, it was decided to conduct the analysis of the effect of the receipt of remittances on 
households‘ education investment behaviour and to leave the analysis of the return migration for a 
post-doctoral research project. 
Remittances are considered as one of the arguments that emigration of highly skilled individuals 
might have a net positive impact on human capital formation in a home country.
103
 The possibility 
that remittances positively influence households‘ educational investment decisions are based on the 
idea of a relaxed liquidity constraint
104
 and reduced children‘s labour participation in the 
remittances receiving household (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006: 4). This, in turn, induces 
investment in children‘s education leading to a positive relationship between remittances and 
children‘s educational attainment and a negative relationship between remittances and child labour 
supply. But as remittances are inseparable from migration processes, a potential countervailing 
effect that has to be taken into account is the effect of parental absence via the disruption of family 
life, which may subsequently negatively influence the educational attainment of children (e.g. 
Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). 
Moreover, Miluka and Dabalen (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008) point out the possibility 
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 The variable on remittances per capita received by a country, which should capture both the impact of remittances 
and return migration, appears to be statistically insignificant in all model specifications. 
103
 Other channels include incentive effect of migration prospects and the effect of diaspora and return migrants. 
104
 The liquidity constraint does not exist at all levels of income. For this reason, income deciles were introduced into 
the model, in order to control for the existence of the liquidity constraint. The inclusion of the variables is explained in 
detail later. 
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of a substitution effect. According to this argument, households with migrant networks have a 
higher probability of emigration. If these households expect higher earnings abroad, they face a 
higher opportunity cost of schooling due to the effect of forgone earnings. Thus, they may decide to 
emigrate and hence not to invest in education or invest less in education. But, this argument is in 
contradiction with the arguments of the brain gain literature (Beine et al., 2001, 2006a) presented 
earlier, which argues that migration prospects increase educational investments. Moreover, new 
models of migration argue that the individual migration decision is made by calculating life-long 
benefits of migration and that migrants acquire education where it‘s cheaper and employ it where it 
brings higher returns. Consequently, the positive rather than the negative impact of migration on 
educational attainment among migrant households should be expected. Therefore, describing this 
effect as the ―network effect‖ may be more appropriate. 
In order to analyze the impact of remittances receipt on human capital formation in a home 
country, two different dependent variables will be used in the subsequent empirical analysis. The 
first is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a child is enrolled in school.
105
 The model with 
this variable should reveal the sign and size of the impact of remittances receipt on a child‘s 
enrolment. But, along with this and as a new empirical contribution to the topic, another variable 
will be used. It will be household‘s investment in a child‘s education. This should directly measure 
change in the educational investments as a results of remittances receipt. As the educational 
investments by a household depends on whether a household self-selects itself into the one sending 
children to school or not, the results from the probit model with a child‘ enrolment as a dependent 
variable shall be used as a first stage results of the Heckman‘s two-stage procedure in the model 
with educational investments as a dependent variable. 
With an aim to capture the impact of the three hypothesized determinants, different 
independent variables shall be included into the model. As discussed in Chapter 3, the three 
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 This is most widely used dependent variable in previous studies. The summary table of previous studies is presented 
in Appendix 5.9. 
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hypothesized influences of remittances on households‘ educational investments decision - 
relaxation of liquidity constraints, disruption effects and network effects - may differ between 
households according to their characteristics related to remittances receipts and parental absence. 
To assess the effect of relaxing liquidity constraints,
106
 it is necessary to take into account that, in 
households with absent member, remittances are not an exogenous addition to income, but the 
alternative source of household income to the situation when the absent member would stay within 
a household and earn a wage. Accordingly, absence of a member in a household which does not 
receive remittances may be considered as an income loss. Alternatively, there is evidence
107
 that 
many households in Bosnia-Herzegovina receive remittances from relatives, which thus may be 
considered as an exogenous source of income. Therefore, besides accounting for receipt of 
remittances, the distinction between households which do and those which do not have absent 
members is necessary. To this end, counterfactual income for households that have absent members, 
compared to households without migrants, should be estimated. The receipt of remittances is 
income gain for households; the estimated counterfactual income for households with migrant 
members is income loss and the difference between the two for households with migrants receiving 
remittances is the net effect of migration and remittances on a household‘s income. To investigate 
the network effect, we will include a dummy variable for parental absence as an additional 
explanatory variable. For the network effect, an interaction variable between remittance receipt and 
absence of a parent will be included in the model. This is based on the assumption that children 
from households with migrants are more likely to migrate in the future (network effect) and that 
remittances may be used to finance migration, instead of education. Thus, the interaction term 
between these two is expected to capture this effect. 
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 Liquidity constraint on the context of remittances should be interpreted as inability of households to borrow and to  
invest in productive activities, such as education, due to a lack of financial resources.   
107
 The evidence is supported by the data collected through the survey. It is also supported by the idea that conflict-
induced migration differs from voluntary migration in the sense that it is predominantly migration of entire families, 
instead of one or two members. This also affects the amount of remittances sent, as interfamily links are expected to be 
weaker than intrafamily links.  
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5.2.2. Background: Remittances and education in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce us to the empirical analysis, by providing brief 
background information about remittances and education in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The background 
on remittances will the analysis conducted as a part of this thesis based on the LSMS data, as there 
were no such analyses done before this thesis. Such a brief background analysis, although focused 
on the key issue that are relevant for this thesis and without intention to provide comprehensive 
overview of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, still can be considered as a contribution to better 
understanding of the remittances and their impact on the economic development of the country. 
Background information on education in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be based on previously published 
work. 
According to the World Bank (2006), Bosnia-Herzegovina is the sixth leading country in 
terms of receiving remittances as a share of GDP. They amount to more than 2 billion EUR, which 
is 20% of Bosnian GDP.
108
 Moreover, remittances represent the most significant inflow to BiH, as 
they are six times larger than FDI and three times than development assistance to this country. It is 
also important to emphasize that the amount of remittance inflows are increasing each year since 
the end of war. These remittances inflows are a significant source of income for a large proportion 
of the BiH population. The data from the Living in BiH 2004 survey, used here for the purpose of 
the analysis of the impact of remittances on the poverty and inequality, show that approximately 
33% of households in Bosnia-Herzegovina receive remittances. The average value of remittances 
received is about 100 KM per month.  
As yet there has been no analysis of the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, the figures presented below are the first attempt to shed more light on this 
issue, although more comprehensive analysis of this relationship is necessary.  
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 Annual inflows of international remittances, through a banking system only, are around 2.4 billion KM (BiH Central 
Bank, 2008). But, the World Network of Bosnian Diaspora estimates these inflows to be at least 6 billion, as majority of 
these remittances are sent as cash transfers through informal channels. 
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Table 5.4. Recipients of remittances by category 
Criteria Number of recipients (% 
of the sample) 
Average amount received 
(KM) 
All 33.50 100.54 
Poor 28.32 52.98 
Non-poor 34.32 105.98 
Primary education 32.34 83.27 
Secondary education 30.48 105.93 
Tertiary education 26.03 104.92 
Rural 36.40 112.24 
Other urban 32.37 86.85 
Capital 31.87 105.22 
Fhh 44.74 98.39 
Mhh 29.61 101.69 
Source: Own calculations based on the LSMS survey 
 
According to the above figures, the remittances sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina are not pro-
poor. A larger proportion of non-poor households receives remittances. Moreover, the average 
amount received is twice larger than the amount received by poor households. Still, a larger 
proportion of households with a low educated head receives remittances, albeit a slightly lower 
average amount compared to highly educated. Also, a significantly larger number of female headed 
households receive remittances than do male headed households. Households in rural areas receive 
more remittances, both in terms of the proportion of households that receive them and in terms of 
the average amount, than do households in urban areas. This suggests that remittances, although not 
contributing to poverty reduction overall, may be expected to have a positive impact on reducing 
differences in poverty incidence between rural and urban areas. 
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Table 5.5. Recipients of remittances by decile 
Criteria Decile Average 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Number of recipients 
(%) 
27.4 33.6 30.8 35.2 37.6 36.6 38.2 34.0 35.4 26.3 33.5 
Average amount 
received (KM) 
51.7 74.6 62.6 103.5 83.0 106.7 107.3 107.2 140.5 169.6 100.5 
Source: Own calculations 
 
It can be seen from the table that remittances do not contribute to decrease in inequality, as 
the average amount of remittances tends to increase from the poorest to the richest decile. Also, the 
proportion of household receiving remittances in each decile, with the exception of the richest 
quintile, increases as we move from poorer to richer decile. These results are important for the 
argument that remittances influence educational investments only of households that fall into a 
specific income decile, which will be explained in detail later. 
Different reports on the educational reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina state that before the 
war, Bosnia-Herzegovina had had a relatively developed educational system, compared to other 
countries in the region. At primary and secondary school, about 27,000 teachers were employed in 
2,235 schools in which around half a million students were enrolled. At the tertiary level, about 
1,600 university teachers in 4 universities were employed to teach about 30,000 students 
(Rakotomanana and Yeager, 1996). During the three-year war, this situation has changed 
dramatically. More than 80% of schools were destroyed or damaged, while a very large proportion 
of teaching staff from all education levels emigrated. According to Uvalic (2005: 32), 81% of 
holders of Masters Degree and 75% of holders of a PhD Degree emigrated from BiH during the 
war. 
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The main characteristics of the educational system in Bosnia-Herzegovina today are a 
reluctance
109
 to reform the inherited educational system from ex-Yugoslavia and the burden that the 
political organisation of the country puts on the educational system. According to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a country organized in two entities, Federation of BiH (FBiH) 
and Republika Srpska (RS), where Federation of BiH is comprised of ten cantons. Education in RS 
is organised and controlled at the entity level, whereas in FBiH most education issues are regulated 
at the canton level. The lack of coordination between cantons and entities make any attempt of 
reform tremendously difficult. 
Inheritance of the Yugoslav system, with highly subsidized education at all levels, but 
without appropriate reforms in terms of adjustments to the new structure of the economy and labour 
market needs, along with the lack of coordination between different levels of authority, result in 
significant mismatch between the skills produced by such an education system and those required 
by the labour market. The phenomena of ―educated unemployment‖ and ―overeducated‖ individuals 
(Fan and Stark, 2007), as reported in the Labour Market Surveys, seem to be widespread.  
The structure of the education system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is as follows. The age of first 
enrolment is 6 years. Primary school lasts for 9 years and attendance is compulsory. Secondary 
school lasts for either 3 (technical schools) or 4 years (general schools) and the age of entry is 15. 
The University level education has four levels. The first level lasts 2-3 years and a graduate receives 
a ―diploma of higher education‖ and a professional title (e.g. engineer, economist). At the second 
level, which lasts for 4-6 years, graduates receive a ―diploma of high education‖ and a professional 
title (e.g. graduated engineer, graduated economist, etc.). At the third level, graduates receive an 
MA degree, while at the fourth level they receive a PhD degree. 
In a country in which no Census has been conducted for the past 18 years, it is extremely 
difficult to obtain any relevant data on the literacy rates and education structure of the population. 
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 For example, EU reports on the progress in implementation of the Bologna process as well as other reports provide 
information on the lack of commitment and efforts of Bosnian government to reform and improve the effectiveness of 
the country‘s educational system. 
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According to the Census in 1991 (the last one conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina), about 10% of the 
population were illiterate. Small-scale household surveys conducted in the meantime suggest that 
this rate has declined to about 5%. Also, these surveys suggest that about 9% of the population are 
without education, more than 30% with primary education only, about 50% with secondary 
education and 8% with higher education. The net enrolment rate in primary school is about 97%, in 
secondary school about 75% and in higher education about 20%. Around 55% of students enrolled 
in secondary schools graduate on time.  
According to the BiH Agency of Statistics, the situation with the number of schools, student 
and teachers is as presented in the table below.  
 
Table 5.6. Official statistics about different levels of education, 2009 
Education level Number of schools 
Number of 
students 
Number of 
teachers 
Student/teacher 
Ratio 
Primary 1,920 350,206 24,360 14.37 
Secondary 310 146,914 11,660 12.60 
Tertiary 43 109,579 8,391 13.06 
Source: BiH Agency of Statistics: Education Statistics, 2010 
 
Child labour is relatively uncommon in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
110
 so the drop-out rates are 
generally very low for children of primary school age (6 to 15 years old), compared to some other 
countries in which empirical evidence on the remittances effect has been investigated (e.g. El 
Salvador, Colombia and Mexico). Therefore, the focus of this study will be on the educational 
attainment of young people of age 16 to 24. This age span encompasses young people of secondary 
and tertiary education where alternatives such as labour market participation are present and where 
drop-out rates are much more significant compared to primary education. According to the above, 
the focus of the study is educational attainment of young people of age 16 to 24. 
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 UNICEF, Child Labour Statistics 1999-2008. 
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5.2.3. Data  
 
The analysis of the impact of migration on the educational attainment of children in Bosnia-
Herzegovina can be conducted by using two alternative datasets. The first dataset is the publicly 
available dataset from Living in BiH (LBiH), conducted by the BiH Office of Statistics in three 
waves between 2002 and 2004. The second data set is from a survey conducted by the author in 
December 2008 in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ASO Survey). The two datasets each have their own 
advantages and disadvantages, thus the relationship between remittances and educational attainment 
will be tested on both datasets. The main characteristics and differences between the two datasets 
are explained below. 
 
Living in BiH Survey (LBiH) 
The Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) was conducted by the World Bank and 
the BiH Agency of Statistics in 2001. Around 5,000 households were interviewed. After, the BiH 
Agency of Statistics decided to conduct three waves of the survey, in 2002-2004, based on the 
LSMS methodology and among 3,000 out of the original sample of 5000 households, in order to 
collect panel data. The survey was called the Living in BiH (LBiH) survey. Although it was based 
on the LSMS, the list of questions was different. For example, the LBiH survey, compared to 
LSMS, included questions on the receipt of remittances that is particularly important for this study. 
However, it did not include questions on the absence of household members, which was available in 
the LSMS. Besides this, comparison of the three waves of LBiH survey reveals that only the survey 
conducted in 2004 contains information about the educational expenditures of a household; thus this 
was chosen as the most appropriate one for this study.  
The original sample of this survey was 2,837 households, or 7,409 individuals, including 
3,080 individuals younger than 25. The number of school age (age 6 to 24) individuals was 2,317, 
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whereas the number of individuals of age 16-24 is 1,250. Additionally, this sample was slightly 
reduced by excluding observations with missing information about the child‘s enrolment. Thus, the 
final dataset used for the model estimation contains 1,187 observations. 
The survey does not contain some important information relevant to this study, such as 
parental absence, which is necessary for testing the model where we separate the impact of 
remittances receipt from the impact of migration of parents. Therefore, a small scale survey was 
conducted by the author in order to collect a more comprehensive dataset for this study.   
 
ASO Survey 
The small scale survey, funded by the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office (ASO), 
was conducted by the author in order to collect additional information about households' 
characteristics and their remittances and education behaviour, which were not available in the LBiH 
dataset and to make possible testing some of the hypotheses stated above. The funds available were 
sufficient for interviewing up to 400 households in BiH, which is significantly less than the LBiH 
survey. 
As mentioned above, there has not been any census in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991. In 
the meantime, a large displacement of people took place during the war in this country. 
Consequently, the information from this Census was considered to be inappropriate to prepare the 
sample for this survey. Therefore, at stage 1 of the sampling procedure, the World Bank LSMS 
sampling technique was used (BHAS, 2001). The selection of municipalities was made by using the 
stratification of municipalities used in the LSMS (and LBiH) survey, for which 25 were chosen 
from 146 Bosnian municipalities. Then, in the second stage of the sampling procedure, the number 
of households surveyed in each municipality was counted on the basis of the LSMS survey.
111
 
Households within municipalities were then chosen randomly, by dividing a municipality into 
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 As the LSMS survey was conducted among 5,000 households and the ASO survey among 400 households, the 
number of households in each municipality was then calculated as the ratio 400/5,000 multiplied by the number of 
households from the LSMS survey. 
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several survey zones and choosing every fifth household unit, starting from the centre of the 
zone.
112
 In the case that a head of household was not present at the moment of interviewing, or a 
household refused to participate in the interview, the interviewers were instructed to choose the next 
households in the street. Before interviewing, all the interviewers were provided with training and 
given detailed written instructions about the interviewing process and how to collect answers to 
each question. In order to make the control of interviewers‘ work possible, for each day of 
interviewing they had to fill in and submit the report with addresses and house numbers of each 
household interviewed. 
 The ASO survey provides demographic information both on the head of the household and 
other household members.
113
 Furthermore, information on the socio-economic status of the 
household is also provided. One section of the survey is dedicated to children‘s schooling and work; 
and another section to migration networks, relationships with the migrants and remittances.  
 The most important questions in the survey, from the point of view of the analysis, were 
related to children‘s schooling, migration and remittances. Among the questions on children‘s 
schooling, the survey asks whether they are currently attending school, what their success at school 
is and whether they are working. The set of questions on migration and remittances ask whether the 
household has members living abroad and whether the household has had members abroad who 
have now returned. For each household member with migration experience, information is provided 
on their age at emigration, duration of migration and educational level. Additionally, households 
were asked about their relationship with the migrant in terms of the frequency of communication. 
The questions on remittances focus on the amount of remittances received on a monthly basis and 
whether the migrants impose any specific expenditure pattern of remittances on the recipient 
households.  
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 In the case that the household head was not in a household, or did not accept participation in the survey, interviewers 
were instructed to choose the next household unit. As the survey was conducted during working days, this caused a 
slight bias towards households of elderly couples. Although many of these households reported receipt of remittances, 
in the end they were excluded from the analysis for not having school age children within the household. 
113
 The questionnaire used in this survey is provided in Appendix 5.10. 
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Out of 400 households interviewed, only 198 households
114
 reported having children aged 6-
24 in the household, which was 285 children in total. According to the above explained motivation 
for the analysis of the educational attainment of post-compulsory school age children, the initial 
sample was restricted to young people
115
 of age 16 to 24. Thus, in the end there were 161 
observations, which were used for model estimation. Previous studies (e.g. Hanson and Woodruff, 
2003; Miluka and Dabalen, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008) have focused primarily on 
children of primary and secondary education. As the main focus of this thesis is the analysis of the 
possible positive influences of remittances on human capital formation in a home country, which 
might offset the negative impact of emigration of highly educated individuals, this study also 
analyzes the impact of remittances on the educational attainment of young people of tertiary 
education age. In order to control for the differential impact of certain explanatory variables on two 
different levels of education (secondary and tertiary) the sample is divided into two groups by using 
a dummy variable for education level, while interaction variables between the educational level 
dummy variable and other explanatory variables will control for the differential impact of these 
variables on young people attending secondary school and those attending a university. This is 
necessary, because - for example - compared to the secondary education level the cost of education 
is much higher for tertiary education, as students have to pay tuition fees in addition to the other 
operational costs. Moreover, as universities are located mainly in the capital city, this implies that 
they have to incur transportation costs or even one-off or continuous relocation costs. 
The list of variables used for the empirical analysis of the relationship between remittances 
and education available in the two different dataset and their descriptive statistics, are presented in 
the table 5.7. The names of variables starting with letter c indicate child level information, while 
                                                 
114
 As explained above, this may be due to the fact that the ASO survey was conducted during weekdays. An additional 
interesting fact was that many of the excluded households, particularly households consisting of elderly couples, 
reported remittances receipt, which suggests that many remittances are sent to BiH from children to their parents, 
probably for altruistic reasons. More detailed study on the motives of remittances is needed before drawing any 
conclusion. But such a study is beyond the scope and main focus of this thesis. 
115
 For students of age 16-24, the term ―young people‖ was used in this thesis as more appropriate than ―children‖. 
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those starting with h indicate household level information. The letter x at the end of the variable‘s 
name indicated that the variable is express as an amount, instead of being dichotomous. 
 
Table 5.7. Summary descriptive statistics of variables 
 ASO Survey LBiH Survey 
Variable description Variable 
name 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
= 1 if child currently enrolled in 
education 
cenr 160 0.56  1187 0.44  
The amount of household’s education 
expenditure per child, in KM 
heepcx 98 95.00 96.58 1186 149.28 455.55 
Age of child cage 161 20.09 2.37 1187 20.17 2.58 
=1 id child is male cmale 161 0.41  1184 0.50  
=1 if first born child* cfb 160 0.69 0.46       
= 1 if an individual is of tertiary school 
age 
ctedu       1187 0.69 0.46 
=1 if household owns a business hbuss 161 0.17 0.37 1186 0.01 0.11 
=1 if female headed households hfh 161 0.06 0.24 1127 0.18 0.38 
=1 if the household head perceives the 
economic situation of the household 
will improve next year, 0 otherwise 
hfin1b 158 0.39 0.49 1178 0.35 0.48 
=1 if the household head perceives the 
economic situation of the household 
will worsen next year, 0 otherwise 
hfin1w 158 0.29 0.46 1178 0.13 0.34 
Employment status of a household’s 
head, 1 if employed 
hhemp 161 0.91 0.28 1186 0.65 0.47 
If household owns a house hhouse 161 0.96 0.20       
Number of household members within a 
household 
hhsize 161 3.81 0.82 1187 4.23 1.44 
Household income per capita, in KM hincpc 161 323.33 286.26 1109 176.73 139.78 
= 1 if mother has higher education 
degree* 
hmedu 161 0.24 0.43       
Number of children in the household hnoc 161 1.70 0.81 1187 2.22 1.06 
Number of school age individuals in the 
household 
hnoc624 161 1.73 0.65 1187 1.97 0.94 
Number of primary school age 
individuals in the household 
hnoc615 161 0.22 0.44 1187 0.34 0.63 
Number of secondary school age 
individuals in the household 
hnoc1618 161 0.46 0.59 1187 0.49 0.59 
Number of tertiary school age 
individuals in the household 
hnoc1924 161 1.05 0.67 1187 1.13 0.76 
= 1 if parent is a migrant (absent)* hpa 161 0.07 0.25       
=1 if a household receives remittances hrem 161 0.13 0.34 1187 0.09 0.29 
= 1 if household lives in urban area, 0 
otherwise* 
hurb 161 0.74 0.44       
= 1 if an individual is of school age, 
but  lives in its own household 
ncsa 161 0.11 0.31 1187 0.16 0.37 
* Not available in the LBiH dataset 
 Source: Own calculations from the two datasets used in this empirical study 
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 The proportion of households reporting receipt of remittances, in the entire dataset, was 
16.25% in the ASO dataset and 15.43% in the LBiH dataset. What is usually being underreported, 
as suggested in previous studies, is the amount of remittances. In the ASO dataset, the average 
amount of remittances received is EUR109.85, whereas in the LBiH dataset is EUR464.48. A 
possible explanation for such a large difference between the two datasets may be in the low 
response rate to this question, where less than 10% of households in each dataset reported this 
amount.  
Out of remittances receiving households from the ASO dataset,
116
 50% of them are from 
migrant households and the other 50% is from non-migrant households.
117
 Although it may be 
expected that households with migrants should be represented in a larger proportion, as remittances 
are particularly sent by migrants to their household's members at home, this is not surprising. The 
previous study in this thesis has revealed that conflict-induced migration is characterised by 
migration of entire families, which then send remittances to their relatives, rather than individuals 
who migrate for economic reasons and send remittances back to their family members. As a share 
of income, average education investment by a household is 11%.  
 
5.2.4. Empirical approach 
 
 The theoretical setting requires adoption of a strategy that controls for the presence of 
different combinations of migration influences for different types of households, as presented in the 
table in Chapter 3. In order to distinguish between households which receive remittances from an 
absent parent (and thus experience the net effect of remittances plus disruption) and those who 
receive remittances from relatives (and thus experience income gain without disruption), a dummy 
                                                 
116
 Cross-tabulation results where the migration of parent variable is used, is reported for ASO survey data only, as there 
is no such information in the LBiH survey data. 
117
 The same high proportion of non-migrant remittance receiving households was found in Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2006), in the case of Dominican Republic. 
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variable for absence of a parent will be included in the empirical model.
118
 Here, we can assume 
that households receive remittances from an absent member; even if they might have an absent 
member and receive remittances from others, it does not make any difference in the expected effects 
of remittances on relaxation of the liquidity constraint.
119
 In addition to this, some authors suggest 
that the remittances are not an exogenous addition to income, but the counterfactual income should 
be calculated in order to properly estimate the difference in the income effect between different 
types of households. The counterfactual income estimation should reveal how much remittance 
non-receivers lose by having an absent member as well as how much do remittances received 
overcome the losses in income by an absent member in remittance receiving households. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible, as the information about migrants‘ demographic characteristics 
and earnings, which would enable comparison with non-migrants, are not available in the datasets 
used. Finally, the interaction term between remittance receipt and parental absence will be 
introduced in order to control for the network effect on education. 
 The main argument of the brain gain literature about the positive impact of remittances 
receipts on educational investments is that remittances have a positive impact via relaxation of 
liquidity constraints that households face. But, this effect should not be expected for any household 
receiving remittances. The liquidity constraint is binding for low-income households only. 
Consequently, households at higher levels of income distribution were not facing liquidity 
constraint, so the receipt of remittances is not expected to change their education investments 
decisions. Also, receipt of remittances by households at the bottom of the income distribution is not 
expected to change their education investments behaviour, as the amount of remittances received is 
not yet sufficient to allow such investments. Remittances sent to such households are usually purely 
altruistically driven and are being completely spent on current consumption. Therefore, the receipt 
of remittances is expected to have an impact on education investments only among households that 
                                                 
118
 This is possible by using ASO Survey data only, as we do not have this information in the LBiH dataset. 
119
 Although it may psychologically have a negative effect, as household members do not receive support by their 
closest relations. But, that level of personal information couldn‘t have been collected in this survey. 
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are within a limited range of income distribution, where the pre-remittances level of income is 
sufficient for current consumption and the receipt of remittances is addition to income that allows 
them education investments. According to this, the empirical model to be estimated includes a list 
of dummy variables for income distribution, as well as a set of interaction terms between income 
distribution dummies and the amount of remittances received by a household. These variables will 
reveal the difference between households receiving and households not receiving remittances at 
different levels of income distribution.
120
 
 The purpose of this analysis is to provide evidence of the impact of remittances on both 
education enrolment of children and educational investments incurred by households on each child. 
Therefore, two different models will be estimated, the one with a dummy variable indicating 
whether a child is enrolled in school as the dependent variable and another with a dependent 
variable expressed as educational investments by a household on a particular child. In the case of 
educational investments, the nature of the data is such that one observes its values only for children 
who are enrolled in school; children out of school report zero expenditures. Using OLS in such 
circumstances would produce biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, two alternative 
estimation methods were considered here. The first is a probit model, where the receipt of 
remittances and the amount received is modelled together and the other is a two-stage Heckman 
model, where the receipt of remittances is modelled in the first stage and estimated by probit, while 
the amount received is modelled in the second stage and estimated by OLS, which is corrected for 
potential sample bias (e.g. Hoddinott, 1992; Cox et al., 1998, 2004). As it may be expected that 
children enrolled in school are not a randomly drawn sub-sample of the population, which requires 
controlling for sample selection and as the interest of this study is to analyse determinants of 
children enrolment, the priority was given to Heckman‘s estimation method. This method controls 
                                                 
120
 Average amounts of remittances received by households at different levels of income distribution in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is presented in the Table 5.5. 
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for selection and the results from the model of determinants of school enrolment can be used as a 
first stage result of the Heckman‘s procedure. 
 In the first model, the dichotomous variable indicating the child‘s enrolment in school 
will be used as the dependent variable. The model is:
121
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   (5.3)    
  
 The data used for the estimation of the model are characterized by exogenous sample 
selection, as the values for most of the independent variables affecting a child‘s school enrolment 
are observed for children currently in school only, which may be considered as a self-selected 
group. Thus, in the second stage, we will apply the Heckman two-stage procedure,
122
 by using the 
probit model as the first stage selection model of the procedure. This way, besides estimating the 
impact of remittances on child‘s school enrolment, as done in previous studies, we will go a step 
further and estimate the relationship between remittances receipt and educational investments by a 
household. In other words, in the second stage the determinants of educational investments in a 
child, conditional on the child receiving any formal education at all, is estimated. It should be a 
useful extension of models from previous studies in order to gain additional insight into the 
relationship investigated. So, in the second stage of the Heckman‘s procedure, the inverse Mills 
ratio is calculated from the estimated parameters of the first stage regression and included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the OLS estimation of the model. The inverse Mills ratio is the 
ratio of the probability density function over cumulative distribution function of a distribution. This 
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 Description of variables used in this model is provided in the Table 5.7. 
122
 Alternative considered here was tobit model. Heckman‘s two stage model and tobit model in their estimation 
procedure treat specific outcomes differently. For example, Heckman‘s model will treat unobserved values for children 
not attending school as unobserved, while tobit will treat them as zero values. Accordingly and due to the nature of the 
data used, Heckman‘s procedure has been chosen as more appropriate. 
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actually controls for the odds that the child will attend school at all. If the estimated coefficient of 
the Inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant, it confirms that the selection problem exists and 
that the Heckman‘s procedure was justified, otherwise not. Hence, the methods used here allow two 
different questions relevant for this study to be answered: the results of the first stage estimation 
will reveal the possible impact of remittances on the participation of children, while the results of 
the second stage estimations will show to which extent the educational expenditures of households 
change with receipt of remittances. 
 The model to be estimated in the second stage is: 
 
iiiiii
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   (5.4) 
  
 One of the key problems with the Heckman procedure is the problem of identification; 
which variables should be included in the first stage and which in the second stage model. As 
suggested by Wooldridge (2003: 562), all variables from the second stage model should be also 
included in the first stage model, because their exclusion leads to inconsistent estimation if they are 
incorrectly excluded, while their inclusion is not very costly. Still, there should be at least one 
variable that is included only in the first stage model, basically an instrument, in order to correctly 
calculate the Inverse Mills ratio (mills); otherwise it is difficult to distinguish between sample 
selection and misspecified functional form. The choice of such a variable is not straightforward, as 
anything that affects selection is likely to affect the amount as well. Therefore, any variable related 
to the income of household is discarded as potential instrument, as it is very likely to affect both the 
decision of the household to send the child to school as well as the amount spent. Other variables 
were taken into consideration and possible candidates chosen as instruments (variables that will 
appear in the first, but not in the second stage regression) are a dummy variable indicating that a 
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child is male (cmale), a variable for the number of school age children (hnoc624) and a variable for 
the absence of a parent (hpai).
123
 As these variables are expected to affect household‘s decision to 
send them to school, they are not expected to have an impact on the amount spent on their education 
once these children are enrolled. 
 The dependent variable in the second stage is educational investment by a household. As 
only household level data were available in both datasets and individual level data had to be used in 
the second stage (as they were used in the first stage as well), the only solution was to disaggregate 
household‘s education expenditures per (each) child enrolled. This was done by the following 
formula: 
 
 
ttssp
p
XwXwX
HEE
HEEPCX

        (5.5) 
 
where: 
HEEPCXp = household‘s education expenditure per child in primary school 
HEE = total household‘s education expenditure 
Xp = number of children from a household enrolled in primary school 
Xs = number of children from a household enrolled in secondary school 
Xt = number of children from a household enrolled in university 
ws = weight for secondary school education investment 
wt = weight for university education investment 
 
 The formula gives us the amount of education expenditures spent by a household on each 
child enrolled in primary school, given the number of children enrolled in other level of education. 
                                                 
123
 This variable is included in the estimation of the ASO dataset only, as the data on parental absence are not available 
in the LSMS dataset. 
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If this amount is multiplied by the ws, we will get the amount of education expenditures spent by a 
household on each child enrolled in secondary school and if it multiplied by the wt, the resulting 
amount is the one devoted to each child enrolled in university. The weights are telling us how much 
more, on average, households spend on children in secondary and tertiary education than in 
primary. This way we ensure that, regardless of the number of children in a household, the amount 
spent on each child in secondary school is always larger than the amount for children in primary 
school by ws and in university by wt. 
 The weights are calculated by using the actual data from the LBiH dataset,
124
 by 
calculating average household education expenditures in households with only one child. In this 
dataset, households with only one child enrolled in primary school reported average education 
investment of KM92.72, those with a child in secondary school of KM 150.95 and with one child in 
university, of KM162.14. This means that, according to these data, the weight for secondary school 
education investment by a household (ws) is 1.63 and for university an education investment (wt) is 
1.75. By using the above formula and multiplying the values for primary school by the calculated 
weights in order to get the amounts for secondary and university education investments, we 
obtained the information about disaggregated household‘s expenditures per child. 
The variable for the income of the household (hincpci) is expressed as a sum of all sources 
of income, except remittances. This variable should capture the effect of the extent to which 
households are facing liquidity constraints on the amount of households‘ educational investments. 
As explained previously, not all households, but only ones below certain income level are expected 
to face such a liquidity constraint. In order to capture this effect more precisely, a set of dummy 
variables for consumption quintiles are created (Σqi). As very poor households receiving 
remittances are likely to spend such additional income on basic needs, positive impact of 
remittances on educational investments is not expected among such households. For this reason, a 
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 This dataset was used as it has more observations. Then the same weights were applied in the ASO dataset as well, in 
order to be consistent. 
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set of interaction terms between the remittances receipt and each consumption quintile (Σqihrem) 
are created. The strongest impact of remittances receipt on education is expected for households 
that are in a specific quintile, where they are not rich (still face liquidity constraint), but are not so 
poor to be forced to spend all the remittances received on basic needs. 
There are three alternative variables for the receipt of remittances (hremi). Fist is a dummy 
variable for receipt of remittances. Second is a continuous variable for the amount of remittances 
received during a year. Although the use of the dummy variable instead of the amount is justified by 
the empirical experience reported in previous studies (e.g. Borraz, 2005), suggesting that remittance 
receiving households are likely to underreport the amount of remittances received, the variable for 
the amount of remittances received was chosen here. The main reason is that the amount, rather 
than receipt as such, is expected to capture the effect of the remittances on educational investments 
by households. 
The mothers‘ education level (hmedui) variable is considered as a proxy of household 
wealth. Parents with higher education are expected to have a higher probability of wage 
employment and of earning higher wages than less educated parents. Consequently, households 
with better educated parents may be less likely to face liquidity constraints and therefore more 
likely to invest in children‘s education. Furthermore, the parents‘ education level may also proxy 
for unobservable influences on educational attainment such as the ability of their children, the lower 
disutility and lower non-financial costs of education. These may include influences such as putting 
more emphasis on children‘s education and helping with homework. Again, children who have 
parents with higher education levels may also consider it optimal to obtain high levels of education. 
Another channel through which parents‘ education impacts on children‘s education is that due to 
experience they are more likely to know the value of and the returns to education and to consider 
education as an investment rather than forgone earnings. Consequently, they may be more likely to 
financially support their children‘s education. Also, they may serve as positive role models for their 
166 
 
children in terms of educational choices. Accordingly, the a priori sign of this variable is positive. It 
is introduced through four dummy variables, namely whether the mother has higher education, 
secondary education, primary education or if she has less than primary education. The last option is 
used as the base category. 
The gender of the household head (hfhi) dummy variable is included taking the value of one 
if the household head is a female, zero otherwise. As the majority of studies investigating poverty 
incidence and inequality between male and female headed households in BiH suggest a positive 
relationship between being a female headed household and household income, as well as that 
female household heads are on average more educated, this dummy variable is expected to have a 
positive impact on the educational enrolment of children and education investments, all else being 
equal. 
The household‘s size (hhsizei) variable is expected to have a negative impact on children‘s 
educational attainment. The larger is the household, the lower is the household budget per capita 
and thus the stronger is the liquidity constrain, all else equal. The number of school age children 
(hnoc624i) also affects educational attainment as the reservation income for education is lower per 
capita in households having more school age children. Household budget constraints may vary by 
household composition in terms of the age composition of children, as households with a higher 
share of its members of the age of primary school education face lower liquidity constraints in terms 
of education expenditure than households having a higher share of those of the age of higher 
education, all else remaining equal. This is expected to be captured by using the weights for the 
educational investments as dependent variable, which is decomposed from the household level data 
on educational expenditures into the individual children level data, by using different weights for 
children enrolled in different levels of education, as presented by Equation (5.5). 
Household head‘s expectations of the economic situation of the household after one year is 
also included in the model by two dummy variables, one for household heads expecting the 
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situation to improve (hhfin1bi) and another for those expecting a worsened economic situation in 
the future (hhfin1wi).
125
 It may be expected that the perception of the head of the household on the 
economic situation is an important determinant of the decision to emigrate for economic reasons. 
As emigration is costly and is conditioned by the household budget, just as are education 
investments, this study controls for this effect. This variable is introduced through three dummy 
variables, that is, whether the household economic situation will improve, remain the same or 
worsen. The middle option is used as the benchmark. If the household head expects the economic 
situation of the household to improve (worsen) in the future s/he might perceive it as reducing 
(increasing) household liquidity constraints and, hence, positively (negatively) impacting on 
education expenditure, all else equal. The effect of a reduction in household wealth is expected be 
greater in magnitude than that of an increase, all else equal. 
A household‘s involvement in business (hbussi) is a variable controlling for the negative 
effect of the work incentive. This is expected to appear as particularly significant for tertiary 
educational attainment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the labour market there is characterized by very 
large unemployment rates and evidence suggests that in many cases individuals opt for further 
(highly subsidized) education after unsuccessful search for a job. Households offering a job 
opportunity to a young person, as well as being in a need of additional labour, might experience this 
disruptive effect on educational attainment of their children more strongly. Also, the costs of 
foregone earnings are higher for these households, compared to households not owning a business.  
School drop-out rates at post-compulsory education, especially for girls, are higher in rural 
areas than in urban areas.  This may be due to the cultural values and attitudes still predominant in 
rural areas. Furthermore, this may be due to infrastructural characteristics. As we lack measures to 
proxy for these two latter effects, except the distance from school, in this study the type of area 
(hurbi) is considered to capture both the effect of cultural and infrastructural differences and the 
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 The data for these two variables are available in the ASO dataset only. 
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effect of economic differences. Consequently, all else equal, households living in rural areas are 
expected to invest less in children‘s educational attainment. This effect is measured as a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the household lives in a rural area. 
 
5.2.5. Results 
 
 The results of the probit estimation (which is also the first-stage of the two-stage Heckman 
model), using the two dataset (with standard errors in parentheses), are presented in the table 5.8.  
 
Table 5.8. First-stage results of probit model of the Heckman’s two stage procedure 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 
value of 1 if child is currently enrolled in education 
Name LBiH Survey
126
 
Probit 
ASO Survey
127
 
Probit 
Age of child cage -0.28*** 
(0.02) 
-0.38*** 
(0.00) 
=1 if child is male cmale -0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.23 
(0.26) 
=1 if female headed households hfh 0.15 
(0.33) 
1.17* 
(0.62) 
Household income per capita, in thousands KM hincpc -10.82 
(51.62) 
1.95*** 
(0.65) 
Household size hsize -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.25 
(0.34) 
Number of children in the household hnoc -0.11 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.38) 
=1 if household head is employee hemp -1.41*** 
(0.16) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
Number of school age individuals in the household hnoc624 -0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.49 
(0.43) 
Average amount of remittances, in thousands KM hrem 0.96 
(179.09) 
-54.22 
(61.67) 
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 Detailed results of the models estimated by using the LBiH dataset and reported in tables 5.8. and 5.9. are provided 
in Appendix 5.11. 
127
 Detailed results of the models estimated by using ASO dataset and reported in tables 5.8. and 5.9. are provided in 
Appendix 5.12. 
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Dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 
value of 1 if child is currently enrolled in education 
Name LBiH Survey
128
 
Probit 
ASO Survey
129
 
Probit 
=1 if household lives in urban area hurb 0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.26 
(0.29) 
=1 if one of parents is absent migrant hpa  0.57 
(0.51) 
Quintile 1  -0.94*** 
(0.15) 
 
Quintile 2  -0.78***  
(0.14) 
 
Quintile 3  -0.58*** 
(0.14) 
 
Quintile 4  -0.46*** 
(0.14) 
 
Quintile 1 x hrem  0.16 
(0.24) 
 
Quintile 2 x hrem  1.77** 
(0.80) 
 
Quintile 3 x hrem  0.06 
(0.18) 
 
Quintile 4 x hrem  0.01 
(0.20) 
 
Intercept  6.65*** 
(0.42) 
6.53*** 
 (1.51) 
Number of observations  1293 160 
Pseudo R
2
  0.354 0.294 
Prob>chi
2
  0.000 0.000 
Correctly classified (%)  78.89 75.00 
 
The results of the estimation of the model from Equation (5.3) on the determinants on 
child‘s school enrolment, presented in the table above, reveal that the main factors influencing 
child‘s enrolment are age of child, gender and economic situation of a household. Negative sign of 
the variable on the child‘s sex can be explained by the fact that female persons from the sample (age 
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 Detailed results of the models estimated by using the LBiH dataset and reported in tables 5.8. and 5.9. are provided 
in Appendix 5.11. 
129
 Detailed results of the models estimated by using ASO dataset and reported in tables 5.8. and 5.9. are provided in 
Appendix 5.12. 
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15 to 24) face much less favourable labour market conditions,
130
 thus employment opportunities do 
not have a diverting influence on their enrolment choice. Significance of the household income per 
capita variable in the ASO dataset and the alternative set of dummy variables in the LBiH dataset, 
show that the degree of liquidity constraint has a significant impact on the household‘s decision to 
send children to school. The negative sign of the coefficients on the quintile dummy variables is due 
to the fact that the benchmark category here is the fifth quintile, or the richest top 20% of 
households. 
Results for the interaction terms between quintile dummies and the receipt of remittances 
support the model specification strategy used here. If we use a variable for remittance receipt only, 
without controlling for different impact of such receipts among households at different levels of 
income, the results would suggest that the receipt of remittances does not have any significant 
impact on school enrolment of children in Bosnia-Herzegovina (as found by estimating the ASO 
dataset without interaction terms). But, if the interaction terms are used, they show that remittances, 
although not having positive impact on child‘s enrolment for all households, still positively 
influence child enrolment among households in the second quintile of income distribution. If we 
know that the poverty line in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 18.2%, then these results show that the impact 
of remittances receipt on educational attainment is the strongest among households just above the 
poverty line. This is in line with the assumptions related to the presence of liquidity constraint at 
different levels of income, explained earlier in this chapter. 
The results of the OLS estimation in the second-stage Heckman‘s procedure, with a control 
variable created from the inverse Mills ratio calculation, are presented in the table 5.9.  
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 Unemployment rate among female workforce in Bosnia-Herzegovina is twice as high as for males. 
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Table 5.9. Second-stage results of OLS model of the Heckman’s two stage procedure 
Dependent variable is the amount of household’s 
education expenditure per child 
Name LBiH Survey 
OLS 
ASO Survey 
OLS 
Age of child cage 492.63*** 
(98.77) 
39.10* 
(21.34) 
Household income per capita hincpc -10.82 
(51.62) 
42.13 
(97.14) 
Household size hsize 919.87 
(173.98) 
-10.35 
(54.24) 
Number of children in the household hnoc -937.61*** 
(223.93) 
32.66 
(58.04) 
=1 if household head is employee hhemp 2486.19** 
(1099.30) 
-37.39 
(68.06) 
=1 if the household head perceives the economic 
situation of the household will improve next year, 0 
otherwise 
hfin1b  -9.24 
(42.18) 
=1 if the household head perceives the economic 
situation of the household will worsen next year, 0 
otherwise 
hfin1w  -7.77 
(46.75) 
=1 if the household lives in urban area hurb -775.66*** 
(280.79) 
14.94 
(49.62) 
=1 if a household receives remittances hrem 0.96 
(179.09) 
-54.22 
(61.67) 
Inverse Mills ratio invmills -2308.12*** 
(658.87) 
-149.39 
(82.80)* 
Intercept  -8109.14*** 
(1720.38) 
-540.55* 
(322.52) 
Number of observations  1293  
Censored observations  668  
  
The estimated coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio in the results from the both surveys is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the sample selection problem exists and that therefore the 
Heckman's procedure was justified. 
 The results of the estimation of Equation (5.4) suggest that remittances do not have a 
significant impact on the educational expenditures incurred by households. Age of child has 
positive impact on the expenditures, which can be explained by increased costs of acquiring 
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education at higher levels of education. Decrease in educational expenditures as a result of 
increased number of children in a household can be interpreted as a redistributional effect, as more 
children share the same disposable household‘s budget for education. Living in urban are decreases 
educational expenditures, as it decreases costs related to higher education, such as transportation 
costs, accommodation and other living expenses. 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
The results of the two empirical studies presented above suggest several relevant findings. 
First, the macro level study reveals the existence of the incentive effect of emigration of highly 
educated individuals on human capital formation, but only in countries experiencing voluntary 
migration. However, in the case of conflict induced migrants, the effect is not as strong as it is in the 
case of voluntary migration. It can be explained by the fact that the opportunities for migration that 
will increase as a result of increased education are not observed in the case of forced migration by 
individuals remaining in the country and deciding about their education investments, therefore the 
same incentive effect does not exist. Moreover, even with the same incentive effect, countries 
affected by a conflict may lack facilities for human capital formation and thus not be able to 
completely utilize the positive impact of this incentive on interest in higher education. Second, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of receipt of remittances on educational investments by 
households suggests that the impact of remittances on educational attainment is positive, but limited 
to only a proportion of remittances receiving households. The reason is that not all households‘ 
educational investments are limited by liquidity constraint. Richer households can afford education 
even if they do not receive remittances. The receipt of remittances will not significantly alter their 
consumption patterns. On the other hand, poor households cannot afford education even when they 
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receive remittances, as they use these receipts for covering basic needs. Therefore, the receipt of 
remittances is likely to have positive impact on households just above poverty line.  
All the evidence presented here suggests that the positive feedback effect of brain drain on 
human capital formation in countries affected by ethnic cleansing and other types of forced 
migration is likely to be modest and lower than in the case of voluntary migration. Once matched 
with more severe rates of brain drain, this means that the net effect of ethnic cleansing on human 
capital formation in a country is most likely to be negative.  
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Introduction 
 
The main aim of this thesis, as outlined in the introduction, is to analyse the impact of ethnic 
cleansing on the stock of human capital in the country. After in-depth investigation of the 
characteristics of ethnic cleansing, their incorporation into the theoretical model of migration 
resulting from ethnic cleansing, as well as four different empirical studies that, combined, represent 
a comprehensive overview of both negative and positive impacts of ethnic cleansing, it could be 
said that this thesis, despite minor limitations explained later, contains rich theoretical and empirical 
contribution to both the theories of migration and theories of conflict. 
 
6.1. Main conclusions 
 
The thesis has provided for the first time a comprehensive analysis of the impact of ethnic 
cleansing on the stock of human capital in a country. First, it described the key features of ethnic 
cleansing using results from interviews with people who survived ethnic cleansing. Then, it 
incorporated insights arising from the analysis of interview data into a theoretical model of the 
impact of ethnic cleansing on the magnitude of brain drain from the country. This model differs 
from previous models of forced migration by incorporating the relative deprivation hypothesis and 
developing a new ―restoration‖ hypothesis in order to better explain the emigration driven by ethnic 
cleansing, where the process of emigration is seen as a two-stage process, starting with forced 
evictions in the first stage and continuing with emigration in the second. Compared to previous 
models of conflict-induced migration, the model developed in this thesis predicts emigration of 
highly educated individuals after they have been forcibly evicted, as it is developed on the basis of 
the characteristics of ethnic cleansing and is not only incorporating risk as one of the push factors of 
migration. As some other types of mass forced migration, such as natural disasters induced and 
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development induced migration, share the key characteristics of the migration process with the 
ethnic cleansing induced migration, namely forced evictions and non-random targeting, the model 
used in this thesis for the purpose of analysis of ethnic cleansing could be, with minor amendments, 
used for the explanation of these other types of forced migration as well. 
The set of hypotheses developed by the model, which should be tested by the empirical 
studies in the first part of the thesis, are:  
- ethnic cleansing worsens economic situation in a country, which causes more emigration, 
- people who were forcibly evicted during ethnic cleansing are more likely to emigrate, 
which means that the more severe ethnic cleansing is, the more emigration will it cause, 
- the lower an individual‘s income and relative position in a community is, the more likely it 
is to migrate (relative deprivation hypothesis), 
- people not only compare their current, but also their previous relative position in a 
community, which means that the more individual‘s income and relative position in a community is 
affected by ethnic cleansing, the more likely she is to migrate (restoration hypothesis), 
- the more educated person is, the more negative impact of ethnic cleansing will be on her 
relative position within a community and therefore the more likely she is to emigrate (self-selection 
mechanism of emigration). 
- a person‘s relative position decreases the more educated she is and if she was forcibly 
evicted, meaning that the more severe ethnic cleansing is, the more brain drain it will cause. 
The methodological approach to the investigation of the impact of migration on the stock of 
human capital is also new, as previous studies were offering partial analysis of the phenomenon. On 
one side, there were studies analysing the negative impact of brain drain. On the other side, studies 
that were opposing this view of the negative impact of emigration were emphasizing the positive 
effect of such emigration on the stock of human capital. This thesis combines four different 
empirical studies into a single analysis of the net effect of ethnic cleansing induced migration on the 
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stock of human capital by measuring both negative and positive effects of migration on the stock of 
human capital in the country. Moreover, each of these two effects was measured at both the 
household and cross-country levels. 
 
6.1.1. Negative impact of ethnic cleansing 
 
The theoretical model of the impact of ethnic cleansing on the magnitude of brain drain from 
the country was empirically tested by two different, but complementary, studies. In the first study, 
household level data were analysed in order to obtain empirical evidence on the self-selection 
mechanism of migration as a result of ethnic cleansing, developed in the theoretical model. After 
collecting the data that were already available, but also conducting own survey, the estimation of 
the empirical model was done by using the probit model with a set of interaction terms. The results 
from the empirical model suggest that there is a positive self-selection of migrants with regards to 
their education level, which is driven by the changes in absolute and relative income caused by 
forced evictions. This result confirms that ethnic cleansing, in general, produce increased brain 
drain, compared to the situation when there are no forced evictions associated with the process of 
ethnic cleansing. This outcome suggests that larger magnitude of forced evictions is associated with 
increased brain drain. Also, the decrease in economic activity and prospects that accompanies 
conflicts is a factor that has a positive impact on the increase of brain drain, as predicted by the 
theoretical model, namely via its ―restoration‖ hypothesis. As the highly educated suffer larger 
losses in both absolute and relative income, they are more likely to migrate, which acts as a self-
selection mechanism of ethnic cleansing. This is in line with the prediction of the model developed 
earlier in the thesis and used for development of the empirical model.  
However, as these factors also increase emigration of the low educated, this feature does not 
reveal whether or not and to what extent is the percentage of highly educated in the case of forced 
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migration different from the voluntary migration. This question is answered by the second empirical 
study, which uses country level data in order to compare the skill distribution of emigrants in 
countries that experienced conflict compared to the countries with migration that is predominantly 
driven by economic motives. Findings from this empirical study suggest that having a history of 
conflict in the previous decade is positively associated with larger emigration rates of highly 
educated people in the current decade compared to the countries that did not experience conflict on 
its territory in the previous period. Therefore, it is possible to conclude from these results that 
countries which experienced a conflict, in general, produce more migrants with tertiary education, 
in total and in proportion of the total number of emigrants, thus losing the most valuable factor of 
economic growth. These two findings combined confirm the predictions of the theoretical model, 
that ethnic cleansing has more severe negative consequences for the stock of human capital in a 
country than does voluntary migration. These findings also suggest that conflict do not only leads to 
increased emigration, but may also increase the proportion of individuals with tertiary education 
among these emigrants as well.  
This becomes more important if we take into account that conflicts, besides leading to the 
emigration of the highly educated that depletes the stock of human capital in the country, also 
produce large destruction of physical capital and other negative consequences for the level of 
economic activity in the country.  Although the lack of human capital may not be so important 
during the immediate period after the conflict, as large destruction of physical capital makes 
marginal product of labour, both low and highly skilled, lower. This reduces the growth-enhancing 
potential of human capital. However, the post-war recovery brings much faster the reconstruction of 
physical than human capital, which increases the marginal product of labour and consequently 
raises the importance of the recovery of the stock of human capital in the country for its further 
economic growth. 
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6.1.2. Positive impact of ethnic cleansing 
 
In its attempt to provide a comprehensive and unbiased analysis of the net impact of ethnic 
cleansing on human capital in a country, by combining the analyses of both negative and positive 
impacts of such event, the thesis acknowledges the insights from the recent migration literature, 
which emphasizes the role of different channels of reverse impact of brain drain on the human 
capital formation in a country of emigration. This literature argues that the emigration of highly 
educated may bring positive impact on the stock of human capital and hence turn brain drain into 
the brain gain. In order to test these arguments against arguments of the brain drain literature and 
estimate the net effect of ethnic cleansing on the stock of human capital, two additional studies that 
analyze these reverse channels were conducted in this thesis. First, the cross-country study reveals 
the existence of the incentive effect of emigration of highly educated individuals on human capital 
formation, but only in countries that experienced voluntary migration. In the case of conflict 
induced migration, the effect does not exist. It can be explained by the fact that the opportunities for 
migration that will increase as a result of increased education is not observed in the case of forced 
migration by those remaining in the country, and therefore the incentive effect is weaker. Moreover, 
even with the same incentive effect, countries affected by a conflict may lack facilities for human 
capital formation and thus not be able to completely utilize the positive impact of this incentive on 
the interest in higher education. Second, the empirical evidence on the impact of receipt of 
remittances on educational investments by households suggests that the impact of remittances on 
educational attainment is positive, but not statistically significant. This may be expected in 
countries with similar context as Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. The explanation for negligible impact 
of remittances on human capital formation in a country would be the lack of capabilities of 
countries that were affected by a conflict to channel the inflows of remittances into productive use. 
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6.1.3. Possible net effect 
 
The new evidence collected through the work on the thesis and presented here suggests that 
the positive feedback effect of brain drain on human capital formation in countries affected by 
ethnic cleansing and other types of forced migration does not exist. Once matched with more severe 
rates of brain drain, this means that the net effect of ethnic cleansing on human capital formation in 
a country is most likely to be negative. 
The comparison of the estimated effect of ethnic cleansing and voluntary migration is 
presented in the summary table below: 
 
Table 6.1. Summary overview of the differences between the effects of voluntary migration 
and ethnic cleansing 
Effect Voluntary migration Ethnic cleansing 
Brain drain Ranges from modest to severe, 
depending on many factors 
Usually more severe compared 
to voluntary migration (ceteris 
paribus), both in terms of 
numbers of migrants and 
selection rate (proportion of 
highly educated people in total 
number of emigrants) 
Incentive effect Positive, strong Does not exist (confirmed by 
the results of the study in Ch. 
4) 
Remittances effect Positive, usually weak Positive, but weak. 
Return migration effect Positive No evidence (left for further 
research) 
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6.2. Contributions of the thesis 
 
This thesis, in the investigation of the topic, has made important contributions to the theory, 
methodology and empirical evidence on the economic consequences of forced migration. It started 
with in-depth investigation of the process of ethnic cleansing which was used for mapping of the 
key differences of this type of migration compared to other types and for placing this type of 
migration on the right place within different typologies of migration developed previously. In that 
sense, ethnic cleansing in this thesis was placed in the intersection between forced and mass 
migration.  
These insights were then used for the purpose of developing a theoretical model of ethnic 
cleansing, which is the first model of this type developed so far. The model is based on the relative 
deprivation models of voluntary migration, but is extended in order to capture the key 
characteristics of ethnic cleansing. This extension includes incorporation of additional hypothesis, 
called ―restoration‖ hypothesis, which is a unique contribution of this thesis.  
The thesis then contributes empirically by providing the evidence on both the negative and 
positive impacts of ethnic cleansing on the formation of human capital in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one 
of the most striking examples of ethnic cleansing in recent history. Moreover, it provides cross-
country evidence on the differences in the impact of migration on human capital between different 
types of migration, voluntary or forced. 
Methodologically, the thesis has drawn from own experience in research of other topics that 
was used for the purpose of this thesis. First, the combination of different qualitative data in order to 
capture some quantitative characteristics of migrants‘ pre-displacement well-being can be a useful 
idea for the research of this topic, as most countries that suffered ethnic cleansing usually do not 
have any household level data about migrants‘ situation immediately before the war. This lack of 
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data was one of the major obstacles for pursuing this type of research so far. Second, the use of 
interaction terms to model a relationship between the migration and the formation of human capital, 
which measure possibility of the incentive effect of migration, has clearly shown that, once we 
control for the type of migration, the incentive effect is even stronger in countries that experience 
voluntary migration, but does not exist in countries with forced emigration. Third, the use of 
equivalence scale for decomposition of the household level educational expenditures to the 
individual level is a new approach that has advantages over previous empirical studies in a way that 
the impact of remittances on educational investments is measured more appropriately by using more 
precise measure of household‘s educational expenditures per child, rather than overall expenditures. 
Fourth, the model of the relationship between remittances and education is tested by using two-
stage Heckman‘s selection model, which gives us more precise and more informative estimates. 
Besides estimating the relationship more correctly by controlling for possible self-selection, the 
model also provides the information not only about the relationship between remittances and 
educational enrolment, but also about between remittances and educational investment. Finally, the 
model of the relationship between remittances and education is for the first time modeled in a way 
to capture the impact of the liquidity constraint on the educational investment. This is done by 
including the set of dummy variables for different quartiles of income distribution. The results 
confirmed the appropriateness of this approach, by showing that the impact of remittances on 
educational investments exists only in households at the second quartile, where the liquidity 
constraint is relaxed, as predicted by the theory. 
 
6.3. Policy recommendations  
 
The results of four different studies presented in this thesis can be used for policy purposes 
in a number of ways. As one of the initial aims of this thesis was to point out to the importance of 
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brain drain as a result of conflict, it could be claimed that the thesis provided sufficient evidence on 
the severity of such cost for the country. The loss of highly educated people through forced 
emigration tends to be neglected in the estimates of costs of war so far. Politicians pursuing ideas of 
conflict, particularly of civil ones, should take these costs of war into account as well and hopefully 
realize, by using simple cost-benefit analysis, that wars generally do not bring benefits to any party. 
Besides conflicts, there are forced population transfers of different ethnic groups by ruling parties in 
many countries. It should be realized, as the results from this thesis suggest, that such displacement 
of people will induce large losses of human capital for the country. 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the emigration of highly 
educated is generally even more severe in the case of conflicts compared to voluntary migration, 
thus significantly depleting the stock of human capital in the country. In addition, positive effects 
such as the incentive effect or the effect of remittance receipts do not exist or are weaker than in the 
case of voluntary migration. This causes the net effect of ethnic cleansing to be negative and to 
require a long period of time for positive feedback effect to offset the negative impact on emigration 
on the human capital in the country. Such a result emphasises the importance of management of the 
positive channels in order to improve their impact on the country‘s recovery and development. First, 
the incentive effect is possibly weaker because countries in the post-war period do not have 
capacities of educational institution developed to the level that will allow the possibility of the 
incentive effect to be utilized to the best extent. Second, the evidence on the use of remittances in 
countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina suggests that the largest proportion of the amount of 
remittances received is spent on current consumption. As the evidence presented here suggests, 
there is not much positive impact of remittances receipts on the educational investments. A 
significant amount of the consumption is actually consumption of imported goods. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, for example, inflows of remittances that represented more that 20% of the country‘s 
GDP made a huge trade deficit and a double-digit current account deficit sustainable for a decade. 
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Policy decision makers should be aware of the potential of remittances for economic development, 
if they are redirected from consumption into productive investments. In order to see it happening, 
the country‘s institutions should have a strategy for developing financial and other institutional 
support to investor from Bosnian diaspora community, improve investments climate and offer fiscal 
and other incentives that will increase the proportion of the remittances spent on productive 
investments. Besides that, it is well known that remittances inflows decrease with time and their 
amount depend very much on the strength of links between migrants and their home countries. 
Policy makers should be aware of this and work on maintaining close relations with its diaspora 
community. Third, as the depletion of human capital is particularly high in the case of ethnic 
cleansing, countries that suffered such severe brain drain should develop policies that will promote 
return migration of highly educated individuals, as this channel can to a large extent offset negative 
impact of brain drain. Moreover, return migrants bring back repatriated savings that can be used for 
productive investments, as well as new skills they acquired while abroad. Policy decision makers 
should be aware of all these opportunities and create an environment that will increase positive 
impact of the emigration of highly educated on the country‘s development, through different 
channels discussed in this thesis. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which does not have any direct institutions that deal with its diaspora, 
such as Ministries that other countries with significant outmigration have, despite continuous efforts 
by the diaspora community on promoting such an idea, with no policy on investments incentives to 
our emigrants and return migrants, with barriers to return of highly educated through the 
complicated regulation on recognition of degrees from best universities from around the world, 
could possibly learn a lot from the findings of this thesis and its policy recommendations. 
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6.4. Additional outcomes of the thesis 
Besides contribution to the theory, to the methodology and to the empirical evidence, this 
thesis has also produced additional outcomes which should be acknowledged at this point. It 
significantly improved author‘s research skills, but also helped him to identify areas for further 
improvements in researching this topic. The contributions to the author are described in the lessons 
learned section, while the areas for improvement are identified in the limitations of research section 
and possible solutions offered in the directions for future research section. 
 
6.4.1. Lessons learnt    
This research was the author‘s first research of this scale. The transfer of knowledge and 
research skills from his supervisors was enormous. This is particularly valuable for researchers from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country will underdeveloped research community.  
The thesis was the author‘s first work on this topic. The knowledge acquired in the four-year 
period was considerable and helped him to work on other projects that required such knowledge. In 
addition, research experience of the author has been enriched considerable during the work on the 
thesis. The importance of good literature review, detailed check of data entries, analysis of all the 
assumption of a specific econometric method has proven many times during this period. This 
improved understanding and skills of the author and prepared him to conduct research projects even 
before completion on the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
6.4.2. Limitations of the research 
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Additional outcome of the thesis and experience gained through the period of work on it is 
identification of different limitations of research in this area that can offer a pathway for future 
research and initiate discussions on improvements necessary for successful completion of future 
projects in this field. 
The data availability is one of the major issues in the migration research. This problem is 
even more emphasized in the context of ethnic cleansing. Conflicts are usually associated with large 
destruction of physical capital, dissolution of institutions and other negative consequences that have 
impact on the availability of the data. For obvious reasons, it is generally impossible to conduct a 
census or any type of household survey during the war. Bosnia-Herzegovina for example did not 
conduct census in the last 20 years. Moreover, administrative data are usually collected only 
partially and they are usually not reliable at all. Quite often the data stored in these countries were 
destroyed during a conflict. In many cases, conflicts are associated with dissolutions of entire states. 
It makes comparison of the country level data before and after the war impossible.  
Data on the pre-war situation of migrants, important for studies of determinants of 
migration, is generally lacking in all countries, as surveys conducted after the war did not ask 
respondents such questions, whereas the economic situation of most of them has changed 
significantly as a result of war. The household level data used for the study on the impact of ethnic 
cleansing on the brain drain from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war did not contain the 
information about household‘s absolute and relative income immediately before the war. This did 
not allow precise estimation of the impact of these two factors, but qualitative proxy variables were 
used. Availability of such a data would considerably improve the quality of the estimation of such 
models. 
The cross-country analysis conducted in this thesis emphasizes additional data limitation, 
the one of comparability of the data across countries. The EU Commission has passed a new 
regulation on migration statistics for its member states in 2008, but the data is not yet harmonized 
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between all the member states. Differences in the data between countries from different continents 
are even more significant.    
The data on the impact of remittances on educational expenditures did not contain 
information about the sender of remittances. Such information would improve the quality of the 
research, as it would allow controlling for additional factors influencing educational attainment, 
such as absence of parent and his support to the family while absent.  
 
6.4.3. Directions for further analysis of the topic 
This thesis is the first work on the impact of ethnic cleansing on the economic development 
of a country affected. For that reason, it is expected to motivate further research on the related 
topics, in several directions. The theoretical model is the first attempt to incorporate specific 
features of ethnic cleansing into the models of migration. This research should be the first step in 
future works on this topic that will produce even more developed theoretical models. Moreover, the 
model presented in this thesis can serve as a motivation and direction for further work on adjusting 
this model in order to better match the characteristics of natural disasters induced and development 
projects induced migration. This way, specific models for different types of migration would be 
developed. These models, by capturing the specific characteristics of each type of migration, should 
have better predictive power compared to simple application of voluntary migration model into the 
context of forced migration. Then, separate empirical studies of the impact of such migration on the 
stock of human capita for each type of migration could be conducted, in a similar manner as it was 
done in this thesis. This way empirical evidence would be provided for better estimation of the 
overall costs of events such as natural disasters and some development projects. 
Theoretical discussion of the channels of brain gain has emphasized the role of return 
migration for the formation of human capital in the country. However, empirical analysis of this 
channel was beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, investigating the impact of this channel 
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is a natural direction for further research that arises from this thesis. By including results from that 
research, we could get even clearer picture of the possible net effect of ethnic cleansing on the stock 
of human capital in the country. 
The thesis has provided sufficient arguments for justification of separate analysis of 
different migration topics in the context of ethnic cleansing, as findings from voluntary migration 
research are not always applicable in the case of forced migration. This should induce further 
research of forced migration. For instance, it would be interesting to analyse the impact of 
remittances receipts on the supply of labour in countries which experiences war, as their post-war 
situation is usually characterized by increased social transfers, such as transfers to war veterans, 
widows of killed soldiers and civilian victims of war. As remittances and social transfers usually go 
together, it is interesting to see the relationship between the two, measuring the extent of the 
―crowding out‖ effect.  
The impact of forced migration on other topics of economic development in the country is 
another possible direction for research. Possible topics include, but are not limited to, the impact of 
migration and remittances on poverty and inequality, impact on the quality of institutions, impact of 
diaspora on the international trade and FDI and impact of remittances on the development of 
financial institutions. There is significant number of studies done in the context of voluntary 
migration for all the topics mentioned, but it would be worth investigating these effects in the 
context of forced migration as well. The empirical evidence from this thesis, which reveals the 
difference in the effects of ethnic cleansing on human capital stock between countries experiencing 
voluntary and those experiencing forced migration could serve as a motivation for such studies.
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Appendix 3.1. Questionnaires used for semi-structured interviews 
 
A. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH IDPS 
 
1. Basic information about the interviewee: 
a. Name: _________________________________________________________ 
b. Gender:  M  F 
c. Age: ___________________________________________________________ 
d. Nationality: _____________________________________________________ 
e. Place of birth: ___________________________________________________ 
f. Current place of living: ____________________________________________ 
g. Employed?: _____________________________________________________ 
h. Your family? Living with you: ___________. Living abroad: ______________ 
i.  Education: _____________________________________________________ 
j. Where last diploma has been obtained: ________________________________ 
 
2. Reasons for displacement: _______________________________________________ 
3. Conditions under which it happened: _______________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Property lost due to displacement: _________________________________________ 
5. Pattern of displacement (sites changed): _____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Reasons for choosing that place of displacement: _____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Process of assimilation/return (personal experience): ___________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you plan to return? ___________ When? _________________________________ 
For which reasons? _____________________________________________________ 
 
9. Any other issue you would like to raise? ____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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B. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH REFUGEES 
 
1. Basic information about the interviewee: 
a. Name: _________________________________________________________ 
b. Gender:  M  F 
c. Age: ___________________________________________________________ 
d. Nationality: _____________________________________________________ 
e. Education: ______________________________________________________ 
f. When last diploma has been obtained: ________________________________ 
g. Place of birth (name and type): ______________________________________ 
h. Current place of living: ____________________________________________ 
i. Your family? Living with you: ______________________________________ 
Living in Bosnia: _________________________________________________ 
2. Reasons for displacement: _______________________________________________ 
3. Conditions under which it happened: _______________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4. Assistance received from humanitarian agencies or government during displacement:  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Property lost due to displacement: _________________________________________ 
6. Pattern of displacement (sites changed): _____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Reasons for choosing first place of displacement: _____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Reasons for choosing final place of refuge abroad (if different from first): _________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Process of repatriation/getting asylum status (personal experience): ______________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Aid received from BiH government: _______________________________________ 
 
11. Do you remit money back to Bosnia? How much? _____. To whom? _____________ 
12. In what are your remittances spent in Bosnia? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Do you plan to return? When? ________ For which reasons? ___________________ 
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C. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH RETURN IDPS 
 
1. Basic information about the interviewee: 
a. Name: _________________________________________________________ 
b. Gender:  M  F 
c. Age: ___________________________________________________________ 
d. Nationality: _____________________________________________________ 
e. Education: ______________________________________________________ 
f. Where last diploma has been obtained: ________________________________ 
g. Place of birth: ___________________________________________________ 
h. Current place of living: ____________________________________________ 
i. Current job: _____________________________________________________ 
j. Your family? Living with you: ___________. Living abroad: ______________ 
2. Reasons for displacement: _______________________________________________ 
3. Conditions under which it happened: _______________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Property lost due to displacement: _________________________________________ 
5. Pattern of displacement (sites changed): _____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Reasons for choosing that place of displacement: _____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Process of assimilation/return (personal experience): ___________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. When you returned? _____________ Where? ________________________________ 
For which reasons? _____________________________________________________ 
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D. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH RETURNEES 
 
1. Basic information about the interviewee: 
a. Name: _________________________________________________________ 
b. Gender:  M  F 
c. Age: ___________________________________________________________ 
d. Nationality: _____________________________________________________ 
e. Place of birth: ___________________________________________________ 
f. Current place of living: ____________________________________________ 
g. Employed?: _____________________________________________________ 
h. Your family? Living with you: ___________. Living abroad: ______________ 
i.  Education: _____________________________________________________ 
j. Where last diploma has been obtained: ________________________________ 
 
2. Reasons for displacement: _______________________________________________ 
3. Conditions under which it happened: _______________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4. Assistance received from humanitarian agencies or government during displacement: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Property lost due to displacement: _________________________________________ 
6. Pattern of displacement (sites changed): _____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Reasons for choosing first place of displacement: _____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Reasons for choosing first place of refuge abroad (if different from first): __________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Process of repatriation/getting asylum status (personal experience): ______________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. When you returned? _____________ Where? ________________________________  
For which reasons? _____________________________________________________ 
 
11. Aid received from BiH government upon return: ______________________________ 
 
12. Do you remit (bring) money back to Bosnia? How much? ______. 
13. In what you spent than money? _________________________________ 
14. Any other issues you would like to raise? ____________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
__________________ 
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Appendix 3.2. Questionnaire used for the survey of refugees – addition to the LSMS. 
 
1. Gender:    M   F 
2. Age: __________________________________ 
3. Household size: _________________________ 
4. Ethnic origin: ___________________________ 
5. What is your highest diploma obtained? 
NO DIPLOMA 
..........................................1 
PRIMARY SCHOOL DIPLOMA 
...............2 
SECONDARY SCHOOL 
DIPLOMA..........3 
COLLEGE ...........................................4 
UNIVERSITY ...............................5 
MASTERS DEGREE ...................6 
DOCTORS DIPLOMA .................7 
 
6. Where did you obtain that diploma (BiH or ...)? 
_______________________________________ 
7.  
8. When did you get it? a) Before 1992  b) After 1992 
 
8. In which place and municipality were you born? _____________________________ 
 
9. Type of that place is: 
VILLAGE ..........1   TOWN .........2   SUBURB ...3 
 
10. In which place and municipality were you living immediately before the war (April 
1992)? _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Type of that place is: 
VILLAGE ..........1   TOWN .........2   SUBURB ...3 
 
12. The first place of displacement during the war was? a) Within BiH b) Out of BiH 
13. What was you reason of first migration? 
WAR ...................................................1 
PROPERTY OCCUPIED ....................2 
PROPERTY DESTROYED ................3 
SECURITY .........................................4 
WORSENED LIVING CONDITIONS...5 
FAMIL REASONS ............6 
JOB ..................................7 
HEALTH ...........................8 
OTHER REASON ............9
  
14. Where did you emigrate the first time out of BiH? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. When did you emigrate the first time out of BiH? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Type of that place is: 
VILLAGE ..........1   TOWN .........2   SUBURB ...3 
 
 
17. What was you reason of first migration out of BiH? 
 
WAR ...................................................1 
PROPERTY OCCUPIED ....................2 
PROPERTY DESTROYED ................3 
SECURITY .........................................4 
WORSENED LIVING CONDITIONS...5 
FAMIL REASONS ............6 
JOB ..................................7 
HEALTH ...........................8 
OTHER REASON ............ 
 
18. You left BiH? a) Arranged individually  b) Humanitarian convoy  c) 
Other: __________ 
 
19. In that place (or country), did you already have family and/or relatives who helped you 
during/after displacament to that country?  YES  NO 
 
  
Thank you! 
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Appendix 4.1. List of municipalities from the LSMS dataset and their distinction into 
different types (urban, mixed or rural) 
 
No. Municipality Type 
1 Novi Grad Sarajevo Urban 
2 Centar Sarajevo Urban 
3 Novo Sarajevo Urban 
4 Zenica Urban 
5 Tuzla Urban 
6 East Ilidza Urban 
7 Banja Luka Urban 
8 Vogosca Mixed 
9 Travnik Mixed 
10 Visoko Mixed 
11 Breza Mixed 
12 Cajnice Mixed 
13 Novi Grad Mixed 
14 Prijedor Mixed 
15 Modrica Mixed 
16 Visegrad Mixed 
17 Zavidovici Rural 
18 Gradacac Rural 
19 Posušje Rural 
20 Kakanj Rural 
21 Grude Rural 
22 Knezevo Rural 
23 Samac Rural 
24 Zvornik Rural 
25 Srbac Rural 
Source: LSMS BiH Basic Information Document 
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Appendix 4.2. Detailed results of micro-level model estimation and post-estimation 
 
 
a. Regression results 
 
y Coef. Std. Err. 
Odds 
Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| 
fhh 0.879024 0.149337 2.408547 0.359686 5.89 0.000 
age -0.04167 0.006762 0.9591829 0.006486 -6.16 0.000 
edu 2.073751 0.53746 7.954605 4.275285 3.86 0.000 
urb 1.502566 0.25114 4.493204 1.128422 5.98 0.000 
fe 1.702725 0.287919 5.488884 1.580352 5.91 0.000 
me -1.57941 0.154367 0.2060977 0.031815 -10.23 0.000 
eduurb -0.52862 0.57201 0.5894199 0.337154 -0.92 0.355 
edufe 0.492463 1.005422 1.636342 1.645214 0.49 0.624 
urbfe 0.181815 0.360993 1.199392 0.432972 0.5 0.615 
eduurbfe 0.051889 1.074155 1.053258 1.131362 0.05 0.961 
_cons -0.75861 0.336295     -2.26 0.024 
Number of 
observations 
     
1575 
Pseudo R
2
 
     
0.3425 
 
 
b. Results of diagnostic tests 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
Likelihood ratio (chi2) 680.34 0.000 
Pearson‘s goodness of fit test 
(chi2) 
703.71 0.2481 
   
Correctly classified  79.87 
Sensitivity  62.11 
Specificity  88.43 
 
 
Test for normality of the Pearson’s residual 
0
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Appendix 4.3 Detailed results of the fixed effects estimation of the macro model 
 
a. OLS model 
erh1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
gdpc -0.22462 0.157204 -1.43 0.155 
gini 0.086134 0.129054 0.67 0.505 
pop -0.02068 0.008143 -2.54 0.012 
wardv 1.696409 2.58698 0.66 0.513 
t2 1.655909 2.40543 0.69 0.492 
_cons 14.26031 6.253512 2.28 0.024 
Number of obs. 
   
217 
R2 
   
0.0596 
Adj R2 
   
0.0373 
Root MSE 
   
17.284 
 
 
b. Fixed effects model 
erh Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. t P>|t| 
gdpc -0.00356 0.002077 -1.72 0.089 
gini -0.00117 0.000867 -1.35 0.178 
pop 0.000108 9.74E-05 1.11 0.27 
wardv 0.039488 0.017218 2.29 0.024 
t2 0.002655 0.009619 0.28 0.783 
_cons 0.219938 0.03339 6.59 0 
     sigma_u 0.189724       
sigma_e 0.04511       
rho 0.946492 
   
     No. of obs. 
   
217 
No.of groups 
   
117 
R2 (within) 
   
0.1050 
R2 (between) 
   
0.0001 
R2 (overall) 
   
0.0021 
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c. Random effects model 
erh1 Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. z P>|z| 
gdpc -0.30069 0.100945 -2.98 0.003 
gini -0.0651 0.080234 -0.81 0.417 
pop -0.02034 0.006395 -3.18 0.001 
wardv 3.542526 1.593774 2.22 0.026 
t2 0.491892 0.750733 0.66 0.512 
_cons 21.79268 3.697037 5.89 0 
          
sigma_u 17.82271       
sigma_e 4.510998       
rho 0.939795       
     No. of obs. 
   
217 
No.of groups 
   
117 
R2 (within) 
   
0.0910 
R2 (between) 
   
0.0408 
R2 (overall) 
   
0.0503 
 
d. Results of diagnostic tests 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
OLS F test (5, 211) 2.67 0.0229 
FE F test (5, 116) 4.26  
RE F test (5, 211) 22.64 0.0004 
Hausman test 62.260 0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects 
 
58.50 0.0000 
Modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression 
model 
5.6e+34 0.0000 
Test for significance of fixed 
effects 
25.88 0.0000 
Test for normality of 
residuals 
49.68 0.0000 
Test for serial correlation in 
residuals 
117.72 0.0000 
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Leverage-versus-squared-residual plot 
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Appendix 5.1. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the Beine et al. (2006) model 
 
 
a) Regression results, default standard errors 
 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.23687 0.035646 -6.65 0 
lnp90 0.048104 0.020326 2.37 0.02 
densm -0.06315 0.143395 -0.44 0.66 
ssad -0.37504 0.083529 -4.49 0 
latd 0.028072 0.056625 0.5 0.621 
_cons -0.09232 0.075693 -1.22 0.225 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.4153 
Root MSE 
   
0.25392 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 9.19 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity (chi2) 
34.81 0.000 
White's test for 
heteroskedasticity (chi2) 
31.32 0.0183 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
2.65 0.0520 
Mean VIF 1.41  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 dens90 Ssad latd 
lnha90 1         
lnp90 -0.3184 1       
dens90 0.1076 0.2097 1     
ssad 0.7918 -0.0614 0.3214 1   
latd -0.0317 0.3389 0.3954 0.2848 1 
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Appendix 5.2. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the model with one conflict 
dummy variable (cdv90) 
 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.24765 0.036902 -6.71 0 
lnp90 0.050376 0.019749 2.55 0.012 
densm -0.06495 0.131029 -0.5 0.621 
ssad -0.39331 0.083581 -4.71 0 
latd 0.028843 0.063979 0.45 0.653 
cdv90 -0.10832 0.049378 -2.19 0.03 
_cons -0.07409 0.073657 -1.01 0.317 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.4407 
Root MSE 
   
0.24942 
 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 8.05 0.0000 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
5.46 0.0015 
Mean VIF 1.36  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 dens90 ssad latd cdv90 
lnha90 1           
lnp90 -0.3166 1         
dens90 0.1003 0.2476 1       
ssad 0.7912 -0.0652 0.3316 1     
latd -0.0281 0.2768 0.3493 0.2435 1   
cdv90 0.5263 -0.1506 0.025 0.4959 0.1427 1 
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Appendix 5.3. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the model with two conflict 
dummy variables (cdv90 and cdv 00) 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.25745 0.038794 -6.64 0 
lnp90 0.049815 0.019489 2.56 0.012 
densm -0.05236 0.127808 -0.41 0.683 
ssad -0.39603 0.083448 -4.75 0 
latd 0.032303 0.065932 0.49 0.625 
cdv90 -0.08312 0.046419 -1.79 0.076 
cdv00 -0.06599 0.050854 -1.3 0.197 
_cons -0.09253 0.07491 -1.24 0.219 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.4477 
Root MSE 
   
0.24894 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 7.13 0.0000 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
6.59 0.0004 
Mean VIF 1.42  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 dens90 ssad latd cdv90 cdv00 
lnha90 1             
lnp90 -0.3053 1           
dens90 0.078 0.267 1         
ssad 0.8008 -0.0474 0.3072 1       
latd -0.0293 0.2672 0.3361 0.2148 1     
cdv90 0.426 -0.0978 -0.0385 0.3815 0.083 1   
cdv00 0.4059 -0.1084 0.0818 0.3424 0.0785 -0.0614 1 
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Appendix 5.4. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the model with interaction term 
between p90 and CDV90 
 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.24781 0.037072 -6.68 0 
lnp90 0.054409 0.025112 2.17 0.032 
densm -0.06933 0.132887 -0.52 0.603 
ssad -0.39185 0.083878 -4.67 0 
latd 0.028851 0.063616 0.45 0.651 
cdv90 -0.14888 0.093323 -1.6 0.113 
lnp90cdv90 -0.01755 0.034682 -0.51 0.614 
_cons -0.0649 0.07738 -0.84 0.403 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.4416 
Root MSE 
   
0.25029 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 6.96 0.0000 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
6.12 0.0007 
Mean VIF 2.46  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 densm ssad latd cdv90 lnp90cdv90 
lnha90 1             
lnp90 -0.3 1           
densm 0.1034 0.2219 1         
ssad 0.779 -0.0031 0.3298 1       
latd -0.0382 0.3364 0.336 0.2567 1     
cdv90 0.4057 -0.6783 -0.1394 0.1885 -0.1924 1   
lnp90cdv90 0.1506 -0.7239 -0.1819 -0.0869 -0.3101 0.8482 1 
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Appendix 5.5. Detailed results of the instrumental variable approach (2SLS) to 
estimation of the Model 2  
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>|z| 
lnp90 0.157225 0.038455 4.09 0 
lnha90 -0.25367 0.034238 -7.41 0 
densm -0.08856 0.199154 -0.44 0.657 
ssad -0.35481 0.080611 -4.4 0 
latd 0.094356 0.083286 1.13 0.257 
cdv90 -0.12666 0.05404 -2.34 0.019 
_cons 0.149434 0.107118 1.4 0.163 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.2384 
Root MSE 
   
0.28258 
First stage R2 
   
0.2687 
First stage 
adjusted R2 
   
0.2238 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
Wald test (6) 58.77 0.0000 
Test for endogeneity of 
variables (F) 
12.429 0.0006 
Test for endogeneity of 
variables (chi2) 
10.1075 0.0015 
Test for overidentification of 
instruments 
2.22521 0.1358 
Test for weak identification 
of the instruments 
28.0881 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
Appendix 5.6. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the Model 2 with the poverty 
dummy (gnid) and interaction term between conflict and poverty (cdvgnid) included 
 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.28344 0.04021 -7.05 0 
lnp90 0.054553 0.019727 2.77 0.007 
densm -0.01659 0.127471 -0.13 0.897 
ssad -0.34905 0.0762 -4.58 0 
latd 0.051835 0.067425 0.77 0.444 
cdv90 -0.03918 0.072072 -0.54 0.588 
gnid 0.225727 0.088048 2.56 0.012 
cdvgnid -0.07101 0.093692 -0.76 0.45 
_cons -0.3705 0.133266 -2.78 0.006 
     No. of obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.4882 
Root MSE 
   
0.24068 
 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 6.78 0.0000 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
4.98 0.0028 
Mean VIF 2.17  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 dens90 ssad latd cdv90 gnid cdvgnid 
lnha90 1               
lnp90 -0.3686 1             
dens90 0.1144 0.3479 1           
ssad 0.6921 -0.0102 0.4041 1         
latd -0.0919 0.321 0.3339 0.1964 1       
cdv90 -0.0025 -0.0362 -0.2291 0.0703 0.0576 1     
gnid -0.5302 0.2255 -0.1349 -0.2035 0.061 0.6972 1   
cdvgnid 0.2534 -0.0411 0.2388 0.2432 -0.0113 -0.756 -0.7445 1 
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Appendix 5.7. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the Model 2 with the variable on 
the ratio between migration of highly and low educated included 
 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnha90 -0.22224 0.040406 -5.5 0 
lnp90 0.040854 0.022763 1.79 0.076 
densm -0.05308 0.115263 -0.46 0.646 
ssad -0.34109 0.077117 -4.42 0 
latd 0.040468 0.063233 0.64 0.524 
cdv90 -0.08041 0.045402 -1.77 0.079 
ps90pu90 0.001151 0.001336 0.86 0.391 
_cons -0.07526 0.084631 -0.89 0.376 
     No. of obs 
   
111 
R2 
   
0.4151 
Root MSE 
   
0.22337 
 
 
 
 b)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 6.51 0.0000 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
3.02 0.0334 
Mean VIF 1.55  
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients 
 
e(V) lnha90 lnp90 dens90 ssad latd cdv90 ps90pu90 
lnha90 1             
lnp90 -0.2659 1           
dens90 0.0775 0.3198 1         
ssad 0.6158 0.1529 0.3698 1       
latd -0.107 0.4027 0.4033 0.2787 1     
cdv90 0.2806 0.023 0.0076 0.3432 0.1474 1   
ps90pu90 0.4297 -0.2851 0.0282 -0.1057 -0.1429 -0.1821 1 
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Appendix 5.8. Detailed results of the OLS estimation of the Model 2 without variable on 
the initial stock of human capital 
 
 
a) Regression results, robust standard errors 
 
dlnha Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lnp90 0.045431 0.02305 1.97 0.051 
densm -0.11576 0.186182 -0.62 0.535 
ssad -0.0304 0.068653 -0.44 0.659 
latd -0.11529 0.066419 -1.74 0.085 
cdv90 -0.03671 0.058099 -0.63 0.529 
_cons 0.571676 0.086261 6.63 0 
     No. of 
obs 
   
122 
R2 
   
0.0549 
Root 
MSE 
   
0.32282 
 
 
 b) Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
F test (5, 116) 1.59 0.1697 
Ramsey RESET test for 
omitted variables 
2.22 0.0899 
Mean VIF 1.08  
 
 
 
c) Matrix of correlation coefficients  
 
e(V) lnp90 dens90 ssad latd cdv90 
lnp90 1         
dens90 0.1884 1       
ssad 0.1001 0.3958 1     
latd 0.0932 0.4907 0.5565 1   
cdv90 -0.148 0.0645 0.3348 0.3162 1 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.9. Summary table of empirical studies on the relationship between remittances and education 
 
 
 
Author Technique  Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Special features Year Data 
source 
Country Results 
Acosta, 
2006 
2SLS, IV 
probit, 
Propensity 
score 
matching 
whether a school-
age child is 
currently enrolled 
in school 
household demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, geographic 
location of the 
household, child age and gender, 
number of children and adults in the 
household, and 
whether the child in question is the 
oldest child in the household 
Controls for 
gender of children 
1998 National 
hosehol
d (HH) 
survey 
Mexico Positive impact for 
children 11-14, but 
for girls 15'17 only 
Amuendo-
Dorantes 
and Pozo, 
2006 
probit 
model with 
endogenous 
regressors 
via 
maximum 
likelihood 
likelihood that a 
school-aged child 
has an age-
appropriate 
education 
dummy variable denoting whether the 
household receives  remittances, 
information on children‘s gender and 
family affiliation, age and birth order, 
educational attainment of the female 
spouse, urban dummy 
Controls for 
gender of children 
2000 HH 
survey 
(LAMP 
project) 
Dominic
an 
Republi
c 
girls seem to benefit 
significantly more 
than boys from the 
receipt of remittances 
by the household 
Borraz, 
2005 
OLS Highest Grade 
Completed, 
Remittance receipt dummy, amount of 
remittances and the remittances 
income share , Absent headed 
household, Non-Spanish language, 
Marital Status of the Mother, Number 
of children under 6, Indicator variable 
if the child is the oldest, Indicator 
variable for more than 6 children in the 
household, Indicator variables for 
electricity, sanitation and water 
services, Indicator variable for home 
ownership, Indicator variable if the 
household participates in a social 
program 
Instrumental 
variable analysis: 
historical 
migration rate and 
geographic 
distance as 
instrumental 
variables, the 
interaction of the 
instrumental 
variables with 
mother and 
households 
characteristics,  
2000 Census 
(10% 
sample) 
Mexico positive and small 
and statistically 
significant 
effect of remittances 
on schooling only for 
children living in 
cities with fewer 
than 2,500 
inhabitants with 
mothers who have a 
very low level of 
education 
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Author Technique  Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Special features Year Data 
source 
Country Results 
Cox-
Edwards 
and Ureta, 
2003 
Cox 
proportional 
hazard 
model 
The hazard of 
leaving school 
Remittances, household income, 
parental education, … 
They investigate 
the impact of 
remittances on the 
probability to 
drop out of school 
  1997 
National 
Househ
old 
Survey 
of 
14,286 
individu
als aged 
6 to 24. 
El 
Salvado
r 
Negative impact on 
hazard of drop-out, 
significant only in 
rural areas. 
Cuecuecha, 
2008 
Lee (1983) 
two-stage 
method: 1. 
multinomial 
logit, 2. 
average 
treatment 
effect 
1. Probability that 
a household will 
be of a particular 
type (if has 
migrant and if 
receives 
remittances); 2. 
standardized 
education years 
1. Age, Sex, Family Income, Migration 
rate in municipality, remittances a % 
of municipality income, capital/labour 
ratio in municipality; 2. Age, Sex, 
Family Income … (different 
estimation for each type of household) 
Disentangling 
migration and 
remittances 
effects 
2000 Census 
(9,1% 
sample) 
Mexico combined effect of 
migration and 
remittances is found 
to be positive for 
males and non-
negative for females 
Hanson 
and 
Woodruff, 
2003 
Instrumental 
Variable 
equation 
Number of school 
grades completed 
Individual, household and regional 
characteristics 
They use number 
of school grades 
completed   
2000 Census 
(10% 
sample) 
Mexico Positive impact of 
migration on 
accumulated 
schooling 
McKenzie 
and 
Rapoport, 
2006 
IV-
Censored 
Ordered 
Probit 
years of schooling 
attained by child 
being in a migrant household, age, age 
squared, Mother's Years of Schooling, 
Proportion of rural households owning 
land in 1910, Male School Attendance 
in 1930, Gini of Income in 1960, 
Number of Schools per 1000 
population in 1930, Gini of Male 
Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds 
in 1960, Average Male Years of 
Schooling in 1960 for 15-20 year olds 
Migration 
instrument 
through historical 
migration rates 
from a 
municipality 
(since 1920) 
1997 National 
Survey 
of 
Demogr
aphic 
Dynami
cs 
Mexico Negative impact on 
(the probability of 
boys completing 
junior high school, 
and of boys and girls 
completing high 
school) educational 
attainment; the effect 
is strongest among 
16-18 year olds. 
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Author Technique  Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Special features Year Data 
source 
Country Results 
Leon et al., 
2007 
IV probit, 
first-stage 
equation as 
tobit 
probability of 
being enrolled in 
school 
absolute amount of remittances 
received per capita during the last 
year, children age and gender, head of 
household's gender and marital status, 
education level of highest educated 
males and females, household size and 
living conditions 
Migration 
instrument 
through historical 
migration rates 
2006 HH 
survey 
Ecuador Remittances increase 
school enrolment, in 
particular for 
girls and in rural 
areas 
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Appendix 5.10. Questionnaire used in the author's survey 
 
 A1. 
Relationship 
with the HH: 
1. HH 
2. Parent 
3. Spouse 
4. Child 
5. Grandchild 
6. Brother/Sister 
9. Other 
A2.Ge
nder 
1. 1. 
Fem
ale 
2. 2. Male 
 
A3. 
Age 
A4. Ethnic 
background: 
1. Bosnian 
2. Serb 
3. Croat 
9. Other 
(specify) 
 
A5. Marital 
status  
1. Married  
2.  Single   
3.  Widowed 
4. Divorced 
5. Civic 
partnership  
9. Other 
A6. Place 
of birth 
A7. Did you 
live abroad 
before? 
1. Yes 
2. No (>>> 
A11) 
 
A8. Year of 
emigration 
 
A9. Reason for emigration: 
1. Study 
2. Earn better wages 
3. Bad household 
economic situation 
4. Dissatisfaction with the 
political situation 
5. Family reunion 
9. Other 
A10. 
Migration 
duration 
(from 8. 
Till today, 
in years) 
A11. Level of 
education 
1. Less than 
primary 
2. Primary 
3. Secondary 
4. College 
5. Faculty 
6. Master degree 
7. PhD 
A12. Do 
you still 
attend the 
school? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
(>>> A18) 
 
1 1            
2             
3             
4             
5             
 
 A13. 
Which? 
1. Primary 
2. 
Secondary  
3. College 
4. Faculty 
5. MSc 
6. PhD 
 
A14. 
Distan
ce to 
school 
(km)? 
 
A15. Do 
you use 
public 
transport
? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
A16. 
Reasons for 
continuing 
with higher 
education 
1. Better 
chance of 
getting a 
job 
2. Pressure 
by 
parents 
3. Friends 
did the 
same 
9. Other 
A17. 
Success at 
school? 
(>>>A20) 
1. Distin
ction 
2. Merit 
3. Pass   
A18. At what 
age did you 
start the 
latest 
education 
level (if 
higher than 
primary)? 
A19. Reason for drop 
out? 
1. Completed studies  
2. Too expensive 
3. No interest/ 
unsuccessful 
4. Agricultural work 
5. Family business 
6. School too far 
7. Poor facilities 
8. Own illness 
9. Family illness-death 
10. Emigration 
11. Safety  
12. Got married 
A20. 
Do you 
work? 
1. Yes 
(>>> 
A22) 
2. No 
A21. Why not? 
(>>> B1) 
1. Cannot find 
job 
2. Unable to 
work 
3. Housework 
4. Pensioner 
5. Student 
6. Enough 
household 
income 
9. Other   
A22. Type of 
job? 
1. Part-time 
2. Full-time 
3. Seasonal job 
9. Other 
 A23. What is 
your job 
position? 
1. Business 
owner 
2. Manager 
3. Administrator 
4. Employee 
9. Other (specify) 
A24. Type 
of 
organizatio
n? 
1. Private 
2. Public 
3. Internati
onal 
 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
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B. TO BE ANSWERED BY HOUSEHOLD HEAD ONLY 
 
B1. What is your profession? 
1. Teacher (at any level of education) 
2. Economist 
3. Lawyer 
4. Engineer 
5. Doctor 
6. Farmer 
7. Salaried worker 
8. Worker qualified for production 
9. Other (specify)____________ 
 
B2. Which is your housing status? 
1. Private apartment/ house  
2. Rented apartment/ house  
3. Apartment/ house without paying (rent) 
4. Temporary sheltering (collective sheltering, etc.) 
 
B3. If you own a business, what type is it? 
1. Trade 
2. Manufacturing 
3. Agriculture 
9.  Other 
  
 
 
 
B4. How many people are employed in the business? ______ 
 
B5. Out of them, how many family members?  ___________ 
 
B6. Do you own any other household assets? 
1. Land 
2. Shares 
3. Savings 
9. Other, specify 
   
B7. Can you please tell whether you expect the household 
situation in the NEXT YEAR to be: 
1. Much better 
2. Better 
3. The same 
4. Worse 
5. Much worse 
6. Do not know 
 
B8. The sources of household average monthly income (Euro) and the household average monthly expenditure structure (Euro) 
 
 Household Income Sources    Household expenditure  
No. Description Euro  No Description Euro 
 Salary    Food  
 Agriculture    Non-food expenditure (clothing, toiletries, 
entertainment, health care, education) 
 
 Sales from the open market    Rent  
 Daily jobs of household members    Public utilities (water, waste)  
 Pension (Kosova/ Bosnia)    Electricity/ Gas  
 Social assistance 
Rent 
   Telephone  
 Sales of household real estates    Taxes  
 Foods, services or clothes from abroad    Savings  
 Remittances     Children‘s education  
 Other      
 Total      
 
 
C. TO BE ANSWERED ONLY BY HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE FAMILY MEMBERS ABROAD 
 
C1. Whom do you have abroad? 
1. Household member 
2. Relatives 
 
C2. Does your family receive remittances (money) 
from family members living abroad? 
1. Yes  
2. No [Survey ends here] 
 
C3. C3. How often does your family receive remittances from 
family members living abroad? 
1. A few times a month 
2. At least once a month 
3. ___ times a year 
4. Once a year  
 
C4. Through which channel they are sent: 
1. Bank (Wetern Union, etc.) 
2. Personally from sender 
3. Informal channels (bus, couriers, etc.) 
 
C5. Are remittances sent for any specific purpose? 
1. Yes 
2. No (>>> C7) 
 
 
 
 
C6. What is this purpose? 
1. Business investment 
2. Education of children 
3. Medical needs 
4. Buy land 
5. House reconstruction/purchase  
 
C7. Except remittances do you receive in-kind remittances 
(Automobiles, Cloths, Electric devices, medicine?) 
1. Yes 
2. No (>>> C9) 
 
C8. What is the approximate value of in-kind remittances per 
YEAR (please specify)? ___________________ 
 
 
C9. Your opinion on the future trend of remittances: 
1. Will increase 
2. Will decrease 
3. Will remain constant
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Appendix 5.11. Detailed results of the two-stage Heckman’s estimation of the LBiH data 
 
a) First stage estimation 
 
cenr Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
hincpc 0.035927 0.016545 2.17 0.03 
hrem -0.02208 0.082004 -0.27 0.788 
hfh 0.155896 0.333253 0.47 0.64 
cage -0.28567 0.01748 -16.34 0 
hurb 0.257502 0.089875 2.87 0.004 
hhsize -0.03513 0.052193 -0.67 0.501 
hhemp -1.41549 0.15865 -8.92 0 
hnoc -0.10843 0.068167 -1.59 0.112 
hnoc624 -0.12383 0.090956 -1.36 0.173 
cmale -0.29599 0.086148 -3.44 0.001 
q1 -0.94508 0.15176 -6.23 0 
q2 -0.78185 0.145566 -5.37 0 
q3 -0.58622 0.137616 -4.26 0 
q4 -0.46208 0.137621 -3.36 0.001 
q1rem1 0.158825 0.244437 0.65 0.516 
q2rem1 1.776704 0.801119 2.22 0.027 
q3rem1 0.065272 0.177075 0.37 0.712 
q4rem1 0.014786 0.196483 0.08 0.94 
_cons 6.653412 0.42081 15.81 0 
     No. of obs. 
   
1293 
Pseudo R2 
   
0.3545 
 
 
b) Second stage estimation 
 
heepc Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
hincpc -10.8252 51.62109 -0.21 0.834 
hrem 0.962551 179.0882 0.01 0.996 
hurb -775.657 280.7952 -2.76 0.006 
hhemp 2486.19 1099.3 2.26 0.024 
hhsize 919.8665 176.9841 5.2 0 
cage 492.6324 98.77155 4.99 0 
hnoc -937.61 223.93 -4.19 0 
_cons -8109.14 1720.383 -4.71 0 
Mills lambda -2308.1253 658.8752      -3.50    0.000     
Rho -0.69787 
   Sigma 3307.85 
   
     No. of obs. 
   
1293 
Censored 
obs. 
   
668 
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 c)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
First stage Likelihood ratio 
test 
634.99 0.0000 
Second stage Wald test 
(chi2) 
60.23 0.0000 
Pearson‘s goodness-of-fit test 1777.13 0.0000 
Percentage of correctly 
classified 
78.89%  
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Appendix 5.12. Detailed results of the two-stage Heckman’s estimation of the ASO data 
 
 
a) First stage estimation 
 
cenr Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
hincpc 1.953385 0.65292 2.99 0.003 
hrem 167.3851 424.8139 0.39 0.694 
hfh 1.168744 0.627474 1.86 0.063 
cage -0.3818 0.069391 -5.5 0 
hurb 0.250284 0.291075 0.86 0.39 
hhsize 0.246555 0.260881 0.95 0.345 
hhemp 0.235277 0.423765 0.56 0.579 
hpa 0.565078 0.514994 1.1 0.273 
hnoc 0.0912 0.379168 0.24 0.81 
hnoc624 -0.47891 0.431723 -1.11 0.267 
cmale 0.221209 0.26386 0.84 0.402 
_cons 6.449686 1.52051 4.24 0 
     No. of obs. 
   
160 
Pseudo R2 
   
0.2944 
 
 
 
b) Second stage estimation 
 
heepc Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
hincpc 42.13132 97.14312 0.43 0.665 
hrem -54.2223 61.67354 -0.88 0.379 
hurb 14.94108 49.61757 0.3 0.763 
hhemp -37.3863 68.06397 -0.55 0.583 
hhsize -10.35 54.2403 -0.19 0.849 
hfin1b -9.24267 42.18346 -0.22 0.827 
hfin1w -7.77368 46.75209 -0.17 0.868 
cage 39.0963 21.34435 1.83 0.067 
hnoc 32.66536 58.03642 0.56 0.574 
_cons -540.55 322.5235 -1.68 0.094 
     Mills lambda -149.3886 82.80224 -1.80 0.071 
Rho -1.195862 
   Sigma 124.92127 
   
     No. of obs. 
   
160 
Censored 
obs. 
   
69 
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 c)  Results of diagnostic tests 
 
 
Test Computed value of test 
statistics 
Probability 
First stage Likelihood ratio 
test 
64.56 0.0000 
Second stage Wald test 
(chi2) 
18.41 0.0307 
Pearson‘s goodness-of-fit test 141.00 0.5551 
Percentage of correctly 
classified 
75.00%  
 
 
 
 
